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ABSTRACT 
A. Vahit Bicak Ph. D 
The University of Nottingham 1995 
A Comparative Study of the Problem of the Admissibility of 
Improperly Obtained Evidence 
This thesis provides a comparative analysis of the rules governing the admissibility 
of improperly obtained evidence in Turkish and English law. The main objective is to 
consider how the issue in question can most appropriately be solved under the different 
legal circumstances of both countries and how the positive law of each country may 
benefit from each other on this particular problem. The first chapter, which is the 
introduction, deals with a brief account of the object, the reasons, the goal and the 
method of the study. In order to place the issue in the context of the entire criminal 
justice systems, general comparison of Turkish and English law is subjected to 
examination in the second chapter. In Chapter Three, attention is turned to the theoretical 
issues associated with the problem of admissibility of improperly obtained evidence. 
Obviously, if the nature and justification of possible solutions to the issue is understood 
correctly, the treatment of improperly obtained evidence may be better evaluated. It is 
argued that the most appropriate solution is to adopt a flexible approach, which requires 
a certain amount of discretion to be given to the judiciary, rather than a rigid one. The 
legitimacy of the verdict principle is argued to be the most appropriate principle to guide 
the exercise of the discretion. In Chapter Four, attention is drawn to the fact that, with 
regard to the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence 
, 
Turkey and England have 
shared similar legislative activities in recent years: the 1992 Amendment to the Code of 
Criminal Procedure for Turkey and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for 
England. Both legislations include two operative provisions; one is a general provision 
for any evidence and one a specific provision for confessions. As far as the general 
provisions are concerned, evidence may be excluded in England if it has an adverse effect 
upon the fairness of the proceedings whereas in Turkey, where evidence is secured 
"hukuka aykiri olarak" (unlawfully), it required to be suppressed. The amount of evidence 
excluded under these provisions may or may not be similar depending on how the 
Turkish and English judges interpret, the key words. Although the exact determination of 
what circumstances must exist before the fairness of the proceedings is adversely affected 
or before the lawfulness of a procedure is breached will undoubtedly require decades of 
jurisprudence, it is submitted that they may be interpreted quite similarly. In Chapter Six, 
it is argued there is a clear consensus between Turkish and English laws as to the fact 
that involuntariness is the decisive criterion for the admissibility of improperly obtained 
confessions. In the Next Chapter, the possibility of whether the same amount of evidence 
will be excluded by the operation of "unlawfulness" and "unfairness" concepts has been 
tested in the context of evidence obtained in breach of safeguards designed to protect the 
suspect. In the final chapter, it is concluded that there are, to a great extent, similarities 
in the ways the two countries deal with the issue, despite the fact that they do not share 
the same legal tradition. This finding contributes to deepen the belief in the existence of 
a unitary sense of criminal justice. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Object of the Study and Terminology 
In order to secure the necessary evidence for bringing offenders to justice, law 
enforcement officers are given powers to invade the freedom of individuals in the 
process of criminal investigations. These powers are not, however, unlimited; in 
modern democratic states the relationship between the public authorities and 
individuals is governed not by the arbitrary exercise of power but by power exercised 
within the constraints of law. Having said that, the law enforcement officers do not 
always exercise their powers within the permissible limits. Where law enforcement 
officers exceed their powers, evidence may be obtained to incriminate the suspect in 
trial. The question of whether such evidence can be taken as a basis for judgement 
is the main concern of this thesis. 
Since the phrase "admissibility of improperly obtained evidence" is generally 
used to state the issue described in the above paragraph, there will be many references 
to it in the following pages. Thus, one may ask, what exactly does it mean? Before 
going further, analyzing what is meant by this expression may be useful. 
Although the term "evidence" has been defined in different ways by authors 
who have made important contributions to the field of the law of evidence, it may 
simply, for the purpose of this thesis, be defined as the means of proof to establish the 
1 
existence or non-existence of a fact in the eyes of the trier of fact. Ideally, anything 
can be given as evidence; the interest of justice would be better served if no restriction 
is placed upon what evidence may be submitted to the court. Each departure from that 
ideal has to be separately justified. ' The hearsay rule, for example, may be justified, 
as is often claimed, by the unfairness of arguing from statements that are not subject 
to cross-examination. Such an ideal, however, does not conflict with the classification 
of evidence, which is often made as oral, real and documentary. The problem in 
question may arise with regard to all these types of evidence. The concern of this 
thesis is not any particular type of evidence but evidence generally, although special 
emphasis is placed on confession evidence. 
"Admissibility" refers to whether a piece of evidence is permitted to be given, 
or to be taken into account and must be distinguished from the weight or the 
credibility of evidence. 
The adverb "improperly", on the other hand, is broad enough to include not 
only any departures from a declared standard or procedure for the conduct of criminal 
investigation with or without bad faith on the part of the investigator, but also any 
irregularities which, although not technically illegal, are incompatible with moral 
standards, such as deception in obtaining or exercising any power. To illustrate, an 
undercover policewoman acting as a girlfriend of a suspect or a policeman acting as 
a priest in order to obtain a confession from someone may be regarded as behaving 
improperly irrespective of whether the conduct is technically illegal. Impropriety can 
Bentham, 1827, Rationale of Evidence, vol V, p. 1. 
2 
be committed by a third party as well as by law enforcement officers, with or without 
the contribution of the police. This study is mainly concerned with the latter. 
The word "obtained" clearly suggests a connection between the improper 
conduct and the discovery of evidence. The question, however, may arise as to the 
nature of this relationship; whether it is a causal link or mere occurrence of 
impropriety in the course of gathering evidence. The approach adopted in this thesis 
is to interpret the word "obtained" as requiring not a causal relationship in the 
technical manner exemplified by Hart and Honoree. It is not necessary to establish 
that the evidence would not have been obtained but for the violation of procedural 
rules. Rather the fact that the improper conduct has contributed in some way to the 
availability of challenged evidence would be sufficient. Such an approach still is 
likely to rule out evidence which is obtained shortly before an impropriety, and 
evidence which is remotely associated with the impropriety. 
2. Reasons for the Study 
In order to justify this study three initial questions should be answered 
convincingly. These are, firstly, the choice of the admissibility of improperly obtained 
evidence as a research topic, secondly, the preference of comparative method, and 
finally, the selection of English and Turkish legal systems. These points will be 
clarified respectively. 
2 Hart and Honore, 1984, Causation in Law, second ed., Oxford. 
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Although to choose a topic for academic purposes represent to a certain extent 
personal interest and preference, a feeling of dissatisfaction with the solution to the 
issue of admissibility of improperly obtained evidence in Turkish law is the main 
cause of pursuing this subject. Also the fact that it is a topic of considerable practical 
significance rather than of merely an academic significance has contributed. 
The problem of admissibility of improperly obtained evidence is not unique to 
Turkey. It is a worldwide problem. Different legal systems may offer different 
solutions. This makes it interesting to compare the different solutions and approaches 
to this issue in different countries. Seeing how different legal systems approach the 
same problem enables one to learn much about the problem itself. Furthermore, a 
comparative study of the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence can provide 
a much richer range of standpoints than a study dedicated to a single nation's law. 
Therefore, making comparisons helps one to understand one's own system's solution 
by seeing it from a different perspective. At the same time, it helps gaining a 
perspective in critically assessing one's own national system's solution. Indeed, 
comparing a system with another one may demonstrate that certain elements which are 
assumed to be essential for the system to work are the product of history rather than 
necessity. It also enables one to be aware of gaps and weakness of one's own 
system's solutions which familiarity has led him to ignore. Similarly, the way an 
English solution to the issue in question is described by an outsider who has a 
different perspective may assist English readers to recognise special characteristics of 
which they have not been conscious. 
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The better comprehension of solutions in one's own legal system, which 
comparative study facilitates, enables constructive changes in the solutions. 
Knowledge of gaps and weaknesses highlights places where alterations are most 
needed; acceptance that certain components in the existing solutions are not 
unchangeable broadens the range of possibilities; and awareness of the different 
settlements in other legal systems provides suggestions of solutions. This is not to 
suggest that legal systems should borrow solutions from each other; legal rules 
transplanted from one social body to another are likely to be rejected. Comparison of 
the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence, however, is likely to facilitate 
practical improvements of laws by opening one's mind to the need for change, the 
possibility for change, and the range of potential solutions. 
There are an enormous number of legal systems in the world; each independent 
state has its own system of law and often two or more legal systems may exist side 
by side within the same state. In spite of traditional recognition of the fact that civil 
and common law systems, to which Turkish and English systems are supposed to 
belong respectively, are based on very different views on the nature of justice, a civil 
lawyer generally looks for comparison at the common law, and vice versa. Such a 
tradition, however, does not answer the question of particularly why Turkish and 
English law have been chosen to compare among the other countries which belong to 
civil or common law. 
Apart from being Turkish and conducting this study in England, there are other 
reasons for choosing to compare Turkish and English solutions to the issue of 
5 
admissibility of improperly obtained evidence in the first place. These two countries 
have been chosen as a result of the fact that in recent years both have been 
reformulating their approaches to the issue of improperly obtained evidence: in the last 
decade Parliaments of both countries enacted statutes regulating this problem. 
Another reason for the choice of Turkish and English law may be stated as the 
lack of academic work comparing these countries' law. Comparison in England is 
most commonly made with other Commonwealth systems and sometimes with civil 
law systems such as German and French. Turkish law is a largely forgotten topic 
among comparative lawyers in the English speaking world. There has been up to now 
no direct or actual comparison of Turkish and English legal systems;, let alone the 
solution to the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence. The choice of 
Turkish and English legal systems is also contributed to. by other factors which include 
the researcher's past experience, accessibility of source materials, and language. 
Before proceeding further, two technical points should be mentioned. First, 
this thesis is concerned only with English and Welsh law, hereafter for simplicity 
"English law", and thus excludes two other legal jurisdictions in the United Kingdom; 
Scottish and Northern Irish laws. Secondly, there may be occasional reference to the 
law elsewhere, but no other national systems apart from Turkish and English are 
discussed in detail. 
3 The only exception is a passage from the edition of 1744 edition of "the Life of Honourable Sir Dudley North", by Roger, which was taken and published in 7 Illinois Law Review 162 (1912) as "Turkish and English Law Compared". 
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3. The Goal of the Study 
The principal aim of the study is not only to ascertain how far, and in what 
respects, Turkish and English solutions to the issue of admissibility of improperly 
obtained evidence resemble to or differ from each other, but also to seek to explain 
similarities and diversities. It is hoped that some contribution will be made in this 
way to the issue of how the issue in question can most appropriately be solved under 
the different social, economic, and legal circumstances of both countries. 
It is not intended to demonstrate the superiority of English or Turkish law, 
rather consideration will be given how the positive laws of each country may benefit 
from each other on this particular problem. Nevertheless, if, after careful 
consideration, it seems appropriate to suggest that Turkey should adopt a solution 
which exists in English law, or the other way around, this will not be avoided simply 
on the grounds that it is a foreign solution. However, existence of differences between 
the two countries' economic, social, and legal structures should not be ignored. 
4. The Method of the Study 
Having clarified the reasons and goals for undertaking this study, the next step 
is that of methodology. As has been stated above this study is not only aimed to 
identify divergencies and resemblances between Turkish and English solution to the 
issue in question, but also to explain such similarities and differences. To this end, 
three distinct stages may be noted in the subsequent pages during the process of 
7 
comparison. The first is the description of legal rules , concepts, and institutions of 
Turkish and English laws related to the issue in question. The second stage is the 
identification of differences and resemblances. The third stage is accounting for the 
resemblances and dissimilarities. " This is, however, not to state that these stages will 
invariably be distinguished from each other or they will always considered in this 
particular order; in the process of presenting arguments they may be mixed with each 
other. 
In order to place the issue in question in the context of the entire criminal 
justice systems, general comparison of Turkish and English law will the subject of the 
second chapter. Also the fact that there is to my knowledge not even one article 
comparing the Turkish and English criminal justice systems neither in Turkish nor in 
English necessitates this general examination. Such a discussion, however, is intended 
only to give an appropriate general basis for an assessment of the issue of admissibility 
of improperly obtained evidence; the aim is not to write an authoritative general 
comparison. 
Following the general comparison of Turkish and English law, attention will 
be turned, in chapter three, to the theoretical issues associated with the problem of 
admissibility of improperly obtained evidence. Obviously, if the nature and 
justification of possible solutions to the admissibility issue is understood correctly, the 
4 These three phases are said to be essential for any legal study which claims to 
be comparative law. See generally, Kamba, 1974, "Comparative Law: A Theoretical 
Framework", 23 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 485-517. 
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treatments of improperly obtained evidence in Turkish and English law may be better 
evaluated. As pointed out by Zuckerman, 
"no rule of law except the most technical one can be 
found workable without an understanding of its 
rationale... When the purpose of a rule is unclear then 
its scope is going to be unclear too". 5 
General examination of approaches and rules of Turkish and English law to the 
admissibility of improperly obtained evidence is conducted in Chapter Four, where 
attention is drawn to the key words "unlawfulness" and "unfairness" in Turkish and 
English law respectively and to the separate regulation of admissibility of improperly 
obtained evidence in both jurisdictions. Chapter Five analyses the concepts of 
"unlawfulness" and "unfairness" in order to reveal the extent of similarity between 
these notions. 
Chapter Six is allocated to analyzing the admissibility of improperly obtained 
confessions which have been subjected to special regulations both in Turkish and 
English law. This chapter will proceed by challenging the assumption that the 
involuntariness test has been abandoned in England. Then I will move to analyzing 
whether the same amount of evidence will be excluded in both jurisdictions where 
evidence obtained in breach of the rules safeguarding the suspect at the police station. 
Finally, in Chapter Eight, concluding remarks are made. 
S 1982 All England Law Reports Annual Review 126,136. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
GENERAL COMPARISON OF TURKISH AND ENGLISH LAW 
1. Introduction 
Since it is proposed to produce a comparative study, and England and Turkey 
belong to diffeient legal systems, the criminal justice systems of these countries, as a 
preliminary step, will be examined briefly in this chapter. An attempt will be made 
to determine what general system differences and similarities do in fact exist between 
the procedures of Turkish legal process as compared to those of England. 
2. Apples and Oranges 
The existence of two main criminal justice systems in Western society is 
generally accepted by specialists in the field of comparative law: common law and 
civil law systems. ' Although important variations can be observed from country to 
country, grouping legal systems on the basis of similarities and relationship may help 
to arrange the vast number of legal systems in a comprehensible order. Factors to be 
taken into consideration in deciding whether a particular legal system belongs to one 
group or the other are said to be historical developments, distinctive modes of legal 
thinking, certain legal institutions, sources of law and the ideology. ' The Turkish 
' David and Brierley, 1968, Major Legal Systems in the World Today. 
2 For the detailed examination of these factors see Zweigert, 1987, Introduction to 
Comparative Law 63-75. 
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legal system is supposed to belong to the civil law while the English legal system is 
stated to be within the common law system. 
As far as the system of criminal justice is concerned two models of criminal 
procedure are said to be exist, those are the accusatorial (adversary, Anglo-American) 
and inquisitorial (the Continental European) model. Both models as they exist today 
seem to be the consequence of historical growth rather than the result of any scientific 
inquiry into what the best way for the administration of criminal justice is. The term 
"inquisitorial" has been used in a more popular sense to describe a system of coercive 
judicial interrogation' However, under the modern inquisitorial system the trial 
judge's function has become entirely separated from the investigatory and the 
accusatory functions. The accusatorial system, on the other hand, has been 
characterised by the limitation of the state's responsibility for the administration of 
justice only to providing means by which a person affected by the offence, or his 
relatives or friends, might secure sufficient remedy without resorting to private 
revenge. However, under modem accusatorial system criminal conduct is considered 
as an offence against the state itself as well as a private injury to one of its members. 
It is generally accepted that common law countries 
-including England- adopt 
an accusatorial procedure, while in civil law systems 
-including Turkey- an 
inquisitorial procedure is in force. However it should be kept in mind that it is hardly 
3 See generally Esmein, 1914, A History of Continental Criminal Procedure 8. 
See generally Stephen, 1883, A History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. 1 (of 3), p. 428; and Howard, 1931, Criminal Justice in England, Chapter VII. 
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possible to find any legal system which adheres strictly to all the features of the classic 
models. In a sense it can be said that the evolution of criminal procedure in the last 
two centuries in the civil law world has been away from the extremes and abuses of 
the inquisitorial system, and that the evolution in the common law world during the 
same period has been away from the abuses and excesses of the accusatorial system. 
The two systems, in other words, are converging from different directions towards 
roughly equivalent mixed systems of criminal procedure. For example, by setting up 
the Crown Prosecution Service, England has taken a major step away from its former 
tradition of leaving most prosecutions to be handled by the police. ' Similarly, the 
increased rights to be given to the defence in Turkish law6 may be regarded as a 
move towards a more accusatorial system. 
Moreover, the current adversarial and current inquisitorial system of criminal 
procedures are both committed to a search for truth'. The issue of which of these 
s Under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 the Crown Prosecution Service is 
decided into thirty-one areas throughout England and Wales, each of which is headed 
by a Chief Crown Prosecutor accountable to the Director of Prosecutions. See for 
detail, Bennion, 1986, "The Crown Prosecution Service", Crim. L. R. 3-15. 
6 See Chapter Seven. 
' As early as 1863 Sir J. F. Stephen stated that ".. a criminal trial is a public 
inquiry, having for its object the discovery of truth. " A General View of the Criminal 
Law of England, 167 (1863) cited by Herrmann, 1982, "The Philosophy of Criminal 
Justice and the Administration of Criminal Justice", 53 Revue International De Droit 
Penal 841, at 846. The Supreme Court of United States in Tehan v. United States (382 
US 406) also expressed the view that "the basic purpose of a trial (criminal 
proceeding) is the determination of the truth". However, some commentators claim that 
discovery of the truth is not an objective of adversarial criminal proceeding. See 
Coutts, 1966, The Accused. A comparative study 14; Pollock and Maitland, 1952, 
History of English Law, vol. 2, p. 671 (2nd ed. ); For criticism of the latter approach 
see Herrmann, ibid, p. 846. 
12 
systems is the most effective means of determining truth is beyond our concern. It is, 
however, necessary to identify the fundamental differences between these systems. On 
the whole, distribution of control over the criminal procedure among the participants- 
the trier of fact and law, the defence, the prosecutor- appears to be the most obvious 
factor that can be used to define differences between these two systems. In adversarial 
systems, the process of truth discovery is said to be structured as a dispute between 
the parties 
-prosecution and defence- in a position of theoretical equality before a 
criminal court. This system entrusts much control over the process to disputed parties 
and relatively little control to the decision makers- the judge and jury. In the purest 
version of this system a judge should be a "mere umpire, to pass upon objections and 
hold counsel to the rules of the game, and the parties should fight out their own game 
in their own way without judicial interference"'. As far as current adversarial systems 
are concerned interference by the judge without an objection from one side against the 
conduct of the other is recognised in some circumstances?, but this does not change 
the adversarial nature of the system; that is maintenance of a high degree of control 
over the criminal process by the disputed parties. 
'Pound, 1906, "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice", 40 American Law Review 738. 
9 For example PACE 76(3). In practice English judges are said to interrupt more 
often then the judges in other adversarial jurisdictions; Evans observed that "it has 
become the rule, now, for the English judge to come down into the arena and to take 
part to quite a surprising degree. The licence that he thinks entitles him to do this is 
to be found in the principle that all evidence should be relevant, and it is now the rule 
rather than the exception to hear judges breaking in on counsel with the question, 
'what is the relevance of that' Evans, 1983, Advocacy at the Bar: A Beginner's 
Guide 91. 
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The idea that control over criminal procedure ought to be largely in the hands 
of the disputants is likely to provoke considerable scepticism in Turkish law as well 
as other inquisitorial systems. The allocation of so much power to self-interested 
parties runs contrary to inquisitorial legal thinking. In inquisitorial systems, there is 
an official inquiry into the facts, rather than a dispute about them, conducted by the 
judge in order to reveal the truth. In this system, control over the criminal procedure 
is almost totally yielded to the judge; he takes the initiative in conducting the case, 
rather than the parties; he leads the investigations, examines the evidence and 
interrogates the witnesses. The rules of procedure provide the defence and prosecutor 
with an opportunity to explain and support their claims before the court. 
The natural consequences of such a distribution of control, in the adversarial 
model, is that each party to the dispute is usually represented by an openly biased 
advocate who is charged with seeking to establish the validity of his party's claims. 
In an inquisitorial system, however, either there are no attorneys at all or they are 
allocated for the primary responsibility of assisting the judge in reaching his decision. 
More importantly, differences in the distribution of control over criminal proceeding 
lead to different attitudes to guilty pleas. 1° Accusatorial systems accept them, 
whereas inquisitorial systems object to them on the ground that the guilty plea would 
interfere with the idea of a judicial search for truth; the court determines guilt, not the 
defendant or the prosecution. The defendant, although in fact innocent, may plead 
guilty for a variety of reasons such as protecting the real criminal, establishing a false 
alibi or undergoing punishment for pathological reasons. Moreover, since guilt is a 
'o For the operation of the guily plea see below note 87 and accompanying text. 
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legal rather than a factual problem, the defendant may plead guilty without knowing 
whether he is actually guilty. 
As far as the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence is concerned, 
exclusion can be justified more easily in the pure version of the adversarial system 
than that of the inquisitorial system. If proceedings are essentially a contest between 
parties for the settlement of a dispute, it is readily acceptable that a party, even if he 
is right on the merits of the dispute, forfeits on a technicality where he disobeys the 
rules regulating the contest. 
Although these two systems differ with regard to the division of roles between 
parties, a great deal of natural criminal justice requirements are recognised under the 
law or established practice in every legal system. For example, in neither of these 
systems is the search for truth free from limitations which derive from a number of 
considerations such as civil liberties, or the need to ensure the integrity of procedures 
or the legitimacy of the verdict" Furthermore, the need for conducting various 
activities before trial is recognised by all societies regardless of the specific system 
of criminal justice. In today's society when a crime is committed the executive 
authorities- generally the police- are expected to detect and investigate the offence and 
" Indeed, search for the truth is not the only commitment of the criminal 
proceedings. It also serves another function which is to protect individual rights and 
personal liberties of the accused (some aspects of human rights). These two functions 
are always, said to be in conflict with each other. By noticing the divergencies of 
emphasis upon these competing values in different legal systems, Packer identified two 
value systems, the crime control and due process model. see Packer, 1968, The Limits 
of the Criminal Sanction 149. 
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charge the wrongdoing, using all the techniques at their disposal. These activities are 
neutrally described as "pretrial" procedure by criminal justice systems. 12 
3. The Systems Described and Compared 
Since a system of criminal justice is strongly related to its underlying historical, 
social, political environment, and the structure of authority on which it is based, the 
balance between the interest of crime control and the protection of the suspect in 
English and Turkish law may be expected to be different. It is not the aim of this 
study to suggest that either English or Turkish law is perfect, rather its goal is to 
assess whether the legislator and the courts in both countries might learn from each 
others' law and practice. By doing so it is acknowledged that some elements of 
English criminal procedure would not probably be acceptable to most Turkish lawyers, 
just as some aspects of Turkish criminal procedure would not be favourably received 
by most English lawyers. 
What is contained in the pages immediately following is simply a narrative 
outline of Turkish and English law which is thought to provide important background 
material for a proper understanding of the subject covered in subsequent chapters. The 
framework of the discussion is based on the Turkish system which is unfamiliar to the 
reader. 
12 The origin of the modem pre-trial process may be found in the establishment 
of a centralised police force in the middle of nineteenth century. Establishment of 
police forces has lead to the radical change in the nature of the criminal process and 
the pre-trial stage has became very important in the determination of the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. 
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3.1. The Origin of the Laws 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, 
the Republic of Turkey was created in 1923 by Kemal Ataturk. New Turkey was 
based on the predominantly Turkish portion of the empire. The primary policy of the 
Republic was to modernise the Turkish social life through westernisation. " In order 
to reach this goal, changing the existing law was considered as a useful device. As 
a result, the Islamic legal practices which had been valid for centuries were abolished; 
in their place Western laws14 were adopted. It is important to note, firstly, that the 
impulse for the reform came not from below but from above; it was not that ordinary 
Turks, generally speaking, were dissatisfied with the law to which they were subject 
and began to demand its reform, but that these reforms were imposed on them by the 
new regime. Secondly, these codifications were not based on any scholarly research 
work. Although it is obvious that knowledge of the experience of other nations is 
invaluable when attempts are made to reform existing systems, adoption of another 
country's law without adjustments for local circumstances may be regarded as 
" Almost every aspect of social life was reformed. The collection of these 
reforms are called Kemalism which remains quite important even today. See for 
detail, Shaw, 1976, History of Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey; For the 
relationship between Kemalism and modernization theory see Hansen, 1989, "Are we 
Doing Theory Ethnocentrically? A Comparison of Modernization Thcory and 
Kemalism", 5 Journal of Developing Societies 175-187. 
14 In different branch of the law different countries' Codes are adopted. For 
example, The Swiss Civil Code of 1907 (ZGB) was accepted as the new Turkish Civil 
Code of 1926. French Commercial law was introduced as the new Turkish Commercial 
Law. The Turkish Penal Code of 1926 is based entirely on the Italian Penal Code of 1889, so on. These varieties lead to conflict of laws within the one legal systems. It is not entirely clear precisely why the Turkish legislature opted for different countries' Codes instead of only one. 
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"courting disaster"". Indeed, the new Turkish law has encountered great difficulty 
in winning gradual acceptance among the population at large16. 
As far as criminal procedure law is concerned, Turkey replaced its traditional 
criminal procedure law by the German law. The present Turkish Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1929 (Ceza Muhakemeleri Usulu Kanunu, hereafter CMUK)17 is a 
translation of the German Code of Criminal Procedure of 1877. It naturally reflects 
the concern and values of Europe in the nineteenth century. However, the enactment 
of the 1961 Constitution's marks a point of radical departure from nineteenth century 
totalitarian state concepts. Although the provisions of the Constitution dealing with 
human rights are phrased in abstract and general terms, and do not explicitly protect 
individual rights in the criminal process, the classification of certain rights as 
constitutional in nature and deserving of state protection and enforcement as a matter 
of priority introduced a new dimension to Turkish criminal justice. Over the years the 
Turkish Criminal Procedure Code (CMUK) has also been subjected to several (twenty 
three) amendments in order to conform with a changing Constitution which adopts 
's This phrase has been suggested by Professor Birch. 
16 Starr and Pool, 1974, " The Impact of Legal Revolution in Rural Turkey", 8 
Law and Society Review 533. 
" The Code of Criminal Procedure, Statute no: 1412 of 4 April 1929. An English 
translation of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMUK) was published in 5 The 
American Series of Foreign Penal Codes (translated by Y. Altug), Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1966; It should be noted that this translation of the Code is sometimes out 
of date. 
18 Although the 1961 Turkish Constitution was abolished after the military coup 
in 1980, the present 1982 Constitution also, in more restricted terms, recognises the 
same values. 
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liberal values and to meet the requirements of modem life. Especially in 1992 the 
Turkish legislature took a major step towards liberalising criminal proceeding by 
passing an Act'9 which significantly improves the position of the defendant and 
regulates the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence. 
The English legal system, on the other hand, cannot be treated as a replica of 
any foreign law. Over centuries a number of legal doctrines may have been absorbed 
from abroad, but the criminal procedure system (or English system as a whole) is the 
outcome of English legal history and political experience. Rather than importing, 
England, in actual fact, exported its legal system to the large part of Canada, the 
United States, to Australia, New Zealand, India, and elsewhere. Thus, the English 
legal system is more consciously tied to its past than the Turkish system, and more 
loyal to the customary form of legal thinking despite social and economic change. 
Moreover, at least in the last three centuries England never had an political disturbance 
like those have occurred several times in Turkey, where one of the principal effects 
of the military coups20 was to overthrow the constitutional system and replace it by 
a totally new constitutional system. As a result of stability England experienced 
unbroken developments of its law for a considerable time21; the current law is the 
19 Ceza Muhakemeleri Usulu Kanunu ile Devlet Guvenlik Mahkemelerinin Kurulus 
ve Yargilama Usulleri hakkinda kanunun Bazi Maddelerinde Degisiklik Yapilmasina 
Dair Kanun (hereafter shortly the 1992 Amendment), Statute number: 3842, The 
Official Gazette no: 21422 of 1 Dec. 1992. 
20 After the adoption of a multi party system in 1950 Turkey experienced three 
military coup in 1960,1971, and 1980. 
21 It is said that English law has a continuous history which can be traced back to 
the sixth century. See, Phillips and Hudson, 1988, First Book of English Law 4. 
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result of gradual development over hundreds of years. It is, therefore, no exaggeration 
to maintain that the law of England is the product of the history of England; 
inevitably, great antiquity and continuity are both inescapable and fundamental 
characteristics of it. In the phraseology of Eddey "the student of English law is the 
student of English history because the former can only be fully intelligible in the light 
of the latter"n. 
3.2. Sources of the Laws 
The law of Turkey is predominantly written law in the form of constitution, 
statutes', decrees having force of statutes (Kanun Hukmunde Kararname)24, decrees 
(Tuzuk)2S, regulations (yonetmelik)26. Other sources are customary and case law. 
22 Eddey, 1967, An Introduction to Public Law 2. 
Z' These lay down principles, but leave to the judge the problem of interpreting 
these principles to concrete facts. Statutes written down in a systematic fashion to 
regulate specific areas of law are given the title of "Codes". The power to enact, 
amend and repeal statutes belongs in principle to the Turkish Parliament. Once they 
pass from the Parliament they become law only with the sanction of the head of the 
state, who promulgates them. In cases where the president considers that promulgation 
is unsuitable, he may return the statute back for further consideration to the Parliament 
(Article 89 of the Constitution). 
24 According to Article 91 of the Constitution the Parliament may empower the 
Counsel of Ministers to issue decrees having force of statutes. In the empowering 
statutes the Parliament should restrict the Cabinet by defining the purpose, scope, 
principles and operative period of them. They are required to be submitted to the 
Parliament on the day of their publication in the Official Gazette. 
25 These are issued by the Counsel of Ministers in order to govern the mode of 
implementation of a particular statute or to designate matters ordered by a particular 
statute. Thus, they can only be issued where a clear reference in the statute to the 
promulgation of them exists. As far as hierarchy of the norms is concerned, regulations 
come after statutes and include more concrete and specific norms than statutes. 
Regulations should be examined by the Counsel of State (Danistay) to check whether 
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Precedent also plays a small part in legal practice. In most cases it appears 
meaningless to begin proceedings if higher courts have consistently dismissed similar 
cases. However no judge is bound by any superior court's ruling on a similar case, 
with the exception of Ictihadi Birlestirme Karari2' 
. 
Whereas in England, in spite of 
the fact that most new law is originated by legislation, an equally vital source of the 
law is the decisions of the judges in cases in the various courts. The judge in each 
case is expressing what the law is in the circumstances of the particular case and so, 
in effect, making new law. As far as early English law is concerned, the process of 
continuous decision by the judges has resulted in each branch of the law being built 
up on the basis of decided cases. The principle of precedent is taken much more 
seriously in England than Turkey28; decisions of the House of Lords bind all lower 
courts and the decisions of the Court of Appeal bind itself and courts below it. Acts 
of Parliament also contributed much, but there are important fields of law where even 
today legislation is of minor importance. Moreover, in those fields of law where 
legislation is relevant, the need for interpretation of words and phrases by the judges 
leads to their contribution to the development of the subject. There is no doubt about 
they conflict with existing statutes, and they should be signed by the President (Article 
115 of the Constitution). 
26 These are issued by the prime minister, ministries or administrative authorities 
in order to put into practice the principles laid down by statutes and regulations. The 
provisions of these should not be contrary to statutes and regulations, this is inspected 
by the Counsel of State (Article 124 of the Constitution). 
27 A decision of the general Board of the Supreme Court of Appeals made for the 
purpose of reconciliation of contradicting opinions on the same question expressed in 
the decisions of various panels, or expressed in different decisions of the same panel, 
of the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
28 As a natural consequence of this fact cases are extensively reported in England. 
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the fact that the role of the judge in contributing to the making of law is older in 
origin than the making of law by Parliament in both countries since England and 
Turkey had an established system of law long before they had a Parliament. 
The basic law in Turkey is the Constitution. All other regulations should 
conform with the Constitution. When the Turkish Armed Forces seized power, each 
time the generals insisted on a major revision of the constitutional system 29 The 
present 1982 Constitution is also constructed by the military junta and confirmed by 
the public on a referendum held in 1982. The current Constitution guarantees to all 
Turks a catalogue of basic rights going beyond the classic human rights. " Having 
said that, most of the basic rights can be restricted to safeguard the integrity of "the 
sacred Turkish State". " The restrictions, however, can only brought into effect in 
the form of statute and are themselves restricted by the requirements of democratic 
society32 
29 Harris, 1985, Turkey: Coping with Crisis; Birand, 1987, The Generals' Coup 
in Turkey. 
3o For example, it guarantees the right to environment which is deemed as one of 
the dimensions of the Third Generation of Human Rights. See Alston, 1983, "Third 
Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of 
International Human Rights Law", 29 Northerland International Law Review 309. 
31 This phrase is used in the preamble which is, according to Article 176, part of 
the text of the Constitution. Giving "sacred" character to the state may be criticised in 
that it gives the impression that the Constitution defends the power of the state against 
the individuals. 
32 Article 13 reads: 
"Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by 
statutes, in conformity with the letter and sprit of the 
Constitution, with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible 
integrity of the State with its territory and nation, and 
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The Constitution of 1982 also contains important procedural rules such as the 
guarantee of exclusive jurisdiction of the judiciary over decisions in criminal matters, 
the guarantee of independence of the judiciary, the prohibition of irregular courts, the 
right of the accused to be heard before the court, the prohibition of double jeopardy 
etc. It is implicit that the state is there for the people's sake and not vice versa, that 
is not to rule but to serve. Some basic rights may be restricted by statutes within 
narrow bounds. No statute is allowed to violate the basic requirements of democratic 
society. The basic rights are directly applicable law. The Parliament as lawmaker is 
just as strictly bound to the basic rights as the government, the courts, the 
administration, the police and the armed forces. 
As far as the English legal system is concerned, a written constitution does not 
exist. That means in practice that the English citizens lack the protection of any 
written catalogue of rights. The existence or non-existence of a catalogue of rights in 
any legal system, however, should not lead us to a conclusive presumption that the 
basic rights of citizens have been protected or denied. Writing down the rights 
national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, 
public order, general peace, the public interest, public 
morals and public health, and also for specific reasons 
set forth in the relevant articles of the Constitution. 
General and specific grounds for restrictions of 
fundamental rights and freedoms shall not conflict with 
the requirements of the democratic order of society, and 
shall not be imposed for any purpose other than those 
for which they are prescribed. The general grounds for 
restriction set forth in this article shall apply for all 
fundamental rights and freedoms". 
For the English translation of the Constitution see Dodd, 1990, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, p. 154-220 
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enjoined by citizens obviously does not necessarily mean to give them implementation, 
and vice versa. 
As signatories to the same international treaties, covenants, agreements and 
conventions Turkey and England already have clear obligations under international law 
to ensure that their domestic laws are compatible with these supra-national rules. Of 
these international legal norms the most significant is the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, hereafter ECHR", which 
was ratified by Turkey in 195434 and by England in 195131 
. 
By their accession to 
the ECHR, both jurisdictions committed themselves to the principle of international 
control of human rights. Indeed, Article 25 of the ECHR entitles citizens of signatory 
countries to file complaints, even against their own states, before the European 
Commission and the European Court if the state complained against has expressly 
recognized the right of individual petition. Turkey made a declaration under article 
25 of the European Convention on Human Rights recognising the competence of the 
Commission to receive applications from individuals alleging violations of their rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention in 198736 while it was recognized by 
33 It was signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 and entered into force on 3 
September 1953, European Treaty Series, No. 5. 
34 Insan haklari ve Ana Hurriyetleri Koruma Sozlesmesi ve Buna ek Protokolun 
tastiki Hakkinda Kanun (The Act Approving the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), Statute no 6366 of 
10.03.1954, Official Gazette of 19.3.1954; Dustur, vol. 35, p. 1567. 
 For a discussion of the Cabinet debate on whether to sign, see Lester, 1984, 
"Fundamental Rights: The United Kingdom Isolated? " Public Law 46. 
36 The Official Gazette no. 19438 of 21 April 1987. This declaration has been 
prolonged for a period of three years commencing on 29 January 1993; see, the decree 
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England much earlier in 196637. Both countries also accepted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights38, the European39 and the UN Conventions for the 
Prevention of Torture4'. These ratifications open up the Turkish and English legal 
systems to the impact of international standards of criminal justice. 
3.3. Judicial Control of Legislative Bodies 
The Constitutional Court of Turkey was introduced in 1961 as a guardian of 
basic law. It examines legislation as to its conformity with the Constitution. If it 
rules a statute unconstitutional that statute can no longer be applied. The court acts 
in matters only if called upon by certain bodies, such as the main opposition party, the 
President of Turkey, lower courts, etc. 
of the Turkish Council of Ministers, The Official Gazette no. 21481 of 30 Jan. 1993. 
For the detailed examination of Turkey's ratification of Article 25, see, Cameron, 
1988, "Turkey and Article 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights", 37 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 887-925. 
37 1 Human Rights Reports 65. This acceptance has been renewed for a period of 
five years commencing on 14 January 1991. 
38 It was adopted by the General Assembly of United Nations on 10 th of 
December 1948. It is non-binding, but morally and legally significant. For detailed 
assessment see, Alston, 1992, The United Nations and Human Rights. 
39 26 November 1987,126 European Treaty Series, in Force 1 February 1989. For 
the approval of Turkey see, The Official Gazette of 27 February 1988. For the 
approval of England see, United Kingdom Treaty Series 5 (1991) Cm. 1634. 
ao 10 December 1984, GA res 39/46, Doc. A/39/51, in force 26 June 1987. For the 
approval of Turkey see, The Official Gazette of 10 August 1988. For the approval of 
England see, United Kingdom Treaty Series 107 (1991) Cm. 1775. 
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As a natural consequence of not having a constitution, England does not have 
an institution to supervise the use of Parliamentary power to make law in accordance 
with the basic law. It is accepted that supreme power related to enacting any law and 
changing any previous law is vested in the Parliament and there is no limit in law to 
the lawmaking capacity of that institution. This clearly contrasts with, among others, 
the Turkish system which accepted that Constitutional Court does have the power to 
overrule legislation as being "unconstitutional". It may be argued that the inability of 
the courts to examine the legislative process in England may create significant 
difficulties in the effective protection of individual rights. 
3.4. The Present System of Criminal Procedures' 
The criminal procedure in both countries is divided into two fundamentally 
district parts: the preliminary (pre-trial stage) and final investigation (trial stage). The 
former is conducted by the prosecution in Turkey while it is dominated by the police 
in England. The latter is the responsibility of the court in both countries. These 
stages will be examined in some detail. 
3.4.1. The Preliminary Investigation 
The purpose of the preliminary investigation is to clarify whether there is 
enough evidence against the suspect to justify criminal proceedings. To start the 
4l Although there is an English translation of Turkish Code of Procedure, the literature available in English on Turkish criminal procedure is sparse. 
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preliminary investigation a simple suspicion that a crime has been committed is 
enough. The framework for conducting the pre-trial stage of criminal procedure is 
laid down by the Criminal Procedure Act (CMUK) in Turkey and by the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (hereafter PACE) in England. The provisions of both 
pieces of legislation are mainly concerned with police powers and suspects' rights in 
the course of police investigation. Procedural provisions are also contained in the 
Police Functions and Powers Act (PVSK)42 and the State Security Courts Act43 in 
Turkey. In England, on the other hand, more detailed regulations are needed in 
addition to PACE in order to ensure that the public and the police know exactly how 
an investigation ought to be conducted and what their respective rights and duties are. 
To this end, the PACE empowered the Home Secretary to issue, with the approval of 
the House of Parliament, Codes of Practice covering certain aspects of criminal 
investigation. 44 Regulation in the form of the Codes of Practice did not exist in 
English law before the PACE came into force, and thus the constitutional place of 
them as a source of law is open to dispute. Copies of the Codes are required to be 
kept at police station for consultation by police officers, detained persons and members 
42 Polis Vazife ve Selahiyet Kanunu (Police Functions and Powers Act), Statute 
No. 2559 of 4 July 1934, Official Gazette of 15 Temmuz 1934. 
a3 Statute no. 2845 of 16 June 1983, Official Gazette No. 18081 of 18 June 1983. 
as At present five Codes of Practice are in force, entitled as follows; Code A (Code 
of Practice for the Exercise of by Police Officers of Statutory Powers of Stop and 
Search), Code B (Code of Practice for the Searching of Premises by Police Officers 
and the Seizure of Property found by Police Officers on Persons or Premises), Code 
C (Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police 
Officers), Code D (Code of Practice for the Identification of Person by Police 
Officers) and Code E (Code of Practice on Tape Recording). The first edition of 
Codes A-D came into force on 1 January 1986. These were supplemented by Code E 
in 1988. A second, revised, edition of Codes A-D came into force on 1 April 1991. 
A third, revised edition, come into force on 10 April 1995. 
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of the public. Any breach of a provision of the Codes may lead to disciplinary 
proceedings against the wrongdoing police officer4S and exclusion of evidence 
obtained as a result of that breach, but breach itself is not a criminal offence or civil 
wrong46. 
3.4.1.1. Participants 
3.4.1.1.1. Public Authorities 
Public authorities in the pre-trial stage are the prosecutor, law enforcement 
officers (the police and the gendarmerie) and the justice of the peace in Turkey, while 
the police47 is the main body in England. 
3.4.1.1.1.1. The Prosecutor 
In Turkish legal theory the primary responsibility to conduct pre-trial (the 
preliminary investigation), either directly or through the law enforcement officers lies 
with the republic prosecutor. 48 Upon receipt of a complaint or any information 
indicating that a crime has been committed, he is required to initiate an investigation 
45 PACE 67(8). 
11 PACE 67(10) and (11). 
47 Some investigations are conducted by specialist bodies such as trading standards 
officers, customs and excise officers. 
48 CMUK 148. 
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to determine whether there are grounds for prosecution. "' All legally admitted 
methods of investigations can be initiated by him. The prosecution, like the courts, 
is assumed to be a judicial agencySO, it is, therefore, expected to serve truth and 
justice, and to direct all its activity towards this aim. As a natural consequences of 
this assumption the prosecution is not seen as a party opposing to the suspect. This 
means that the task of the prosecution is not only to gather evidence against the 
suspect but also to investigate circumstances favourable to him s' 
Furthermore, determination of the guilt or innocence of the suspect is not the 
duty of the prosecution. Rather, its task is to clarify in the preliminary proceedings 
the question of whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the demand that the 
suspect should answer the accusation in a public trial before the court. If sufficient 
evidence exists to justify suspicion for filling a formal accusation, the prosecution is 
required to file charges (mandatory prosecution). 52 Otherwise, he discontinues the 
49 CMUK 153/1. 
so The judge and the public prosecutor have equal privileges, status and salary. 
Interchange between the two branches is simple and not uncommon. By noticing the 
difference of mentality of a public prosecutor and of the judge, it is claimed that a 
man who has exclusively performed the task of prosecuting can hardly be expected to 
become an absolutely impartial judge. See, Mannheim, 1937, "Trial by Jury in Modem 
Continental Criminal Law", 53 The Law Quarterly Review 99, at 112; If this is a valid 
criticism, impartiality of English judges who acted as a defence counsel, or prosecutor, 
in their early carriers is also questionable. 
s' CMUK 153/2. 
12 CMUK 148. The 'Mandatory prosecution' requirement does not prevent the 
prosecution from exercising any discretion, because the prosecution inevitably exercise 
discretionary power by the manner in which they weight the evidence available or 
decide issues of substantive penal law which determine whether the case will be 
prosecuted or dismissed. 
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proceedings. The victim may appeal the decision not to prosecute, either to the 
prosecutor's superior or to the court. 
Law enforcement officials are required to report all the facts constituting a 
crime to the prosecutor as soon as they come to their attention. This enables the 
prosecutor to inspect whether the investigation is conducted within the boundaries of 
the law. By requiring this it is intended that the prosecutor acts as a guarantor of 
human rights. However, in practice most cases, particularly less serious ones, are 
handled by the prosecutor after law enforcement officials complete the investigation 
and give the file to him. Such a practice leads prosecutors to do little more than 
confirm what the police have already done. This practice derives from the facts that 
law enforcement officials learn about the crime first and that they are better trained 
than prosecutors to use the technology of factfinding, and that law enforcement 
officials often wish to avoid the formal procedures applicable to the investigation. It 
is obvious that such a practice would reduce the prosecutor's function to deciding only 
whether a formal charge against the suspect is to be filed. 
3.4.1.1.1.2. Sulh Hakimi 
Apart from the prosecutor the preliminary investigation stage involves a judge, 
(sulh hakimi) with the power to determine the legality of the prosecution's, or in 
urgent cases, of the law enforcement force's, demands where these interfere with the 
personal rights of the suspect. He is not an investigator and thus he can only act at 
the request of the prosecutor. One may ask how he can control the prosecutor 
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effectively if he acts only at the prosecutor's request. One of the basic principles of 
Turkish criminal law is the principle of legality which requires, inter alia, that 
prosecutors have no inherent power to take a position that modifies or nullifies the 
Code's requirements. The Code requires prosecutors and police to call on the sulh 
hakimi if an arrestS3 or search warrant34 is needed. Where there is "danger in delay" 
a prosecutor may issue a search warrant on his own authority. " The sulh hakimi's 
involvement derives from the constitutional requirement that civil rights and liberties 
of the citizen cannot be restricted without a decision of a judge. "' The function of 
the judge at this stage is mainly to guard and control the prosecutor and the police by 
determining the necessity of pre-trial custody, or of a search warrant or a medical 
examination of the suspect etc. 
Judicial control of pre-trial investigation is more theoretical than real. Albeit 
regarded as agents of the prosecutor, law enforcement officials inevitably tend to 
operate with a certain autonomy, and this is especially so in those cases where 
immediate action is called for. Requiring judicial authorization of arrests, 
interrogation, searches and seizures is not effective protection in practice because most 
accused persons cooperate with the law enforcement force not knowing that they do 
not have to. 
53 CMUK 106. 
sa CMUK 97. 
ss CMUK 97. 
56 Article 20 and 21 of the 1982 Constitution. 
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The sulh hakimi may, on occasion, conduct an interrogation of the accused, or 
may examine a witness, during the investigation stage. When he does so, he acts at 
the request of the prosecutor, because records of judicial interrogation and examination 
may often be read into evidence at trial, while statements to the police can ordinarily 
be proved only by the testimony of police officers. " 
3.4.1.1.1.3. Law Enforcement Officials 
The preliminary investigation, in theory, should either be directed or controlled 
by a state appointed prosecutor in Turkey. " It is, however, conducted in practice by 
the law enforcement officials 
-the police judiciare59- (the police and the gendarmerie) 
since the prosecutor lacks his own agent. Law enforcement officials have a dual 
function; to maintain law and order, and to investigate crime in order to enable a 
criminal proceeding to take place. As regards their latter function they work under the 
formal supervision of the republic prosecutor. 6° They are obliged to execute orders 
of the prosecutor concerning the legal procedures 6' Such orders are normally given 
in written form, but in emergency cases they may be delivered orally. 
 CMUK 247. 
S8 CMUK 148 specifies that the prosecutor is the master of investigation. 
S9 For the use of this phraseology see, Leigh and Zedner, 1992, A Report on the 
Administration of Criminal Justice in the Pre-Trial Phase in France and Germany, The 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, HMSO. 
60 CMUK 154 and 156. 
61 CMUK 154. 
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Law enforcement officials in Turkey are nationally organised into two separate 
bodies: the police and the gendarmerie. The police force are located in, and 
responsible for the provincial (vilayet) and the district (kaza) capitals. The police who 
investigate criminal complaints and prepare them for prosecution are called adli polls 
(judicial police) although they are members of the regular police forces and are not 
employed by the judicial department 62 The gendarmerie, on the other hand, is 
responsible for rural areas, especially for villages. The gendarmerie is a branch of the 
Turkish Military Force. As far as detention and investigation of crime is concerned, 
it is responsible to the republic prosecutor. 3 Data published by General 
Commandership of Gendarmerie in 1989 reveals that in 92 % of investigation in 
Turkey is conducted by gendarmerie. However, since the density of population in 
rural areas is much lower than in urban areas, half of the population live in Turkey 
in the area in which gendarmerie has authority. " The use of the army, who lack 
professional training63, for police duties is likely to increase the amount of improper 
conduct in performing such duties. 
62 Safak, 1993, "Adli Polis Nedir? (What is the judicial Police? )", Zaman (daily 
newspaper) 31'st of January. 
63 Jandarma Teskilat ve Yetkileri Kanunu, (The Gendarmerie Organization and 
Powers Act), Statute no: 1908 of 1983, Article 7. 
" Yenisey, 1991, Hazirlik Sorusturmasi ve Polis (Preliminary Investigation and the 
Police) 52. 
65 Generally speaking they not only lack professional training but also general 
educational background. Although, military service is compulsory and takes normally 18 months in Turkey, the fact that people who have a university degree perform it in 6 months leads this service to be performed by largely uneducated officials. 
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The idea of direct official supervision of police activities by prosecutor or 
magistrate has not so far been adopted in England. 66 Accountability for investigation 
still belongs to the police. Unlike Turkey, police forces are organised at local level 
in England67 and they historically have been subject to a significant amount of local 
control" Nowadays the Home Secretary has certain powers to control and co- 
69 
ordinate all forces even though each force remains operationally independent. 
In order to bring criminals to justice, both legal systems seem to have felt the 
same pressure to give the law enforcement-force considerable power to proceed with 
their investigative functions. Despite structural differences in the pre-trial stage, 
similar powers are given to the law enforcement-force in both countries. The question 
of whether these powers are balanced by adequate safeguards is the concern of the 
next title. 
" One should note that the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice rejected the idea that judges or the Crown Prosecution Service should have a power and 
responsibility to supervise police investigation and preparation of evidence. Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993, Report 
. 
Cmnd. 2263, p. 3,22. 
67 There are 43 separate police forces; each force has its own geographical territory 
on the whole coinciding with the territory of the country's local authority units. The Police Act 1964 s. 2. 
68 Under the Municipal Corporation Act of 1935 local watch committees exercised 
controlling power over the police. See generally Critchley, 1978, History of the Police in England and Wales p. 124. The PACE set up "consultative committees" to obtain the view of local people on policing matters (s. 106). 
69 The Police Act 1964 s. 28-37. 
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3.4.1.1.2. The Suspect and his Counsel 
Before the enactment of the 1992 Amendment the dominant feature of the 
preliminary investigation in Turkish law was secrecy and many of the procedural 
rights of the suspect were not recognised until the judicial examination began. The 
defence counsel, for example, were able to attend when the suspect was interrogated 
by the sulh hakimi, but not when he was questioned by the law enforcement force. 
In 1992 the Turkish legislature took a major step towards liberalizing criminal 
proceedings by passing an Act which amends several provisions of the 1929 Code of 
Criminal Procedure (CMUK). 7° Among other matters, the position of the suspect is 
considerably improved, and the openness principle of the preliminary investigation is 
introduced by the Amendment. 
The Amendment establishes the suspect's right to legal advice and the right 
to inform someone of the suspect's whereabouts in the pre-trial stage. " It also states 
that the defence counsel has the right to communicate freely with the suspect who is 
held in pre-trial detention. "' Their written communication cannot be subject to 
control. 
The defence is further strengthened in that the defence counsel (mudafi) has 
been given a right to inspect the prosecutor's file at any stage of the investigation 
70 The 1992 Amendment, supra note 19. 
" Article 12 of the 1992 Amendment replacing Article 135 of CMUK. 
I Article 20 of the 1992 Amendment replacing article 144 of CMUK. 
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proceedings. " Prior to 1992 in Turkish proceedings inspection was restricted to the 
time after the prosecutor had filed a formal charge with the court. The right to inspect 
the file is only given to the defence counsel; the suspect has no such right. It may be 
restricted by the judge (sulh hakimi) upon the request of the prosecutor if further 
investigation could be endangered. 
The position of the suspect is also improved by requiring that at the beginning 
of an interrogation either by the police, the prosecutor or the judge the suspect has to 
be informed of his right not to say anything about the alleged offence. 74 Before 
1992, the Turkish criminal practice did not expressly recognise either the right to 
silence or the right to be informed of it in pre-trial stage. Although the 1982 
Constitution stated75 that no one shall be forced to incriminate himself or his relatives 
prescribed by the statute7', lack of any requirement to inform the suspect led to 
unawareness of the right not to incriminate. 
The abovementioned procedural rights, however, are not recognised and 
enforced in cases of persons suspected of crimes such as terrorism, drug smuggling, 
membership in illegal organizations and espousing or disseminating ideas prohibited 
73 Article 19 of the 1992 Amendment replacing article 143 of CMUK. 
74 Article 12 of the 1992 Amendment replacing article 135/4 of CMUK. He is, 
however, obliged to answer questions related to his identity (CMUK 135/1). 
75 Article 38/5. 
76 Such as spouse, ex-spouse, fiancee, relatives to the third degree of 
consanguinity. CMUK 47. 
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by law as "damaging the indivisible unity of the State". " These cases are tried by 
the State Security Courts which composed of two civilian and one military judge. 
Like Turkey, an arrested person in England has a statutory right to consult a 
solicitor78 and to ask the police to notify a named person likely to take an interest in 
his welfare about the arrest. 7' The police are also required to caution a person whom 
there are grounds to suspect of an offence before questioning. " 
Conducting criminal investigation is closely regulated by both jurisdictions. 
In order to balance police powers a comprehensive system of safeguards for the 
suspect was provided. Although it is open to criticism whether the right balance was 
established between police powers and safeguards for the suspect, one point is clear: 
that both the police powers and safeguards are structured within a clearly defined 
framework. This probably will enable the suspect and the police to know exactly 
where one another stands in relation to respective rights and responsibilities. The 
breach of safeguards will be subjected to a detailed examination in Chapter Seven. 
" Article 143 of the Constitution. 
78 PACE 58. 
79 PACE 56. 
80 Code C para 10. 
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3.4.2. Trial Stage 
If at the end of the preliminary investigation the republic prosecutor reaches 
the conclusion that a public prosecution is necessary, a public accusation is prepared 
with the list of evidence and handed to the court of venue in Turkey. In England such 
a decision is made by the police and the case is handed over to the Crown 
prosecutors 8' A national prosecution service for England and Wales has been 
introduced by the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 in which the prosecution of 
offenses is separated from the detention and investigation of crime. " Accordingly, 
after the case is handed over to Crown prosecutors, responsibility for conducting the 
case through the court belongs to the prosecutor. The prosecutor has the power to 
make decision to continue or drop a case without consulting the police. " 
Depending on the seriousness of the offence involved different courts are 
responsible for the conduct of the trial in both countries. In Turkey there are three 
types of general criminal courts; Justice of the Peace Courts (Sulh Ceza Mahkemeleri), 
Court of General Jurisdiction (Asliye Ceza Mahkemeleri), and Aggravated Felony 
81 Instead of prosecuting the police may, at their discretion, administer a caution, 
or take no further action. 
82 See for detail, Bennion, supra note 5, p. 3. 
83 The power of the prosecutor to withdraw the charges in the magistrates' court 
is absolute (the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, section 23), whereas it is subject 
to the court's approval in a crown court [R. v. Broad, (1978) 68 Cr. App. R. 281]. 
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Courts (Agir Ceza Mahkemeleri). 84 In England, on the other hand, the courts with 
trial jurisdiction in criminal cases are the Crown Courts and the magistrate' courts. 85 
There are no formal proceedings such as preliminary hearing before the trial 
in Turkey. By contrast, in England all persons accused of crime appear first in the 
magistrates' court, and around 95% of all criminal cases are heard and determined by 
these courts. The great majority of the accused86 in England foregoes trial as a result 
of the mechanism of "guilty pleas". 
The system of guilty plea in England operates as follows; at the beginning of 
the trial the accused is asked how he pleads, whether guilty or not guilty to the 
charges against him. If he pleads guilty, the judge or the magistrate normally proceeds 
to the question of sentence: the prosecution does not need to prove the case according 
84 Jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Courts is restricted to trying persons 
charged with misdemeanours strictly listed in the Criminal Code. Persons charged 
with felonies punishable by severe penalties such as death, severe imprisonment and 
imprisonment for more than five years are required to be tried by the Aggravated 
Felony Courts. All offences outside these two groups are subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Criminal Courts of General Jurisdiction. (The Turkish Criminal Code, Articles 
526-584). 
8S The form of trial used in the Crown Court is entitled "trial on indictment" while 
the commencement of trial in the magistrates' court is named as "summary trial". The 
legal framework of how to decide whether a case is tried in the Crown Court or in a 
magistrates' court is provided by the Criminal Law Act 1977 in which offences are 
divided into three classes. First of those are offenses triable summarily only; these are 
the least serious offenses. Secondly, some offenses are triable only on indictment; the 
most serious offenses fall into this category. Thirdly, some offenses are triable either 
way; this class includes offenses of medium gravity (The Criminal Law Act 1977, The 
Magistrates' Courts Act 1980). 
86 The extent of guilty plea is said to be over 90 per cent in the magistrates' courts 
and more than 60 per cent in the crown court. Zander, 1989, A Matter of Justice 188. 
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to rules of evidence, despite the rhetoric about the prosecution having to prove its case 
beyond reasonable doubt. The idea behind the plea of guilty seems to be a practical 
one; saving time and money. To reach this end, guilty pleas are encouraged by the 
criminal justice system. The Court of Appeal, for example, allowed an accused who 
pleads guilty to be given a discount on his sentence. "' This practice is likely to put 
considerable pressure on defendants to plead guilty. There is even some evidence 
which suggests that the discount for a guilty plea pushes defendants into pleading 
guilty where they are really innocent. 88 Of course the great majority of those 
pleading guilty do so with other incentives such as the desire for quickness; 
defendant's real guilt; less publicity, less cost etc. 
3.4.2.1. Lay or Professional Involvement 
In the vast majority of criminal cases in England the decision 
-makers are lay 
people. They are involved as magistrates and as members of the jury. Lay 
involvement in the court is likely to introduce popular experience of the world and 
current standards of morality into the criminal justice system, and therefore to fulfil 
an important social and political function. Such a practice is likely to prevent the law 
from becoming remote from "the man in the street". 
The magistrates are predominantly local lay people who carry out their work 
on a part time basis and they generally receive no salary. They are advised about 
87 R. v Coffey (1982) 74 Cr. App. R. 169. 
88 Baldwin and McConville, 1977, Negotiated Justice: Pressure to Plead Guilty. 
40 
legal matters by their legally trained clerk. There are, however, a few full time 
stipendiary magistrates who are lawyers and sit alone. The Crown Courts, on the 
other hand consist of a professional judge89 and jury. 90 There is a division of 
functions between jury and judge; the jury's duty is to ascertain what are the true 
facts, and then to determine, on the basis of these, the guilt or innocence of the 
accused, whereas the task of the judge is to control the evidence presented before the 
jury, to direct the jury on matters of law and to sum up the evidence of the 
prosecution and defence for them. Question of law are decided by the judge while the 
jury is concerned with questions of fact. Although the issue of the admissibility of 
improperly obtained evidence may involve mixed question of law and fact, it is a 
judicial matter. When admissibility of evidence is questioned on the ground that it has 
been obtained improperly, the judge conducts a voir dire (trial within a trial) in the 
absence of jurors. 
It is noteworthy that trial by jury is used by only about 5 per cent of those who 
are eligible to be so tried 91 Since the resources of the court system do not allow all 
defendants to be tried by jury92, the system of "pleading guilty" is encouraged. Thus 
almost 90 per cent of all defendants charged with serious criminal offences plead 
89 In England judging is seen as the culmination of a successful career as a lawyer, 
rather than a career on its own right. 
90 The Juries Act 1974, The Courts Act 1971 s. 16-25 and 31-40. 
9' McConville and Baldwin, 1981, Court. Prosecution and Conviction 77. 
92 Crown Court trial costs £7,500 a day. Gibb, 1995, "Law Reform Chief Attacks 
'Obscure and Antique Acts"', The Times, March 16. 
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guilty 93 The limited use of the jury trial is capable of giving the impression that the 
jury's functions of being an example of participatory democracy and being a safeguard 
against abuse of state power" are largely symbolic. 
Unlike England, lay participation in courts does not exist in Turkey because 
it hardly conforms to the ideas of uniform, bureaucratically organised and centralised 
justice. There is only one judge to conduct the trial in the Justice of Peace Courts and 
the Courts of General Jurisdiction, while Aggravated Felony Courts have a chief 
justice and two associate justices. 
3.4.2.2. Is Trial a Contest or an Inquest? 
The Turkish trial may be seen as a judicial quasi-scientific search (an inquest) 
for the truth rather than a contest or dispute between the parties. It is the judge who 
interrogates the defendant, the lay and expert witnesses 9S Even in Turkish legal 
terminology the prosecution and the defence are not even called parties (taraflar) but 
participants (sujeler) 96 There is no case for the prosecution97 nor a case for the 
93 McConville and Baldwin, supra note 91, p. 7. 
9a For a recent critique of the jury system see, Darbishire, 1991, "The Lamp that 
Shows That Freedom Lives: Is It Worth the Candle? ", Crim. L. R. 740-752. 
95 CMUK 231. 
96 Kunter, 1986, Muhakeme Hukuku dali Olarak Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku 
(Criminal Procedure Law) 289. 
97 The courts are not bound by the submission of the prosecution ; They have 
power to reformulate the criminal charge during the course of trial (CMUK 257/2). 
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defence but simply the case before the court. The trial judge 
-or a chief justice in 
Aggravated Felony Courts- is 
- 
responsible for constructing an objective and 
comprehensive picture of the alleged offence by including the arguments and the 
evidence of the participants 98 He can on his own initiative request documents or 
other information from public authorities and can obtain expert opinion. It is the 
judge, not the defence lawyer or the prosecution, who conducts all questioning of 
witnesses and other participants in order to define the issue in controversy. Cross- 
examination by defence lawyer and republic prosecutor is not allowed. If a defence 
lawyer or public prosecutor wants to put a question to a witness or a suspect, he has 
to suggest the question to the judge. The judge then decides whether to ask that 
question. " A formal acknowledgement of guilt which makes presentation of proof 
unnecessary does not exist under Turkish law. Even if the accused has submitted a full 
confession, other evidence against him should be presented to the court. The court 
98 The trial starts by reading the accusation of the prosecutor, followed by 
questioning of the accused and witnesses by the judge. The republic prosecutor and 
counsel for the defence are allowed to ask supplementary questions but they are not 
permitted to cross-examine the defendant or witnesses. The reason for this might be 
the assumption that the prosecutor and the defence counsel (mudafi) do not oppose 
each other as parties. They should not engage in battle before the court. Indeed, even 
during the trial the prosecutor is required to take into account the facts favourable to 
the defendant and, in appropriate cases, must demand the acquittal of the accused. 
Although the participants have limited influence upon the manner in which evidence 
is adduced at trial, their affect on the extent of the proof may be significant. Before 
the trial the defendant and his counsel can cause the court to summon witnesses and 
experts or produce other evidence. During the course of the trial participants can also 
request additional evidence to be taken. If the trial judge is not satisfied with the 
evidence introduced by the participants he has authority to seek further evidence and 
adjourn the trial. 
" Cizmeci, 1993, "Caprazin Bu Mu Adalet" 11 Nokta (Weekly Journal) 77,13 
March. 
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must ascertain the full truth for itself without being bound by the pleas of the 
participants. 
Because the courts are not dependent on the submission of the parties and are 
responsible for the extent and nature of the evidence to be taken , the judge possesses 
prior knowledge of the case. During the trial he also uses a dossier that has been 
prepared by the prosecutor and the police before trial. This practice may have a 
negative effect upon the impartiality of the judge in that the point of view of the 
prosecution will communicate itself to the judge before the case has been heard. This 
danger is lessened by the requirement that only the evidence received in open court 
may be considered in reaching a judgement. In spite of the fact that the case-file 
(dosya) consists of all materials considered relevant for the case, documents-including 
the record of investigation- cannot be used as evidence unless they are read aloud at 
the trial. If the accused, the witnesses, or experts are present at the trial the court is 
required to base its judgement on what has been heard directly from them. Statements 
made to the police and the gendarmerie principally cannot be read at trial. 10° The 
court is not permitted to read prior statements from the records unless their present 
statements differ from what they said at an earlier stage. 101 The principles of orality 
and immediacy require that only the evidence received in open court may be 
considered in reaching a decision. 
goo CMUK 242 and 243. 
1' CMUK 247/2. 
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Criminal trials in England, on the other hand, take the form of a contest 
between the prosecutor and the defence: the onus is on the parties to present their 
cases. The procedure is mainly oral. Witnesses come to give their evidence in open 
court and can be cross-examined by the opposing party. The judge or magistrate has 
no power to interrogate the accused, and should not normally ask questions except to 
clear up some ambiguity left unanswered by prosecutor's or defence counsel's 
question. 1°2 The trier of fact (the jury in the Crown Court and the bench in the 
magistrates' court) do not have access to pre-trial statements. The evidence becomes 
known for them essentially from the accounts of witnesses. 
It should also be mentioned that under Turkish criminal procedure, as is 
generally the case on the Continent, the accused cannot be a witness in his own case. 
Of course, he is questioned at the trial, after being informed of his right to silence, if 
he is willing to answer. He is always heard as an accused and never as witness in 
Turkey whereas in England the accused cannot be questioned without consenting to 
be sworn as a witness in his own defence. It seems completely unacceptable to a 
Continental lawyer to burden an accused with the witness' obligation to tell the truth 
under oath. This would seen to create a situation where he might be compelled to 
choose between self-incrimination and criminal liability for perjury. 
102 R. v. Marsh, The Times, 6 July 1993 (CA): "it was most undesirable that judges should interrupt a witness, particularly a defendant, when giving evidence in- 
chief or being cross-examined". 
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4. Conclusion 
In this chapter the systems of criminal procedure of England and Turkey have 
been outlined without going into detail. This examination shows first that no judicial 
system, and certainly neither the English nor the Turkish system, has ever been 
designed from scratch; they have developed over a long period by trial and error, and 
inevitably have features which are only explicable by reference to history. Secondly 
and more specifically, the goal of the English proceeding, like that of the Turkish, is 
the determination of the objective truth on the basis of and within the framework of 
the procedural forms which the law prescribes. It seems to me that it is error to view 
the English criminal procedure merely as a sporting match between the prosecution 
and the defence without any goal of ascertaining the truth. Similarly, it is just as 
wrong to view the Turkish criminal procedure as a means of convicting the accused 
at any price. Rather, the object of both criminal procedures is the same; search for 
the truth within the permissible legal framework. The formalities of criminal 
proceedings should be constructed to create the proper atmosphere for discovering the 
truth and for avoiding factual errors. It is out of our concern to respond to the question 
of whether the truth may be better obtained by placing the responsibility for evidence 
on the parties who may use cross-examination, or by leaving the interrogation of the 
accused and the witnesses to the presiding judge. 
The division of criminal procedures in both countries as pre-trial and trial stage 
is the same and specifically designed to guard against two broad errors; the placing 
on trial of those against whom there is no real evidence, and the conviction of any 
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who are possibly innocent. The former error is aimed to be avoided by the mechanism 
of the pre-trial stage, while the latter is attempted to be prevented by the trial. There 
are, however, some operational differences such as the pre-trial stage in England is left 
entirely in the hands of the executive officer-the police; they conduct the investigation, 
decide whether or not to prosecute, while in Turkey a public prosecutor has charge of 
the pre-trial investigation. One may, however, argue that this difference is more 
theoretical than real. 
There is no dispute between Turkish and English law over the fact that 
procedural formalities should serve to protect the fairness of proceeding, particularly 
by means of balancing powers of public authorities against safeguards for the suspect. 
The strictness of the legal requirements of criminal procedure should also contribute 
to the protection of the defendant's human rights in criminal procedure. The 
difference between Turkish and English criminal procedure does not lie in the ideals 
but rather in the methods chosen to achieve them. 
Having examined the background, we now turn to the theoretical analysis of 
the possible solutions to the issue of the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE THEORETICAL ISSUES 
1. Introduction 
It is important in the first place to bear in mind that there is more than one 
"exclusionary" or "inclusionary" rule in relation to improperly obtained evidence, such 
as the exclusion (or inclusion) rule applying to search and seizure, or applying to 
confessions, or applying to identification. To some extent each rests on a different 
basis and has a somewhat different scope. In this chapter "exclusionary" and 
"inclusionary" rule will refer to combined exclusionary or inclusionary rules unless 
otherwise is stated. 
It seems to be generally accepted that there are three main solutions to the 
problem of admissibility of relevant evidence which is obtained contrary to the 
standards of propriety recognised by the law. The first is that if evidence proposed 
by the prosecution is relevant and of the necessary probative value, the court does not 
need to inquire into its origin, it should be admitted as a basis of judgment. At the 
other end of the spectrum it is maintained as a second solution that all evidence which 
has not been obtained properly by the police should be excluded. The third solution 
is a flexible one. On this approach no dogmatic answer exists; improperly obtained 
evidence should be admitted in some cases but excluded in others. The pros and cons 
of each approach will be examined in turn. 
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2. Mandatory Inclusion 
The traditional solution to the problem of admissibility of improperly obtained 
evidence both in England and Turkey is to admit all relevant and reliable evidence, 
adduced before the court by the prosecution, as a basis of judgment regardless of how 
it was obtained. ' In a nineteenth century English case, R. v Leatham2 the court 
pronounced; "it matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible 
in court". 
2.1. Justifications 
A number of reasons may be identified, which are given to justify the solution 
in question. They are; 
2.1.1. Determination of Facts Fully and Accurately 
It is maintained that the object of the criminal trial is to ensure full and 
accurate determination of facts3. Taking into account all relevant information 
increases the amount of relevant evidence available to the factfinder, and ensures full 
and accurate determination of facts, and naturally facilitates the discovery of "truth" 
' See Chapter Four 2.1 and 2.2. 
2 [1861] 8 Cox C. C. 498. 
3 Criminal Law Revision Committee, 1972, Eleventh Report. Evidence (General), 
Cmnd 4991, para. 1. 
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as to whether the suspect committed the offence with which he is charged. The 
conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that all relevant evidence should be included 
regardless of how it was obtained. 
In reply to this argument one may ask whether establishing the objective truth 
is the only purpose of the trial. In the adversarial British system it is hardly possible 
to give an affirmative answer to this question because in this system the trier of fact 
makes a decision that appears to be justifiable on the material presented in court rather 
than ascertaining the truth in any real sense°. At first glance the above argument may 
seem to be, to some extent, justifiable in the inquisitorial Turkish system because it 
is generally accepted that a inquisitorial system yields particular importance to "truth 
discovery" when compared with an adversarial system. Although it is true that 
determination of the objective truth is quite important in an inquisitorial system, it 
does not mean that the objective truth will be determined at any price; it is not 
legitimate to apply every possible method to reach the goal (discovery of truth). The 
truth should be discovered within the boundaries of the law in Turkey, otherwise delil 
yasaklaris (evidentiory use prohibition) may come into force to exclude evidence 
obtained by breaching the law. 
4 See Chapter Two. The plea of guilty is given as an example of the assertion that 
"adversary procedure is not concerned with the truth of the material facts but only 
truth of facts put in issue by the accused". See McEwen, 1992, Evidence and the 
Adversarial Process 7. 
s CMUK 135. 
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2.1.2 The Object of the Trial is to Ascertain the Facts in Issue 
The point at issue is whether the trial is a suitable place for trying violations 
of legality which are said to be unconnected with the issue in the case. Wigmore held 
the view that; 
"a judge does not hold court in a street-car to do 
summary justice upon a fellow-passenger who 
fraudulently evades payment of his fare; and, upon the 
same principle, he does not attempt to investigate and 
punish all offenses which incidentally cross the path of 
that litigation. Such a practice might be consistent with 
the primitive system of justice under an Arabian sheik: 
but it does not comport with our own system of lawi6 
So far as this reasoning is concerned, rules of evidence are only designed to 
enable courts to determine the truth of the charge against the accused; the way in 
which evidence was obtained is irrelevant to the determination of the guilt or 
innocence of the particular suspect. An inquiry into improprieties will be collateral 
to the main issue. The court is not in a position to conduct a complete inquiry into 
the alleged improprieties, and therefore investigation of alleged impropriety could 
confuse and delay adjudication on the main issue'. Consequently, the criminal court 
should not attempt to inquire into improprieties during criminal investigation. 
6 Wigmore, 1922, "Using Evidence Obtained By Illegal Search and Seizure", 
American Bar Association Journal 479. 
Ibid, p. 479. 
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This justification is derived from the fragmentary model of a prosecution' in 
which the court's sole task is said to be to hold a trial; there is no way that a court can 
involve itself in extra-courtroom executive misconduct by performing its truth-seeking 
function. 
The justification in question is criticised in that it simply ignores the moral 
dimension of the criminal trial. In Zuckerman's phraseology, it is argued: 
"... (the criminal trial) is concerned with the 
determination of moral blame, which may in turn justify 
the infliction of suffering and humiliation on an 
individual, as well as of legal liability. The willingness 
of the public to accept the authority of the criminal 
court as a dispenser of punishment depends on the 
extent to which the public believes in the moral 
legitimacy of the system. The morality or fairness of 
the system of adjudication hinges on many factors, such 
as the impartiality and incorruptibility of the judiciary. 
Amongst these must also be numbered a publicly 
acceptable judicial attitude towards breaches of the law. 
A judicial community that is seen to condone 
, 
or even 
encourage, violations of the law can hardly demand 
compliance with its own edictsi'. 
The important point to be noted is that Wigmore's fragmentary line of 
argument does not refuse to acknowledge that there should be certain standards 
regulating the conduct of criminal investigation; but contends that the infringement of 
these standards should be subjected to separate prosecution. However, it can be 
argued that the separate prosecution of the wrongdoing officer is not an obstacle to 
8 For detailed examination of the Fragmentary and Unitary models of the 
prosecution see, Schrock and Welsh, 1974, "Up from Calendra; The Exclusionary Rule 
as a Constitutional Requirement", 59 Minnesota Law Review 255. 
9 Zuckerman, 1989, The Principles of Criminal Evidence 344. 
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excluding improperly obtained evidence. In order to explain why separate prosecution 
does not preclude exclusion one may argue that they have different goals. Indeed, the 
separate prosecution is conducted to inflict a direct punishment on the law enforcement 
officer who violates the applicable standards, while the exclusionary rule is designed 
for some other purposes1° rather than punishing a particular wrongdoing officer. 
2.1.3. The Social Interest in Ensuring the Conviction of the Guilty 
It is beyond question that the public has an interest in ensuring the conviction 
of the guilty. Advocates of inclusion argue that this social interest requires the 
admission of all evidence probative of guilt. 
This argument is open to dispute in that it assumes that the social interest is 
simply in the factual outcome of criminal proceedings. However, it can equally be 
argued that social interest also exists in ensuring the quality of the proceedings. " 
For example, it can hardly be maintained that the social interest does not exist in a 
conviction based on a confession obtained by inhuman treatment (torture). It is 
necessary to acknowledge a plurality of social interests involved in this debate. 
I 
10 These purposes will be examined under the title of 'the Justification of Exclusionary Rule'. See Chapter Three 3.1. 
'1 Dennis, 1989, "Reconstructing the Law of Criminal Evidence", 42 Current Legal 
Problems 31. This point has been expressly recognised in a number of cases R. v King [1969] 1 A. C. 304; R. v Fox [1985] 1 W. L. R. 1126. 
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2.1.4. Reducing Crime 
The essence of the argument here is that if we want to reduce the crime rate, 
all the evidence ought to be admitted into the trial. According to Wilkey, inclusion 
of all evidence will significantly curtail a variety of crimes such as gambling, 
narcotics, prostitution, armed robbery and concealed weapons12. However, no 
mention is made by Wilkey about any empirical evidence which shows that a logical 
connection exists between the inclusion and the crime rates. On the other hand, it may 
be argued that inclusion encourages police crime such as assault, corruption, and 
related unlawfulness such as breach of regulatory Acts, Codes etc. 
2.1.5. Reminding of Obedience to the Law 
A great deal of consideration is given by Professor Nesson13 to the behavioral 
implications of judicial decisions. He points out that one of the primary aims of a 
legal system is to encourage and enable citizens to assimilate legal rules into their 
behaviour. The function of the trial is not only to discover the truth about a past 
event, but also to project a behavioral message which will influence the conduct of 
members of society. Through trials, 
"the court's message to the public at large is 'if you do 
what the defendant did, you will be doing wrong and 
12 Wilkey, 1978, " The Exclusionary Rule; Why Suppress Valid Evidence", 62 
Judicature 215. 
13 Nesson, 1985, "The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and Acceptability 
of Verdicts", 98 Harvard Law Review 1357. 
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you should feel guilty; if you commit such an action, we 
will judge you guilty and punish you'' 14. 
Inclusion of all evidence regardless of how it was obtained is, therefore, to make 
stronger this behavioral message in that it reminds the individuals that the law must 
be obeyed; failure to do so will be punished irrespective of the fact that evidence is 
obtained improperly. " 
However, it can equally be argued that to admit all evidence is also to reinforce 
a message to the society that the -police are not bound to behave in ways the law 
wishes them to behave. 
2.2. Criticisms 
2.2.1. Courts will be Party to Lawless Invasions 
Critics of the inclusionary rule maintain that when a court becomes aware that 
a law enforcement officer has breached the rules regulating the obtaining of evidence, 
and subsequently permits the use of the fruits of such an invasion at trial, it condones 
the wrongdoing and effectively becomes an accomplice after the fact to the improper 
activity. t6 
14 Ibid, p. 1360. 
's Choo, 1989, "Improperly Obtained Evidence", Legal Studies 266. 
16 Bennett, 1973, "Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for 
Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule", 20 UCLA Law Review 1137; see 
below notes 81,82 and accompanying text. 
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2.2.2. Legitimising the Improper Conduct 
There is no dispute over the fact the law enforcement officers are not permitted 
to conduct the criminal investigation in an unrestricted manner, as certain rules are laid 
down for the conduct of all authorities. Critics of the inclusionary rule argue that 
admitting the evidence obtained in violation of these standards may be seen a 
manifestation of a willingness to tolerate to such malpractice. " The court's attitude 
in this direction may, to some extent, have a legitimizing effect of the improper 
conduct. Thus, existence of the inclusionary rule can hardly convince the citizens 
about the fact that improper conduct of law enforcement officers is truly forbidden in 
the first place. " 
2.2.3. Reducing the Public Respect for the Law 
The basic assumption of this criticism is that the behaviour of those involved 
in the administration of the criminal justice system is a model for the citizens19. 
Both the law enforcement officers and the citizens should be subjected to the same 
rules. Wrongdoers, including those within the administration of the criminal justice 
system, should not benefit from their wrongdoing. It is maintained that by admitting 
improperly obtained evidence the criminal justice system is benefiting from its own 
" Kamisar, 1978, "Is the Exclusionary Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' 
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment", 62 Judiciare 67, at p. 83. 
" Paulsen, 1961, "The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police", Crim. 
L. C. & P. S. 255, at p. 258. 
19 Olmstead v United States (1928) 277 U. S. 438, at p. 485. 
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wrong. Inclusion is, therefore, capable of giving to the society a behavioral message 
that those responsible for the administration of the criminal justice system may commit 
crimes in order to secure the conviction of private criminals. Such a message is likely 
to reduce the respect for the law in the eyes of the public. " 
2.2.4. Encourage Laziness and Inefficiency of the Police 
Although the duty of the police in a democratic society requires them to 
observe the procedural requirements which conform with democratic values, the 
inclusionary rule may encourage laziness and inefficiency of the police by enabling 
them to rely on improperly obtained evidence instead of more proper detective 
methods. 
3. Mandatory Exclusion 
The exclusionary rule is one of the most controversial issues all over the world. 
It excludes otherwise admissible evidence from criminal trials where that evidence was 
obtained improperly by the law enforcement officer. 
20 Bennett, Supra note 16, p. 1137; Heydon, 1973, "Illegally Obtained Evidence", 
Crim. L. R. 1147; see below notes 81,82 and accompanying text. 
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3.1. Justifications or Rationales for the Exclusionary Rule 
The exclusion of improperly obtained evidence has been much debated2'; a 
number of principles that might justify the existence of exclusionary rule may be 
derived from these disputes. Each justification will be examined in turn. 
3.1.1. Personal Right Theory 
An early rationale for the exclusionary rule in United States held that the 
accused enjoys a personal constitutional right to exclude evidence obtained as a result 
of breach of the constitution22. It is maintained that the constitution is sufficient to 
give the aggrieved party a personal right to suppression. The right to exclusion is 
conceptually and ethically a part of constitutional right to be free from unconstitutional 
(improper) conduct of law enforcement officers and the right to fair trial. If 
improperly obtained evidence were taken as a basis of judgment, the protection of the 
constitution declaring citizens' right to be secure against improper activities would 
21 The literature relating to the exclusionary rule is extensive. For articles 
favouring the exclusionary rule see, Atkinson, 1925, "Admissibility of Evidence 
Obtained Through Unreasonable Search and Seizure", 25 Colom. L. R. 11; Allen, 
1950, "The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties", 45 
ILL. L. Rev. 1; Hall, 1953, "Police and Law in a Democratic Society", 28 Ind. L. J. 
133; Paulsen, 1954, "The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree", 6 Stan. L. 
Rev. 411; McKey, 1973, "Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule and the Right of 
Privacy", 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 3277; Paulsen, supra note 18, p. 255; Quantana, 1973, 
"Erosion of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule", 17 How. L. J. 805; Traynor, 
1962, "Mapp v Ohio At Large in the Fifty States", Duke L. J. 319; Bennett, supra note 
16, p. 1129. 
22 Weeks v United States 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Gouled v United States 255 U. S. 
298,313 (1921). 
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have no value. Further it is stated that to use improperly obtained evidence against 
the accused at trial will be a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused23. The 
constitution absolutely forbids the violation of itself and therefore requires exclusion 
of improperly obtained evidence. Support for this position may be found in the case 
of Mapp V Ohio24 in which it is stated that 
" when the Forth Amendment's ban against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is considered with the Fifth 
Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination, 
a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies 
but actually requires the exclusionary rule. " 
Accordingly, both the innocent and guilty have a right to apply to the courts to 
vindicate their constitutional right to exclusion23. 
This theory requires mandatory exclusion of improperly obtained evidence 
because it entitles the defendant with a constitutional right to exclusion whereas it does 
not give the court a right to admit the evidence obtained improperly. 
As far as the concept of a "fragmentary model of government" is concerned, 
the personal constitutional exclusionary right is implausible in that the executive, not 
the court, is the sole addressee of the constitutional norms which regulate the way of 
obtaining evidence. Since the executive is the only branch of government which is 
capable of infringing the constitutional requirements, the norms particularly speak to 
the executive. If violations of the constitution happens it is out of the court's 
23 Weeks v United States, 232 U. S. 383, at p. 398 (1914). 
24 367 U. S. 643, at p. 662 (1961). 
25 Weeks v United States 232 U. S. 383, at p. 392 (1914). 
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competence, and thus the court is not responsible for it. Without responsibility for the 
impropriety it can hardly be claimed that the court has a duty to exclude evidence 
improperly obtained at the trial. Thus, non-existence of a duty means non-existence 
of the right. 26 
The theory expounded in Mapp v Ohio, however, conforms with the unitary 
model of government. Indeed, unlike the fragmentary model of government approach, 
the unitary model maintains that there is no fragmentation of governmental 
responsibility, nor any implication that the constitutional norms are addressed only to 
the executive 27 It assumes that there is a conceptual and moral connection between 
the trial and the evidence gathering process. The court, therefore, cannot insulate itself 
from responsibility for the manner in which evidence was obtained 28 If the court 
admits improperly obtained evidence it commits a constitutional wrong. It is implied 
that admission is unconstitutional when the way of obtaining evidence is 
unconstitutional. 
Although it is maintained that the exclusionary rule is a command of the 
Constitution in the form of a personal constitutional right of the party, opponents of 
this viewpoint would maintain that it does not exist in the text of the American 
Constitution. Indeed, there is no textual support in the Constitution itself to justify a 
personal exclusionary right. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment 
26 Schrock & Welsh, supra note 8, p. 289. 
27 Ibid, p. 295. 
28 People v Cahan, 1955 cited by Schrock & Welsh, supra note 8, p. 298. 
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say anything about the existence of a right to exclusion. Moreover, where it is clear 
that, both the police and the defendant acted improperly one may ask why the 
defendant has a personal right to be freed from the consequences of his own illegal 
acts because of improper police incursion upon a right which they were abusing. 
As far as English and Turkish laws are concerned, none of them explicitly 
recognize a personal exclusionary right. England, unlike Turkey, does not even have 
a written constitution in the form of a single document 29 
3.1.2. Unreliability Theory 
As far the unreliability rationale is concerned the primary purpose of the 
criminal trial is to determine the truth of the criminal charges, and thus improperly 
obtained evidence may only be excluded on the ground of unreliability. It seems 
possible to say that the unreliability principle is a natural consequence of the right of 
the accused to a fair trial, because this right requires that the suspect should not be 
convicted where there is a risk that the evidence is unreliable. There is no doubt about 
the fact that unreliable evidence is likely to lead to wrongful conviction of the suspect. 
In order to reduce the high risk of wrongful conviction, unreliable evidence obtained 
improperly should be excluded. 
It is to be noted that this principle operates in such a way as to draw much 
improperly obtained evidence outside the scope of the exclusionary rule. To illustrate, 
29 See Chapter Two 3.3. 
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a verbal confession obtained by use of torture would have been admissible as evidence 
where independent evidence confirming its truth exists. Further, suppose that this 
confirmatory evidence is insufficient by itself to prove guilt, should the confession be 
admitted? With regard to the reliability principle, since there is no doubt about the 
reliability of the confession the answer must be affirmative. It becomes obvious from 
this example that the reliability theory does not find any fault with the use of coercive 
tactics to extract statements as long as it does not have an impact on the reliability of 
the statements. Similarly, there is no significant risk of unreliability as to the result 
of a breathalyser administered by the police in excess of their power. The examples 
we have given points to a conclusion that the unreliability theory would result in 
weakening the standards for the conduct of criminal investigation. If one takes 
standards for the conduct of criminal investigation seriously, the unreliability rationale 
can hardly be a sufficient criterion in deciding whether to admit improperly obtained 
evidence. 
Furthermore, as far as the suspect is concerned it is maintained that the 
unreliability principle fails to provide "any" protection against the disadvantages of the 
infringement30. However, it is necessary to recognize that it provides some, but only 
incidental, protection on the grounds of unreliability. 
30 Ashworth, 1977, "Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights", Crim. L. R. 723, 
at p. 729. 
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3.1.3. Protective Theory 
According to this rationale justification of the exclusion of improperly obtained 
evidence runs on the following lines31. To subject a suspect to improper treatment 
during the police investigation will be an infringement of the suspect's right 
recognised by the law. Since it is the responsibility of a legal system to take declared 
rights seriously, the suspect whose rights have been violated should be protected 
against any disadvantage flowing from the violation. It is said that the appropriate 
way of protecting the suspect from such disadvantage is for the court of trial to 
exclude any evidence obtained as a result of the infringement, because by doing so the 
suspect will be put in such a position as if the infringement had not occurred. 
So far as the protective principle is concerned, the police officer's state of mind 
is irrelevant in deciding the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence, because the 
concern of this rationale is the effect of the particular conduct upon the suspect. 
According to this theory the exclusionary rule is only justifiable where the 
evidence was obtained as a result of a breach of the rules which are intended to 
safeguard the suspect's rights. This premise includes two separate limitations. Firstly, 
not every breach of a pre-trial procedure is capable of exclusion of evidence. Breach 
of a rule which is not intended to safeguards rights so as to protect against the 
collection of evidence is unlikely to be causally linked to obtaining evidence. Arrest, 
for example, is not a step taken for the collection of evidence except in the remote 
31 Ibid, p. 729. 
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sense that without arrest there would have been no interrogation and perhaps therefore 
no confession. To sum up, in order to justify the ekclusionary rule the pre-trial 
procedure which has been infringed is, firstly, required to be a step towards the 
collection of evidence. Secondly, a causal link is required between the breach of the 
rules which are aimed to safeguard the suspect's rights and the collection of evidence. 
The important point to be noted is that an infringement could occur of a rule which 
is intended to safeguard the suspect's rights, and yet there might be no causal link to 
the obtaining of evidence. A clear illustration of this might be the case of R. v 
Alladice32, where the rule broken (the right to legal advice) was intended to safeguard 
rights, but the evidence was not obtained through that breach. 
The rationale in question can hardly be said to be unproblematical. Some of 
the difficulties were identified by Zuckerman. He points out that by bringing into 
existence the standards for the conduct of criminal investigations, the lawmaker's 
intention was to prevent the innocent from disturbance by the law enforcement officer 
where probable cause does not exist. 33 He goes on; 
"Here, whether we like it or not, we are no longer 
concerned with the question of whether we should 
disturb an individual against whom there is no probable 
cause but with the question of whether a person, in 
relation to whom evidence of guilt is now available, 
should be treated as if there were no increased 
probability of his guilt. " 
32 (1988) 87 Cr. App. R. 380. 
33 Zuckerman, 1987, "Illegally Obtained Evidence 
-Discretion as a Guardian of Legitimacy", 40 Current Legal Problems 57. 
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The increased probability of guilt reveals that the price to be paid for protecting the 
suspect from disadvantage resulting from the breach of declared standards may be 
acquittal of the guilty. It is not self-evident that excluding evidence, as a result failing 
to protect the public from the criminal, is an appropriate response to police 
violation. " 
In discussing the difficulties of the protective rationale, Ashworth himself has 
drawn attention to the fact that the definition and the extent of the rights for this 
purpose may give rise to problems, particularly in those jurisdictions which do not 
have a constitutional or codified declaration of individual rights. 
Problems such as these give rise to the view that not every departure from a 
declared standard or procedure should render evidence liable to exclusion. Ashworth 
himself argues that a rigid protective rationale should be rejected and instead a 
"qualified protective principle" should be adopted. As far as this new rationale is 
concerned, 
"evidence obtained by means of a departure from a 
declared standard or procedure should be liable to 
exclusion, unless the court is satisfied that the accused 
in fact suffered no disadvantage as a result of the 
breach". " 
The qualified protective principle does not require the mandatory exclusion of 
improperly obtained evidence. Rather, it "provides only a prima facia justification" 
34 Ibid, p. 58. 
 Ashworth, supra note 30, p. 729. 
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for exclusion and invests the trial judge with a discretion to decide whether to accept 
improperly obtained evidence as a basis of his judgement 3' 
3.1.4. Deterrence Theory37 
3.1.4.1. In General 
Another justification for the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence is the 
deterrent rationale. Under this theory, improperly obtained evidence is excluded in 
order to deter law enforcement officer from violating standards or procedures for 
criminal investigation. This theory assumes that a criminal court has responsibility for 
the whole course of conduct called prosecution rather than merely for the trial38; the 
evidence-gathering role of the police can hardly be detached from the evidence- 
admitting function of the courts39. The rationale presumes that the potential 
exclusion of improperly obtained evidence will discourage the police from employing 
improper methods in the process of collecting evidence. 
36 Ibid, p. 733. 
37 The terms "deterrence theory" or "deterrence effect" is said to be inaccurate by 
Kamisar, despite its popularity in legal literature. Instead, he suggested that "it seems 
more accurate and more useful to call the [exclusionary] rule a 'disincentive'- a means 
of eliminating significant incentives for [acting improperly]", Kamisar, 1983, "Does 
(Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a 'Principled Basis' Rather than an 
'Empirical Proposition"', 16 Creighton Law Review 565, at p. 597. 
38 This is called the 'Unitary Model of Government', see for detail Schrock & 
Welsh, supra note 8, p. 257. 
39 U. S. v Leon 468 U. S. 897, at p. 938 (1934). 
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This theory aimed to protect the general public from future police misconduct 
rather than compensating the individual rights of the victim. It is expected that by 
encouraging obedience with the rules, the exclusionary rule will ultimately benefit the 
general public since fewer improprieties will occur in future. 
According to this theory the rule applies only in situations where it logically 
could be expected to have a deterrent effect. If a violation of procedural requirement 
occurs in a situation where the violator is not apt to be deterred, than the rule is not 
applied. 
Aspects of deterrence 
To make this theory as clear as possible it is important to distinguish three 
distinct types of deterrence; "special", "general" and "systemic deterrence""' 
Special deterrence refers to the deterrent effect of exclusion on the wrongdoing 
officer himself. It is maintained that preventing an offending officer from presenting 
his evidence to the court would give a message that it was a vain effort and likely to 
lead him to feel resentful, and thus it would persuade him to be more careful in the 
future. It is doubtful, however, to what extent, if any, exclusion of evidence will have 
such a influence upon the individual police officer. Furthermore, one may argue that 
ao The fist two types were identified by Oaks, 1969-70, "Studying the Exclusionary 
Rule in Search and Seizure", 37 University of Chicago Law Review, and the third is 
mentioned by Mertens & Wasserstrom, 1981, "The Good Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law", 70 The 
Georgetown Law Journal 394. 
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concentrating his attention upon the procedural requirements might lead him to 
discovering new ways of covering up his misconduct so as not to be caught. 41 
General deterrence is described in the work of Oaks42 as follows; besides 
deterring the specific officer who lost evidence from acting improperly further, the 
exclusionary rule also deters the police officers who are aware of the rule but had no 
personal experience of suppression of evidence obtained by themselves. This aspect 
of deterrence is subdivided into two categories; "direct" with immediate effect, and 
"indirect" involving long term consequences. As far as the former is concerned it is 
said that compliance with the rules will be induced by the threat of excluding 
improperly obtained evidence. " it is further recognised that effectiveness of direct 
deterrence depends on a number of factors. Those are, firstly, effective 
communication between the court and the police officers; secondly, understanding of 
the officers as to the law related to obtaining evidence and the importance to them of 
obeying those rules, and thirdly, police officers' perceptions of the relative costs of 
conformity and nonconformity with the rule 44 
With regard to indirect deterrent effect, by applying the writings of Johannes 
Andenaes, Herbert Packer and Franklin Zimring, Oaks made an analogy between the 
deterrent effect of criminal law and the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule, and 
a` This point has been brought to my attention by Professor Birch. 
a2 Oaks, supra note 40, p. 665. 
a3 Ibid, p. 710. 
as Ibid, p. 710. 
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identified three indirect ways in which the threat of exclusion may play a role in 
deterring violation of the standards. Firstly, exclusion clearly expresses the social 
disapproval for the infringement. Secondly, exclusion may help to develop patterns 
or habits of conforming behaviour that keep influencing an individual police officer's 
conduct even after he has ceased to weigh the pros and cons of observance in an 
individual case. Thirdly, the exclusionary rule may be valuable in providing an 
argument to a obedient police officer to justify his own obedience where compliance 
is regarded as undesirable by his fellow officers as 
Finally, systemic deterrence is used to describe the exclusionary rule's effects 
upon an individual police officer through a police department's institutional 
compliance with the standards of criminal investigation46. It is assumed that the 
threat of exclusion will be likely to influence police departments and through them, 
the individual officers. Unlike individual officers, police departments cannot, at least 
officially, have hostility toward the proper ways of obtaining evidence, and it is proper 
to expect from the police institutions to encourage their officers through training and 
issuing guidelines to act according to regulations during the investigation of an 
offence. 
as Ibid, p. 711. 
a6 Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 40, p. 399. 
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3.1.4.2. Criticisms of the Deterrence Theory 
It seems perfectly proper to accept that the deterrent theory may present several 
difficulties. Those which have frequently been pointed out deserve brief attention. 
3.1.4.2.1. Lack of Empirical Support for the Rule's Deterrent Effect 
In the United states a considerable amount of empirical research has been 
conducted to assess the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. Although all 
researches pecifically focused on the implementation of the rule to evidence obtained 
as a result of improper search and seizure, they contain valuable arguments which are 
pertinent to the general deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. 
The first empirical assessment of the effect of the rule was conducted by 
students of Colombia University Law School47 Their interest was to determine 
whether the exclusionary rule altered police search and seizure practices in narcotics 
cases by using before-after48 research design. They found that the exclusionary rule 
did not have a substantial effect in changing police practices 49 
47 Note, 1968, "Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in 
narcotics Cases", 4 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 87-104. 
48 In Mapp v. Ohio, decided in 1961 (367 U. S. 643), the Supreme Court of United States held that evidence derived from an illegal search and seizure is subject to the 
exclusionary rule. 
a9 Note, supra note 47, p. 103. 
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Oaks' Study: The importance of the contribution made by Oaks to this debate 
is accepted by both the opponents and the advocates of the exclusionary rule. His 
study is heavily depended upon by most critics of the exclusionary rule's deterrent 
effect. He examined the arrests for narcotics, weapons, gambling and stolen property 
offenses in an American city-Cincinnati- for the period of six years before and after 
the imposition of the exclusionary rule. Although he was careful to recognise the 
limited nature of his studySO, he stated that the imposition of the exclusionary rule 
in 1961 in United States had no deterrent effect on police practices, because his data 
indicated that impropriety occurred quite frequently after the adoption of the 
rule 5' 
However, occurrence of the violations despite the exclusionary rule does hardly 
prove that the rule does not deter police misconduct. It seems perfectly realistic not 
to expect the exclusionary rule to remove improprieties completely. Therefore, in 
determining the extent of the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect one should examine 
the number of improprieties it prevents, not the number of that occur despite it. In 
other words, the only sensible approach to the problem is to ask how much police 
impropriety would be without the rule. Davies clearly illustrates this point by drawing 
an analogy between the imposition of the speed limit on the nation's highways and the 
imposition of the exclusionary rule as follows; 
"Anyone who drives frequently will have observed that 
many drivers do not comply with the 55-mph limit (new 
speed limit). At the same time, however, it seems 
so Oaks, supra note 40, p. 709. 
" Ibid, p. 707. 
v 
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highly likely that motorists' average speed has decreased 
from what it was during the era of 70-mph speed limits. 
Thus despite the frequent violation of the formal speed 
limit, it is still likely that the reduced speed limit has 
influenced motorists' driving behaviour. Much the same 
is probably true about the effect of the exclusionary rule 
on police behaviour. It clearly has not ended illegal 
searches. Yet is quite likely that the rule has limited the 
incidence of illegal searches. "" 
Spiotto's Research: Following in Oaks' footsteps, SpiottoS3 counted 
suppression motions in felony cases in Chicago trial courts for a twenty year period 
before and after federal imposition of the exclusionary rule in order to determine the 
impact of the rule. He assumed that there would be a decrease in the number of 
motions to suppress if the rule was effective. Since his findings indicated a significant 
increase in the rate of motions to suppress, he concluded that the rule was not 
deterring illegal searches by the police. " Shortly after Spiotto's study was published, 
a critique written by Davies" revealed that Spiotto's research contains several flaws 
including a faulty research methodology. Spiotto wrote56; 
52 Davies, 1983, "A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) 
About the 'Costs' of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of 
'Lost' Arrests", American Bar Foundation Research Journal 627. 
13 Spiotto, 1973, "Search and Seizure; An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary 
Rule and Its Alternatives", 2 Journal of legal Studies 243. 
sa Spiotto, 1973, "The Search and Seizure problem- Two Approaches: the 
Canadian Tort Remedy and the U. S. Exclusionary Rule", 1 Journal of Police Science 
and administration 37. 
ss Critique, 1974, "On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra", 69 Northwestern University Law Review 741, at p. 754. 
56 Spiotto, supra note 53, p. 243. 
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" During the period 1950-1970 in the course of which 
the exclusionary rule was introduced into Illinois, there 
was proportional increase in the motions to suppress for 
narcotics and guns. Yet it would seem that if the 
exclusionary rule had a strongly deterrent effect on the 
police, the proportional number of motions to suppress 
would have decreased. "
Since Illinois adopted the exclusionary rule in 1923, thirty-eight years before the 
federal imposition of the rule, not during the 1950-70 period, the court was governed 
by the rule in 1951 as well as in 1969, and thus his study has no pre-rule data to 
support the 'before-after' type of research. 
Furthermore, the use of motions to suppress as indicators of the rule's deterrent 
effect may be criticiseds'. It may be said that observation of the frequency of 
motions made before and after the introduction of the exclusionary rule can hardly 
measure the impact of the exclusionary rule for two main reasons. Firstly, the motions 
to suppress, by virtue of its non-existence, cannot measure improprieties prior to the 
introduction of the exclusionary rule. Secondly, even in the case of existence of some 
form of motions to suppress before the appearance of the new rule, an increase might 
be expected on the rate of motion to suppress following the introduction of the new 
law which introduces more liberal exclusionary approach by tightening the regulation 
of the law enforcement officers' duties and the suspect rights. 
 For detail see, Critique, supra note 55, p. 755. 
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Canon's Study: Another empirical study was conducted in the early 1970's 
by Canon and published in 197458. Two basic data gathering techniques were used; 
those are, firstly, replicating Oaks' examination of arrest records in nineteen large 
American cities, and secondly, sending questionnaires to police departments, 
prosecutors and public defendants in cities with a population of more than 100.000. 
With regard to replicating the Oaks' study, Canon was aware of the fact that it was 
easier to demonstrate the existence of widespread non-compliance with the rule than 
to demonstrate compliance, and he did not attempt to show the efficiency of the 
exclusionary rule as a deterrent. Rather, he raised considerable doubt about earlier 
conclusions that the rule was ineffective in deterring improper police behaviour. " 
On the other hand, his survey demonstrated that police compliance with search and 
seizure regulations increased significantly between 1967-1973, and he attributed these 
changes to the imposition of the exclusionary rule. 60 
58 Canon, 1974, "Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some new Data and 
a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion", 62 Kentucky Law Journal 681. 
S9 Ibid, p. 725. 
60 The methodology and representativeness of Canon's questionnaires are criticised 
by Schlesinger as follows " 
.. 
he received returns on only 47.4 per cent of the 
questionnaires sent to the police, 35.2 per cent of those sent to prosecutors and 40.2 
per cent of those sent to public defenders. Thus, the nature and the size of his sample 
do not permit valid generalization; it was neither random nor representative. Those 
cities whose search and seizure practices were least in conformity with current law- 
those whose practices would have negated cannon's thesis about the effectiveness of 
the rule- would have been the ones least likely to respond to a mailed questionnaire; 
they would hardly have been anxious to acknowledge or to announce their own failure 
to obey the law...... there is simply no way of knowing whether the questionnaires were 
answered truthfully..... the questions themselves contained strong inducements for the 
police to answer in a manner which confirmed Canon's thesis... ". See, Schlesinger, 
1979, "The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven that it is a Deterrent to 
Police? " 62 Judicature 406-407; This discussion, while undoubtedly an important one, 
is beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
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The common feature of the above studies is that they were all carried out 
immediately after the imposition of the federal exclusionary rule in United states. It 
is to be remembered that changing the law does not cause alterations in human 
behaviour overnight; it takes quite a long time. It can, therefore, be argued that the 
impact reported in 1960's and early 1970's may not continue to exist without great 
change into the present. 
3.1.4.2.2. Deterrent Effectiveness is Doubtful 
Apart from empirical assessment of the deterrent effect, criminal justice 
literature supplies a number of reasons for doubting the deterrent effectiveness of the 
exclusionary rule. Reasons for doubting the deterrent effectiveness may be stated as 
follows; 
The Operative scope of the rule is limited; As the Report of the Royal 
Commission6' has argued, the operative scope of the rule is limited to exclude only 
that evidence presented at trial. Considering the large number of defendants who are 
either not arrested, or not charged, or not prosecuted, or plead guilty, it becomes 
obvious that a small proportion of police activity comes to the attention of a trial 
court. Even where the improper conduct ultimately results in a criminal trial, there 
is nothing a court can do unless the prosecutor attempts to exploit violations by 
introducing at the trial evidence obtained as a result of an improper behaviour. Even 
61 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1981, Report (The Philips Report, 
Cmnd. 8092, para. 4.125. 
75 
then, the exclusionary rule does not come into play where the suspect does not contest 
the legality of police action. To conclude, the instances in which the rule can have 
deterrent effect are tremendously minimized. This consequently leads to the question 
of why the court's exclusion of evidence should deter police when most of the time 
the issue of admissibility cannot come into play 62 
The police have other purposes in acting improperly than obtaining 
evidence; Another reason that has been advanced for doubting the effectiveness of the 
exclusionary rule as a deterrent is that the police are not always concerned with 
collecting evidence, prosecuting and convictions. "' Instead they may attempt to deal 
in their own way with antisocial behaviour. A number of examples is given by 
Heydon" to illustrate other purposes of the police in acting improperly than obtaining 
evidence for use in court as follows; 
"One purpose may be to obtain a hold over one 
participant so that he can be used as an informant in 
future. Another is that the police can to some extent 
control crime by such illegal forms of harassment as 
illegal arrests, physical maltreatment of suspects or 
prisoners, and unnecessary destruction of property. In 
this way crime is prevented- an illegal search of a 
suspect which leads to the discovery and confiscation of 
weapons prevents their abuse, a brief period of illegal 
arrest interrupts the criminal activity. Crime is made less attractive- money may have to be spent on lawyers 
62 Burns, 1969, "Mapp v Ohio: An All American Mistake", 19 De Paul Law 
Review 80, at p. 96. 
63 Lafave, 1965, "Improving police Performance Trough the Exclusionary Rule", 
30 Missouri Law Review 391,421-58; Barrett, 1960, "Personal Rights, Property 
Rights, and the Fourth Amendment", Sup. Ct. Rev. 46, at 55; Allen, 1961, "Federalism 
and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf', Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, at p. 37. 
" Heydon, supra note 20, p. 690. 
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to get release, the destruction of gambling equipment 
adds to the expense of the criminal conduct,... The 
complaisant members of the public who gamble and buy 
alcohol and drugs illegally will be deterred by raids and 
searches; and the illegal conduct of the police may be 
intended to create in the mind of would-be criminals an 
illusion of police omnipresence and omnipotence, and an 
increased fear of being detected. " 
It becomes obvious from these examples that some improper police activities may not 
be affected by the exclusionary rule because of a tendency not to prosecute offenders. 
However, it can be argued that none of the supporters of the rule meant to 
suggest that the rule would influence all types of police behaviour. If the rule fails 
to deter some types of improper police behaviour, additional controls should be 
developed rather than removing the existing device 65 To make this point as clearly 
as possible Professor Amsterdam's analogy between the exclusionary rule and police 
department anti theft programs for marking personal property is worth quoting; 
"Identification marks diminish the value of property to 
a prospective thief because he knows that it will be 
more difficult to sell the goods at a worthwhile price. 
Thus such programs reduce the incentive to steal. 
Although thieves who steal only for excitement, for their 
own use, or for revenge, are not deterred by 
identification programs, police departments should not, 
for this reason alone, abandon these programs. "" 
Similarly, it can not be right to claim that the exclusionary rule is a failure as a 
deterrent since it fails to deter a police officer whose conduct is motivated by 
something other than the hope for successful prosecution. 
65 Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 40, p. 397. 
66 cited by Mertens & Wasserstrom, Ibid, p. 397. 
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The impact of the rule falls only indirectly on police; Looking at the 
problem from the "special deterrence" point of view it may be maintained that 
suppression of evidence does neither punish the offending officer directly, nor effect 
his official status with regard to his payment, or his job security etc 67 Despite the 
supporters of the deterrence rationale's assumption that a conviction is important to 
the police, it is claimed by the critics that loss of conviction through exclusion of 
evidence is not a serious matter for the police since police effectiveness is not 
measured by the number of convictions. The only person who is directly effected by 
the exclusionary rule is said to be the prosecutor, rather than the individual officer 
whose improper conduct results in the exclusion of evidence. 
Although it is true that effectiveness of law enforcement is not judged by the 
conviction rate, it does not follow that exclusion of evidence creates no incentive for 
the law enforcement officers to correct their improper pattern of behaviour. The 
general public concern against recent miscarriage of justice in England suggests that 
the loss of conviction may be a serious matter for the officer who engaged in the 
improper activity68. Moreover, it may be suggested that the number of cases 
dismissed because of the improper activity should be taken into account in deciding 
the promotion or salary of the wrongdoing officer. 
67 Schlesinger, 1977, Exclusionary injustice: The Problem of Illegally Obtained 
Evidence 57-58. 
68 My attention has been drawn to this point by Professor Birch. 
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Furthermore, one may ask whether there are good reasons for regarding the 
prosecutor and the law enforcement officer as totally independent functionaries. 
Unlike English criminal justice system, in the Turkish system the prosecutor has 
authority over the police69 and can pressure the police to correct the improper 
practice. A similar direct channel of communication and co-operative arrangement 
between the prosecutor and the law enforcement officer may be suggested for English 
law. 
Lack of clarity of the rules regulating obtaining evidence; According to this 
argument the law regulating the proper ways of obtaining evidence is, in some areas, 
quite complex and it can hardly be understood and followed by ordinary police 
officers. 7° This complexity inevitably makes difficult for a police officer the 
determination of legality of his activity in advance and consequently prevents deterrent 
effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. 
This argument assumes that many police activities are in a doubtful or marginal 
zone of legality. However, it becomes obvious from the study of New York City 
Police ' that most improper police activities occur in situations where police officers 
clearly know that they are violating the law. 
69 See Chapter Two 3.4.1.1.1. 
70 Oaks, supra note 40, p. 731. 
't Loewenthal, 1980, "Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule In Search and Seizure", 
49 U. M. K. C. Law Review 32. 
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This line of criticism, if a valid one, may, and should, be overcome by a 
number of ways such as introducing more clear substantive rules or clarifying the 
existing rules or by educating the law enforcement officers about the rules regulating 
the collection of evidence. It should be noted that lack of clarity is a problem 
associated with the substantive law, not the exclusionary rule, and therefore, it may 
not only be a reason for doubting the deterrent effectiveness of the exclusionary rule, 
but also may be a reason to doubt the deterrent effectiveness of any device which may 
be introduced for enforcing the norms regulating the ways of obtaining evidence. 
Impossibility of deterring the law enforcement officer from behaviour that 
he believes to be correct; The deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule is also 
criticised in that when a law enforcement officer acts with a reasonable 
, 
but mistaken, 
belief that his conduct is consistent with the requirement of procedural norms, 
exclusion would hardly have a deterrent effect. This is the criticism which lead to the 
adoption of a "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule by the United States 
Court of Appeal. ' 
This criticism and the following "good faith exception" are derived from the 
incorrect assumption that the exclusionary rule is designed to serve a specific 
deterrence. As explained above the rule more importantly has a systematic deterrence 
dimension. 73 
n Illinois v Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). 
" For the comprehensive discussion of the 'good faith exception' see, Mertens & 
Wasserstrom, supra note 40, p. 365; LaFave, 1982, "The Fourth Amendment in an 
Imperfect World: On Drawing 'bright Lines' and 'Good Faith"', 43 University of 
80 
3.1.4.2.3. Availability of More Effective Deterrent Devices; 
One may ask whether the exclusionary rule is the only answer to discouraging 
impropriety of the law enforcement officer or whether other remedies may be devised 
to achieve the same end and at less social cost. It is maintained by the critics of the 
exclusionary rule that excluding the evidence is not the only effective method of 
deterring police misconduct; there are several other remedies which are more effective 
than the exclusionary rule. 74 One can argue for this reason that the deterrent 
rationale does not require exclusion of evidence, instead it requires replacement of the 
exclusionary rule with a more effective deterrent device. This argument assumes that, 
firstly, deterrence is the primary rationale for invoking any remedy to rectify an 
improper police behaviour, and secondly, the exclusionary rule is not as effective a 
deterrent as it should be. 
Pitisburgh Law Review 307; Jensen & Hart, 1982, "The Good Faith Restatement of 
the Exclusionary Rule", 73 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 916; 
Kamisar, 1984, "Gates 'Probable Cause, ' 'Good Faith, ' and Beyond", 69 JOWA Law 
Review 551. 
74 Wilkey, 1982, "Constitutional Alternatives to the Exclusionary rule", 23 South 
Texas Law Journal 531; Also see Schroeder, 1981, "Deterring Fourth Amendment 
Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 The Georgetown Law Journal 
1361; Note, 1975, "The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, Past, Present, No 
Future", 12 The American Criminal Law review 507; MacDougall, 1985, "The 
Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives- Remedies for Constitutional Violations in 
Canada and the United States", 76 The Journal of Criminal law and Criminology 608; 
Foote, 1955, "Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights", 39 Minnesota 
Law Review 483. 
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3.1.5. Judicial Integrity Theory 
Another justification advanced for the exclusionary rule is based on the 
recognition of the need to safeguard "judicial integrity". 75 It is generally accepted 
that this rationale fords earliest expression in Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in 
Olmstead v United States76 in which he stated that improperly obtained evidence 
ought to be excluded in order to first, maintain respect for the law, adding that "if the 
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man 
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy". " The second goal of the rationale 
is stated as preventing the development of totalitarian government 79 
Underlying this rationale is the conception of a "unitary model of a 
government" in which the investigatory process is seen as a part of the entire criminal 
justice process and is thus inseparably tied to the criminal trial. 79 No distinction can 
be drawn between the government acting as a gatherer of evidence and the government 
's "Integrity" is defined as "an unimpaired or unmarred condition: entire 
correspondence with an original condition... an uncompromising adherence to a code 
or moral... or other values. " Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1174 
(1966)ed. 
, 
cited in Bennett, supra note 16 
, 
p. 1133, footnote 14. 
76 277 U. S. 438 (1928). However, fourteen years before Olmstead v US, in Weeks 
v United States- 232 U. S. 383 (1914)-, a similar argument advanced but it was not labelled as a judicial integrity theory at that time. See Bennett, supra note 16. 
" 277 U. S. 485 (1928). 
78 277 U. S. at 485. " To declare that in the administration of criminal laws the end justifies the means- to declare that the Government may commit crimes- would bring terrible retribution". 
79 Schrock & Welsh, supra note 8, p. 257-258. 
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acting as a judge. 8° By assuming the existence of an inextricable link between the 
courts and the police, this rationale places a responsibility on the courts for the way 
the evidence they use is obtained. 
Several concerns are tightly interwoven in this rationale. The first concern is 
the ratification of improper police activity. It is maintained that admitting the fruits 
of improper police activity into evidence means that the court implicitly gives its 
'sanction' to such impropriety, and, consequently, becomes an accomplice to the 
improper activity. " To make this point as clearly as possible it is said that when an 
improper act is committed, it is a crime only of the individual officer and thus the 
court-more widely the government- is innocent. However, after having full knowledge 
about this impropriety if the court accepts the evidence, all the elements of a 
ratification would seem to be present. 82 In the ordinary course of events it goes 
without saying that it is wrong for the state to participate in or condone improper 
conduct by individual police officers. Subsequently, under this justification the 
judiciary, by excluding evidence, declines to legitimize improper conduct. 
The second concern, as stated above, is to maintain respect for the law. It is 
morally inappropriate for the state to fail to observe its own law and disregard the 
80 Olmstead 277 U. S. 438 at 470 (1928). 
81 Tery v Ohio, 392 U. S. 1,13 (1968): "Courts which sit under our Constitution 
cannot and will not be made a party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights 
of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions". 
82 Olmstead v United States 277 U. S. 483 (1928). 
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procedural standards, and at the same time require its citizens to observe the law. " 
The state 
-and its agent the police- must obey the law while enforcing the law. 
Failure to do so will destroy respect for the law. As far as this rationale is concerned 
the only appropriate way the court has to show its respect for the law is exclusion of 
evidence obtained improperly. Because, by doing so the government whose agents 
violated the investigation standards would be in no better position than the government 
whose agent obeyed it. 84 Some commentators have pointed out that the exclusion is 
not a punishment, instead it is a method of teaching proper behaviour that preserves 
the integrity of the judicial process. In the phraseology of Justice Brandeis in 
Olmstead v United States; 
"our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. 
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its 
example. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it 
breeds contempt for law. "85 
One further significant feature of the judicial integrity theory is that it does not 
require the mandatory exclusion of improperly obtained evidence. The reason for this 
is that a rigid rule of exclusion is highly likely to result in technical acquittals and this 
would bring the criminal justice system into just as much disrepute as a failure to 
observe the procedural standards. 86 
83 People v Cahan (1955) 282 U. S. p 2d. 905 at 912. 
Kamisar, supra note 17, p. 68. 
gs (1928) 277 U. S. 438 at 485. 
86 Choo, supra note 15, p. 278. 
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3.2. Criticisms 
3.2.1. It Exacts Heavy Societal Costs in the Form of Lost Cases 
As has already been mentioned the rule enables the suspect to make a motion 
to suppress evidence alleged to have been improperly obtained. If the motion is 
granted the evidence in issue will be lost. This clearly reveals that the rule is by no 
means a costless remedy for the violation of criminal proceedings norms. Opponents 
of the exclusionary rule, however, developed this point by claiming that the rule is a 
legal device which frequently prevents the factfinder from considering probative and 
reliable evidence that would convict offenders. 97 
In an attempt to answer the question of how many cases are lost as a result of 
the exclusionary rule several empirical assessment of the rule's effect in the United 
States were conducted by the General Accounting Office", the National Institute of 
Justice89, Nardulli90, Davies91, Orfield92, and Uchida and Bynum93. 
87 Bivens v Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 338 416 (1971); 
Posner, 1982, "Excessive Solutions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases", 
57 Was. L. Rev. 635. 
88 General Accounting Office, 1979, Report of the Controller General of the United 
States. Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions (GAO 
Report). 
89 National Institute of Justice, 1982, The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A 
study in California (NIJ Report). 
90 Nardulli, 1983, "The Social Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical 
Assessment", 3 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 585. 
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The GAO Report found that only 0.4 per cent of cases studied were declined 
for prosecution due to the exclusionary rule. Moreover, by examining 2.804 cases 
which went to trial the study found that the admissibility of evidence was challenged 
in 10.5 per cent of cases. A great deal of challenges were not successful. Evidence 
was lost in only 1.3 per cent of the cases. In many cases even after losing the alleged 
improperly obtained evidence convictions were still obtained on the basis of other 
evidence. Total loses altogether 
-cases dropped in trial and pre-trial rejected cases- 
constituted 0.8 per cent of all cases examined. Thus, the report concluded that the 
exclusionary rule had minimal effect. 
In 1982 another research study conducted by the National Institute of Justice 
focused on felony cases rejected for prosecution or dismissed by the prosecutor after 
charges were filed because of search and seizure problems. It is reported that 4.8 per 
cent of all cases of arrest for felony were not proceeded with because of improper 
search problems. "" It further revealed that the attrition rate in drug cases was as high 
as 30 per cent. Consistent with this line of data it is concluded that the exclusionary 
rule had a major impact on the disposition of felony arrests. 
91 Davies re-analyzed the NIJ data and reached different conclusion see Davies, 
supra note 52. 
92 Orfield, 1987, "The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of 
Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1016. 
93 Uchida and Bynum, 1991, "Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress and 'Lost 
Cases': The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions", 81 The Journal 
of Criminal Law & Criminology 1034. 
94 NIJ Report, supra note 89, p. 10. 
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The NIJ study is often criticised by those who maintained that it overstates the 
effect of the rule95. Further, NIJ data was re-analyzed by Davies and different 
conclusions were reached. In Davies reanalysis the NIJ data show that only 0.8 per 
cent of all arrests were not proceeded and that 2.4 -not 30- per cent of arrests in drug 
cases were lost because of the rule. 
0 
Another attempt to clarify the impact of the exclusionary rule on felony 
prosecutions was made by Nardulli. He conducted a larger study which is based on 
the data collected in nine medium-sized counties (with the population ranging from 
100,000 to 1,000,000) in three states (Illinois, Michigan and Pennsylvania). In order 
to provide a comprehensive picture of the impact of the rule data was collected not 
only on motions to suppress physical evidence but also motions to suppress 
identification and confession evidence. The results showed that the motions to 
suppress were filed in 11 per cent of cases studied but only in 7.6 per cent of cases 
were the motions to suppress proceeded. The success rate was only 0.69 per cent. 
Even in the cases where the motions were allows a number of defendants were still 
convicted on the basis of other evidence. Nardulli concluded that less than 0.6 per 
cent of the cases he examined were lost because of the exclusionary rule and thus, "the 
various exclusionary rules exact only marginal social costs" 96 
93 Driscol, 1987, "Excluding Illegally Obtained Evidence in the United States", 
Crim. L. R. 559; Davies, supra note 15,52, p. 617; Nardulli, supra note 90, p. 590. 
96 Nardulli, supra note 90, p. 585. 
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The studies conducted by Orfield and Uchida and Bynum97 have also reached 
similar results with the findings reported by Nardulli, Davies and GAO report. 
To sum, apart from the NIJ study, the evidence, derived from all these 
American studies, suggests that it would be a mistake to exaggerate the amount of lost 
cases dictated by the exclusionary rule. Only around one per cent of prosecuted cases 
are lost as a result of the rule's operation and most of them were not serious offenses. 
Even after evidence obtained improperly is excluded a number of defendants were still 
convicted without the excluded evidence. 
3.2.2. Benefits Only the Guilty 
Invoking the exclusionary rule may result in exclusion of powerful evidence 
of guilt without questioning its evidentiary reliability. Therefore, for many years a 
popular way of attacking the exclusionary rule has been to say that it is a device for 
'freeing the guilty' 98 It is maintained that the rule only operates in the interest of 
a person who is clearly guilty, because it works after the facts come into existence, so 
that by then it is known who the criminal is, the evidence against him, and the other 
circumstances of the case. "' At the same time innocent victims of improper conduct 
97 Supra note 93. 
98 See, Schlesinger, supra note 67, p. 3; Wilkey, supra note 12; phraseology of 
Justice Cardoza 
-'the criminal is to go free because the constable blunders'-is often 
quoted by critics of the exclusionary rule, People v Defore 270 U. S. 657 (1926). 
" Kaplan, Criminal Justice, 215-216; Professor Oaks has observed that this 
criticism of the exclusionary rule is more valid in the search and seizure context than 
the coerced confession or the eyewitness identification, because evidence obtained as 
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receive no direct benefit, since nothing incriminating them is obtained there is nothing 
to suppress. 1°° 
As far as deterrent theory is concerned, it is not necessarily true that only a 
guilty person is benefitted by the rule, through the rule's deterrent effect. The 
innocent victim, along with the public as a whole, is benefitted from a decrease in 
police impropriety through the rule's systematic deterrence effect. "' 
This line of criticism is said to be misdirected; it is more properly directed at 
criminal justice system standards. 102 While it is true that, by depriving the courts 
of relevant and probative evidence clearly pointing out the guilt of the defendant, the 
rule result in the freeing of the guilty, it does not follow that the rule prevents 
criminals from being convicted more often that would be the case if other remedies 
were replaced for it. 103 Furthermore, the same accused would not be convicted 
since the evidence would not have been discovered if the police officer had complied 
with the standards of criminal procedure in the first place. 104 Therefore, if 
a result of improper search and seizure is no less reliable than properly obtained 
evidence, Oaks, supra note 40, p. 737-738. 
100 Williams, 1955, "Evidence Obtained By Illegal Means", Crim. L. R 345. 
101 Heydon, supra note 20, p. 692. 
'02 Stewart, 1983, "The Road to Mapp v Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, 
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases", 83 Columbia Law Review 1392. 
103 Almost everybody accept that the breach of criminal procedure standards should 
not be left without any remedy. 
104 Loewenthal, supra note 71, p. 31. 
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something is to blame for freeing the guilty it should be the standards rather than 
exclusionary rule. 
3.2.3. Restricts the Police Too Much 
The exclusionary rule is also criticised for making obtaining evidence more 
difficult by placing too big a burden on the police. "' With the concern of the 
increasing crime rates106, the advocates of this argument point out the non-existence 
of restrictions to criminals in their choice of weapons, and suggest similarly non- 
existence of restrictions for the police. "' 
This criticism may also be said to be misdirected since it is not the 
exclusionary rule which places limitations on the action of the police, but the 
substantive rules governing obtaining evidence. Since none of the parties to the 
present discussion suggested non-existence of any remedy, abolishing the exclusionary 
rule would hardly affect restrictions upon the police. Only a change in the substantive 
law of obtaining evidence which the police are required to obey can do that. 
pos Wilkey, supra note 12, p. 224. 
106 Schlesinger, supra note 67 p. 4. 
107 Heydon, supra note 20, p. 694. 
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3.2.4. Undermines the Reputation of and Destroys the Respect for Entire Judicial 
System 
Another criticism of the rule focuses on its undermining effect on the 
reputation of the judicial system. According to this criticism the rigid operation of the 
exclusionary rule will result in the technical release of many suspects, and this would 
undermine the respect for the legal and judicial system in the eyes of the general 
public. "' 
3.2.5. Encourages Certain Form of Police Misbehaviour 
Some commentators have pointed out the existence of some indications that 
certain kinds of police misconduct are being encouraged by the exclusionary rule. 1°9 
A clear illustration of this is that the law enforcement officers may intentionally 
conduct an improper activity not in order to obtain evidence, but in order to immunize 
the criminals from conviction while at the same time satisfying the public that criminal 
are being harassed by them. By examining the records of the Chicago Crime 
Commission, and by observing one of the breaches of Municipal Court's practice Dash 
noted that the same police officers are involved repeatedly in improperly conducted 
gambling raids which could very easily have been conducted in a proper legal manner. 
108 This point has been made by a number of authors. See, Heydon, supra note 20, 
p. 695; Schlesinger, supra note 67, p. 61; Zuckerman, supra note 9, p. 345. 
109 Dash, 1951, "Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice", 46 Illinois Law 
Review 392; Schlesinger, supra note 67, p. 57. 
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He was convinced that "raids are made to immunize the gamblers""'. However, 
Heydon is quite right in pointing out that immunising by corrupt policeman is not a 
valid criticism for the exclusionary rule because if police corruption is common, the 
police would have many other methods of helping criminals in addition to abusing the 
exclusionary rule. "' Another kind of police misconduct which is being encouraged 
by the exclusionary rule is said to be perjury on the witness stand. A study conducted 
in the United States indicates that police officers often fabricate testimony to escape 
from the effect of the exclusionary rule. 12 
3.2.6. It Penalises the Public Rather than the Individual Officer who Acted 
Improperly 
Barring use of the evidence obtained as a result of improper police conduct is 
seen as a penalising of the public at large in that it will prevent the court from using 
some amount of evidence. This deprivation will injure the public at large not the 
policeman. Consistent with this line of reasoning it is recommended that instead of 
penalising the public by excluding evidence, the wrongdoing police officer should be 
penalised. In this connection Wigmore wrote that "our way of upholding the 
110 Dash, supra note 109, p. 382. 
"' Heydon, supra note 20, p. 695. 
12 Note, supra note 47, p. 87. 
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Constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody who 
broke something elsei13 
However, it might have been possible to argue that exclusion can hardly be 
seen as a punishment to the public. As far as the deterrent effect of the rule is 
concerned society as a whole will benefit from it through its systematic deterrence 
effect. 
Further, although it is true that objective of the exclusionary rule is certainly 
not to penalize the law enforcement officer for the past wrong he has done, it may 
have some indirect penalizing effect upon the law enforcement officers. For example, 
if the officer's improper conduct too frequently results in exclusion of evidence, his 
personal record will show it and promotions may not follow. "' 
4. Flexible Approach (Discretionary Exclusion or Inclusion) 
Between the strict inclusionary and exclusionary approaches lies an 
intermediate solution which may be called the flexible approach. It suggests a 
situation where instead of deciding the issue of the admissibility of improperly 
obtained evidence by recourse to a fixed rule of exclusion or inclusion, the court is 
able to decide between these two alternatives by taking into account the conflicting 
113 Wigmore, 1940, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in 
Trials of Common Law, para. 2184. 
14 A police officer stated that "... the police force is an egotistical society. We are 
all motivated by rank, position.... " Fielding, 1988, Joining Forces, p. 148. 
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interest in each individual case. Since in legal terminology the power to make choice 
between alternative courses of action is called "judicial discretion""', this approach 
may be labelled the "discretionary rule". 
4.1. Justifications 
4.1.1. The Conflicting Nature of Perspectives 
The law of evidence, and in particular the above examined rigid rules 
regulating the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence reflect two identifiable 
perspectives towards the criminal process. "" The first is the utilitarian perspective 
which focuses on the ascertainments of truth and the apprehension of the guilty as a 
paramount objective. The other one may be labelled the moral perspective which 
regards the criminal procedure norms as deserving of protection and as taking 
precedence over other concerns. "' The conflicting nature of these perspectives 
inevitably confronts the judges with a dilemma which cannot be solved without a 
flexible- discretionary- rule. 
"s Smith, 1980, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, p. 278. 
116 Packer calls them models- "The Crime Control Model" and "Due Process 
Model" see Packer, 1969, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Chapter 8, p. 149. 
"' See Zuckerman, supra note 9, p. 344. 
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4.1.2. Undesirable Consequences of Both The Mandatory Exclusionary and 
Inclusionary Rules 
It is true that the rule of mandatory inclusion and the rule of mandatory 
exclusion have the advantage of being relatively easy to apply. However, none of the 
above arguments, as has been seen, are totally convincing as to whether improperly 
obtained evidence should be automatically included or excluded. Both the 
exclusionary and inclusionary rule have undesirable consequences. As pointed out by 
Zuckerman, 
"there is an uncanny symmetry between the 
consequences of an admissibility and inadmissibility 
rule. If applied consistently, each of these rules will 
undermine public confidence in the criminal process. If 
the court always admits illegally obtained evidence, it 
will be seen to condone the malpractice of the law- 
enforcement agencies. If it always excludes it, it will be 
seen to abandon its duty to protect us from crime. "' 
Therefore, the only conclusion which can safely be drawn is that improperly 
obtained evidence must be excluded in some circumstances but admitted in others. 
This is likely to reduce the harsh consequences of a strict application of the rules. 
4.1.3. The Need for Individualised Justice 
Since the variety of unforeseeable circumstances may arise in day to day 
enforcement of the criminal procedure law, it may be impractical laying down fixed 
rules in that "rules without discretion cannot fully take into account the need for 
1' Ibid, p. 345. 
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tailoring results to unique facts and circumstances of particular casesi1'. Justice 
requires that the conditions surrounding the individual case is to be taken into account. 
This is called "individualised justice" and can only be achieved by the discretionary 
rule. 12° For many circumstances the mechanical application of the exclusionary or 
inclusionary rules may mean injustice. 
4.1.4. The Subjection of Police Practices to Judicial Scrutiny 
Another justification for discretionary inclusion or exclusion is that it enables 
the judiciary to scrutinize police practices in the investigation stage of criminal 
process. This scrutiny is said to endorse the fact that the law enforcement officers are 
not above the law. 121 
4.1.5. The Legitimacy of the Verdict Theory 
According to this theory, which is discussed in detail in chapter five, courts are 
not only concerned with promoting the factual accuracy of the verdict but also with 
the legitimacy of the verdict. Decisions as to the admissibility of improperly obtained 
evidence depend on the courts findings whether the legitimacy of the verdict will be 
harmed. 
19 Davis, 1970, Discretionary Justice: A preliminary Inquiry, p. 17. 
120 James, 1974, "A Judicial Note on the Control of Discretion in the 
Administration of Criminal Justice", in Criminology and Public-Policy: says in 
Honour of Sir Leon Radzinowich, ed by R. Hood, p. 157. 
12' Zuckerman, supra note 9, p. 356. 
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4.2. Criticisms 
A number of disadvantages are associated with the discretionary rule, and they 
are often offered, at the same time, as an argument for the need to structure discretion 
through guidelines. The list of disadvantages attributed to the discretionary rule 
includes the lack of clarity, unpredictability, and the shortage of judicial accountability. 
As far as the lack of clarity argument is concerned, it is maintained that " the 
discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is different in 
different Men". 122 Although it is true that whenever any aspect of a trial is left to 
the discretion of the judge 
, 
some degree of uncertainty is inevitably imported into the 
law, this line of criticism overstates it by equating the discretionary rule with 
arbitrariness. However, the discretionary rule gives the judge a freedom to choose 
between permissible alternatives. 123 The fact that individual judgments do not derive 
from a rigid rule, does not mean that there is no guiding force for the discretionary 
rule. The discretionary rule does not suggests a judicial discretion which is unlimited. 
An unrestrained discretion will not confirm with the idea of the Rule of Law. 124 
`22 Lord Comden, Doe d. Hindson v. Kersey (1765) Lincoln's Inn Library Trial 
Pamphlet no: 204 ft: 124, cited by Pattenden, 1990, Judicial Discretion and Criminal 
Liti ag tion, p. 11. 
u3 Dworkin, 1977, "Is the Law a System of Rules", in The Philosophy of Law, 
ed. by R. M. Dworkin, p. 52. 
124 Pattenden, supra note 122, p. 26. 
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According to the argument for unpredictability, the discretionary rule does not 
permit the defence and the police alike to predict the outcome of possible challenge 
to the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence. Again, structuring discretion 
through guidelines increases one's ability to predict outcomes in particular cases. One 
should not, however, expect an absolute predictability. It is unlikely that guidelines 
can forecast all future situations in which the exclusionary or inclusionary discretion 
might be applied. Even if this would be possible, it is equally unlikely that guidelines 
structured at the present time will be sufficient to produce a fair outcome in all future 
cases. 
The shortage of judicial accountability argument, on the other hand, is based 
on the concern that the discretionary rule may make difficult for the public to 
scrutinize judges for their decisions in individual cases. This concern may also be 
overcome by regulating discretion through guidelines which can be a yardstick for 
testing the judge's decisions and which reduce the scope for reliance on irrelevant or 
arbitrary factors. 
These arguments reveal that, although each case depends on its own facts and 
circumstances, the principles by which the discretion is to be exercised are needed to 
be developed. The emergence of guidelines is likely to increase uniformity of judicial 
decisions and with it the stability and rationality of the legal system. 121 Conversely, 
lack of guidance on how to exercise the discretion is likely to harm the uniformity, 
125 Ibid, p. 19. 
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clarity and consistency of the legal system. The possible criteria by which discretion 
might be exercised will be subjected to discussion in the next chapter. 
5. Conclusion 
The strict exclusionary rule is in direct confrontation with the crime control 
consideration, while the strict inclusionary rule places too much emphasis on the crime 
control consideration and at the same time ignores the moral dimension of the criminal 
trial. The danger of such strict rules may be summarized as follows; the strict 
exclusionary rule fails to bring crime under tight control and thus leads to the 
breakdown of public order, the rigid inclusionary rule can easily become a tool for 
those seeking to create a police state. It seems to me that the discretionary rule has 
some advantages over the strict rules. Because it does not require a choice- at least 
in advance- between the competing considerations, rather suggests that they are to be 
reconciled or weighed against each other by considering the fact and circumstances of 
each case. However, unless certain guidelines for the use of discretion exists this 
approach will also have the disadvantage of being imprecise and confusing. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
APPROACHES AND RULES OF TURKISH AND ENGLISH LAW 
REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we discussed some of the theoretical perspectives that 
have proved useful in helping us understand the possible treatments of improperly 
obtained evidence. In this chapter it is proposed to discuss the English and Turkish 
approach to improperly obtained evidence and to point out differences and similarities 
of the. law of each country in this area. Attention will be drawn to the fact that with 
regard to the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence England and Turkey have 
shared similar legislative activities in recent years. The legislative history of key 
provisions such as PACE 78 and CMUK 254 will be traced. The various elements of 
such provisions will be analysed in the light of the interpretation of these provisions 
by the appeal courts of each country. 
2. The General Rule 
I. In Turkish Law 
The traditional view of a criminal trial in the Turkish criminal justice system 
is that its main objective is "truth discovery", with the role of the judge being to 
discover the truth by examining all sources of relevant information, including the 
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defendant. ' A distinction is made between the formal (statutory) truth and the actual 
(objective) truth. The former denotes what is seen as real (truth); it does not extend 
beyond the appearance of the reality. For example, a contract for sale of land can 
only be proved by certain types of written agreement; it is not possible to prove the 
existence of it by other means. The actual truth, on the other hand, relates the 
substantial reality rather than the formal one. Unlike Turkish civil procedure, Turkish 
criminal procedure is interested in actual (objective) truth, 2 rather than the formal 
(statutory) truth. Section 237 of CMUK requires the court to investigate all aspects 
of a case with the purpose of ascertaining objective truth. Two important principles 
derive from this requirement. Firstly, in the proof-taking session the judge in a 
criminal trial is not bound by the submissions of the participants.; In order to search 
out the truth the court must on its own motion extend the taking of evidence to all 
facts and means of proof that are important for their decision. In other words the 
court is not limited to the evidence offered by the prosecution or the accused4 but 
must satisfy itself with any investigation necessary to ensure that justice has been 
served. The court may even reformulate the criminal charge during the course of the 
trial. ' 
1 See Chapter Two 3.5.2.2. 
2 Kunter, 1986, Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku (Turkish Criminal Procedure Law), 
p. 23. 
3 CMUK 155 and 156. 
4 By a motion to receive evidence, the party does nothing but call the court's attention 
to its clarifying function. 
S Fulfilling this function requires the judge to exercise considerably more control over 
the process than his English counterpart who, as stated in the case of R. v Marsh (The 
Times, 6 July 1993), "sat and held the ring. It was for counsel on each side to conduct 
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Secondly, the judge is not bound by any formalistic rules (statute) that 
establish certain ways to prove certain facts in evaluating the evidence and deciding 
the case. Generally speaking in the criminal process, unlike civil process, everything 
may be regarded as evidence and the weight given to the evidence and the inferences 
allowable are left to the discretion of the court. It is the judge who evaluates all 
offered or self-requested evidence, giving it the weight he thinks it reasonably 
deserves. Neither the facts which may be given as evidence nor evaluation of them 
can be restricted. This is called "the system of free conviction" (vicdani delil sistemi) 
or "the principle of free evaluation of evidence" (delillerin serbestligi prensibi)6. This 
principle is a contrast with the ancient Continental system of "legal proof (preuve 
legale, gesetzliche Beweistheorie) where the evaluation by the fact-finder was governed 
by strict rules attributing certain quantities of weight to any given evidentiary item. 
Under the system of legal proof, if the legally required evidence was obtained, a 
conviction had to follow regardless of the judge's evaluation of that evidence. The 
reverse was also true. No matter how persuaded the judge of the defendant's guilt on 
the basis of evidence other than legally required, a conviction was not permitted. ' By 
examination and cross-examination and for the judge to see that they did it unfairly". For 
the relatively active role of the Turkish Judge, see Chapter Two 3.5.2.2. 
6 The terms of "moral certainty" or "full persuasion" of the judge may also be used to 
describe this principle which is expressed in the phrase of Intime Conviction by the French, 
Libero Convincimento by Italians, and Beweiswurdigung by Germans. This principle may be traced. back to the ancient Roman law doctrine that proof of a fact meant nothing unless 
the judge was thoroughly convinced of its existence. Kunter, supra note 2, p. 542. 
This system was politically and sociologically inspired by the desire to restrain the judge's power, which was to be achieved by making him executor of prescribed rules rather 
than the decisive factor in a legal proceeding. This system was in force all over Europe from 
the early decades of the sixteenth century until the French revolution. See generally Esmein, 
1914, A History of Continental Procedure; Kunert, 1966, "Some Observations on the Origin 
and Structure of Evidence Rules Under the Common Law System and Civil Law System of 
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refusing the system of legal proof, it is constitutionally established in Turkey that the 
judges shall decide according to their free conviction (vicdani kanaat)8. This 
principle is also reinforced by the provision of CMUK as follows; 
"with respect to the effect of reception of the evidence, 
the court decides according to its free conviction 
obtained from the investigation and the trial". 9 
Not surprisingly, this philosophy has made traditional Turkish law hostile to the 
exclusion of improperly obtained evidence. The cases in which the question of 
admissibility of improperly obtained evidence has directly been presented to the courts 
have virtually always ruled in favour of admissibility. In the case of E. 966/742, 
K 967/4610, for example, the Supreme Court of Military Appeals was confronted with 
the problem of eavesdropping by the police without lawful authority. Although the 
act was plainly illegal, it was held that the way of gathering evidence cannot be 
restricted, every piece of material which is helpful in reaching the truth may be taken 
as evidence. In a few cases, however, dicta were expressed that the evidence would 
not be admitted under all circumstances. " 
'Free Proof in the Code of Criminal Procedure", Buffalo Law Review 122, at p. 144. 
8 Article 138/1 of the Constitution: "Hakimler vicdani kanaatlerine gore hukum verirler". 
9 CMUK 254/1: "Mahkeme irat ve ikame edilen delilleri, durusmadan ve tahkikattan 
edinecegi kanaate gore takdir eder". 
10 T. 18.1.1967, E. 966/742, K. 967/46 (2. division), 11 Askeri Adalet Dergisi (Journal of Military Justice) 51; Another decision to the same effect is E. 570, K 561 which was decided 
on 10.11.1970, (3 rd division) (unpublished) cited by Coskun, 1972, Aciklamali Askeri 
Mahkemelerin Kurulusu ve Yargilama Usulu Kanunu (The Establishment and Criminal Procedure of Military Courts), p. 226. 
" 35/100 (2 nd division), date; 26.4.1973 (unpublished) cited by Coskun, 1974, Gizli Dinleme (Eavesdropping), p. 148. 
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2.2. In English Law 
In English law it is traditionally accepted that the trial is not a suitable forum for 
trying violations of legality or due process which are unconnected with the issue in the 
case and an investigation of an alleged illegality or impropriety could confuse and 
delay adjudication on the main issue 12. Therefore relevant evidence is in principle 
admissible irrespective of the fact that it was illegally or improperly obtained and this 
is clearly emphasised by early cases. In Jones v. Owens13 a constable unlawfully 
searched the suspect and found a quantity of young salmon in his pocket. By 
accepting this evidence as a basis of judgment the suspect was convicted of unlawful 
fishing and the following view expressed; 
"it would be a dangerous obstacle to the administration 
of justice if we were to hold, because evidence was 
obtained by illegal means, it could not be used against 
a party charged with an offence". 
This approach has been employed in subsequent cases. In Kuruma14 the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council held that in order to decide whether evidence is 
admissible, the test to be applied is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If 
the answer is affirmative, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how it 
was obtained. " The accused in this case was convicted of being in unlawful 
12 Wigmore, 1940, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials of 
Common Law, 3rd ed., vol. 8, s. 2183, p. 5. 
13 (1870) 34 J. P. 759. 
14 [1955] A. C. 197. 
IS Although the facts which lead to the appeal in Kuruma had occurred in Kenya, the 
opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is regarded as a restatement of the 
law of England as it stood in 1955. 
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possession of ammunition which had been discovered in consequence of a search 
by 
a police officer of a lower rank than the rules required for such searches. In support 
of its judgment the Privy Council referred to a dictum in R. v Leatham16 where it 
was stated that it does not matter how evidence was obtained, even if it had been 
obtained by theft it would be admissible. Thus, English law traditionally did not see 
the problem of the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence in terms of principles 
such as legitimacy, deterrent, or protective, but was instead concerned with the 
relevance of the evidence. Although all cases mentioned above are concerned with 
illegal searches, the approach which has been adopted in these cases is applicable to 
all sort of evidence'7, subject to certain exceptions. 
2.3. Comparison 
It becomes obvious from the above explanation that for many years it was well 
established as a general rule both in Turkey and England that the means by which 
evidence was obtained was immaterial to its admissibility in criminal proceedings. 
Both jurisdictions hold a firm belief that the ends of justice are better served if no 
attention is given to the fashion in which relevant evidence is produced. This general 
rule is not, however, free from any exception. 
16 (1861) 8 Cox C. C. 498, at p. 501; The issue in this case was involved the 
admissibility of letters, containing incriminating statements to corrupt practices at an 
election, which were obtained as a result of a clue given in the course of improper 
examination of the defendant. 
" For the case of illegally obtained sample of body fluid see R. v Apicella (1985) 82 Cr. 
App. R. 295; for illegally taking breath specimens see Fox v Chief Constable of Gwent [1986] A. C. 281 (H. L). 
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3. Exceptions to the General Rule 
3.1. Traditionally 
3.1.1. In Turkish Law 
The principle of free reception and evaluation of evidence does not mean that 
the Turkish courts have power to convict the suspect on whim. There are limits to 
this general rule. It is firstly limited by the maxim in dubio pro reo ; in doubt decide 
for the accused. This maxim mandates a standard of proof substantially similar to the 
English burden of proof 8. Secondly, the principle of orality requires that nothing 
but what has been discussed in open court can be made a basis for judgment. " 
Thirdly, the court is also required to disclose the grounds for the judgment20. 
According to the CMUK a criminal judgment contains two parts, the dispositive 
judgment and the statements of reason (gerekce)21. Not only all single facts that were 
found but also all inferences leading from one fact to another and to the final 
combination of facts are included in the gerekce. By qualifying the principle of free 
18 It is a common misapprehension about criminal procedure in the civil law system that 
there is no presumption of innocence. See, Merryman, 1985, The Civil Law Tradition: An 
Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America 131. 
19 CMUK 254/1. 
20 "Takdire esas olan hal ve sebeblerin hukumde gosterilmesi gerektigine.. ", Yargitay, 
1 C. D, 14.4.1966 T ve 902/1245; ile 25.4.1970 T, 2688/1307 decisions. 
21 CMUK 260. 
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evaluation the requirement of gerekce opens the doors to an appeal based on the 
alleged violation of rules of logic or experience or of the laws of nature. 
Finally and more importantly it is not permitted to use every possible evidence 
to reach the objective (actual) truth. The use of some methods described by the 
constitution and Code of Criminal procedure for obtaining evidence is forbidden. 
Although the Code before the 1992 Amendment did not contain specific exclusionary 
rules that prohibit the use in court of any evidence obtained through violation of those 
provisions, in a few cases dicta were expressed that all evidence obtained in violation 
of those provisions or of public decency or morality should be excluded regardless of 
its probative value. 2 The fact that evidence obtained improperly cannot be regarded 
as evidence is stated in the phrase of "evidentiary use prohibition" (delil yasaklari) 23 
3.1.2. In English Law 
Besides accepting as a general rule the principle of admissibility of relevant 
evidence, it has been recognised at common law that the trial judge always has the 
discretion to disallow evidence in criminal cases if the rules of admissibility would 
operate unfairly against an accused. Apart from reaffirming the traditional rule under 
which relevant evidence is always admissible regardless of how it was obtained, the 
22 "... kanuna, ahlaka ve genel adaba aykiri surette toplanan delilleri hakim telakki 
etmekten kacinmak zorundadir. " Askeri Yargitay (The Supreme Court of Military Appeals), 
2. Ceza Dairesi, 26.4.1973 t, 35/100, cited by Coskun, supra note 11 
, 
p. 148. 
23 This term is employed in Turkey to cover all exclusions of evidence, including those based on competence or relevance. 
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case of Kuruma24 gave, at the same time, some support to the existence of a 
discretion to suppress improperly obtained evidence. The existence of the judge's 
discretion to exclude illegally or improperly obtained evidence was acknowledged in 
Jeffrey v Blacl2s, in which the suspect was arrested for a trivial offence of theft (of 
a sandwich) and then the police searched the suspect's home and discovered a quantity 
of drugs. Although the Divisional Court held the opinion that the search was illegal 
on the ground that it was not for the offence for which he was arrested, evidence 
obtained by illegal search was accepted as a basis for judgement. However, the Court 
expressed the view that 
"... the justices sitting in this case, like any other criminal 
tribunal in England sitting under the English law, have 
a general discretion to decline to allow any evidence to 
be called by the prosecution if they think it would be 
unfair or oppressive to allow that to be done... it is a 
discretion which every criminal judge has all the time in 
respect of all the evidence which is tendered by 
prosecution. 9t26 
The proper scope of the exclusionary discretion was not certain at common 
law. The Privy Council in Kuruma did not articulate the basis on which relevant but 
improperly obtained evidence may be excluded in the exercise of discretion. Evidence 
obtained by trick was given by the Privy Council to illustrate excludable evidence on 
the ground that its admission would be unfair to the accused. 27 The court, however, 
24 [1955] A. C. 197. 
25 [1978] 1 Q. B. 490, The existence of the discretion was first recognised in Voisin [1918] 1 K. B. 531 at 539-540; see also May (1952) 36 Cr. App. R. 91 at p. 93. 
26 [19781 1 Q. B. 497-498. 
27 Kuruma [1955] A. C. 204. 
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did not attempt to account for why a trick can give rise to the exclusion of evidence 
whereas the illegality in Kuruma did not. Similarly, in Callis v Gunn it was held that 
evidence of fingerprints obtained without cautioning the suspect that he could refuse 
was admissible. Simultaneously, it was proclaimed that the discretion would be 
exercised to disallow evidence if "the evidence was obtained oppressively or by false 
representations or a trick, threat or bribe". " More recently, in the case of Jeffrey v 
Blacl29, it was held on appeal that cannabis and cannabis resin obtained in the 
absence of the defendant's consent or of a search warrant should had been admitted 
as evidence; at the same time it was stated that 
"if the case is such that not only have the police officers 
entered without authority, but they have been guilty of 
trickery, or they have misled someone 
, 
or they have 
been oppressive or they have been unfair, or in other 
respects they have behaved in a manner which is 
morally reprehensible, than it is open to the justices to 
apply their discretion and decline to allow the particular 
evidence to be let in as part of the trial"3o 
Further discussion to clarify the scope of the discretionary power to exclude was 
conducted in R. v Sang". Five Law Lords dedicated their effort to bringing dicta in 
previous cases into harmony. There is, however, very little consensus in R. v Sang 
on the true ambit of the discretion except two points; The first is that as a part of his 
function of ensuring the accused received a fair trial according to law the judge always 
28 Callis v Gunn, [1964] 1 Q. B. 495. 
29 [1978] 1 Q. B. 490. 
3o Jeffrey v Black [1978] 1 Q. B. 490, at 498, emphasis added. 
31 [1979] 2 All E. R. 1222; this decision has been subjected to intense scrutiny and 
criticism; see, Polyviou, 1981, "Illegally Obtained Evidence and R v. Sang" in Crime, proof 
and Punishment: Essays in Memory of Sir Robert Cross, ed. by Tapper, p. 226. 
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has a discretion to disallow evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative 
value. The second is that the discretion could not be used in entrapment cases. The 
unanimity as to the issue of entrapment was the result of the recognition that the 
discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence can only be exercised where 
evidence was "obtained from the accused after the commission of offence" 32 That 
is to say, the trial judge has no discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence if 
it was obtained during, or before the commission of offence. This formulation 
automatically rules out the exercise of discretion in cases such as evidence obtained 
by means of telephone tapping or bugging of the suspect's residence during the 
commission of offence. 
One should notice that in none of the above cited cases had evidence been 
excluded in the exercise of discretion ; instead, in each case it is stated that the 
discretion would be exercised if some other things occurred. It is open to speculation 
whether the discretion would be exercised had the other things happened. Leaving 
aside the speculations one thing is clear; that the judicial discretion to exclude relevant 
evidence on the ground that it was illegally or improperly obtained has been rarely 
exercised at common law in reported decisions. The cases of R. v Court3' and R. v 
Payne34 are rare illustrations of the use of discretion. The appellants in both cases, 
convicted of driving motorcars whilst unfit through driving, were taken to a police 
station immediately after their arrest. They were told at the station that a doctor 
32 R. v Sang, [1979] 2 All E. R. 1222. 
33 [1962] Crim. L. R. 697. 
3a [1963] 1 All E. R. 848. 
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would examine them in order to determine whether they suffered from any illness or 
injury; but that the purpose of examination was not to ascertain whether they were fit 
to drive. Although at the time of examination there was no deliberate attempt on the 
part of the police to mislead the suspects, later on the police decided to take 
advantage of medical examination of the suspect. In other words, the evidence 
obtained as a result of medical examination was sought to be used for a purpose which 
it was not originally intended; to prove they were intoxicated. The Court of Appeal 
held in both cases that evidence of the doctor that the defendant had not been fit to 
drive should have been excluded in the exercise of discretion. Evidence, which arose 
in these cases as a result of the physical examination, was seen in R. v Sang3S as 
tantamount to a self-incriminating admission which the suspect has been unfairly 
induced to make, after the offence has been committed, against the principle of nemo 
debet prodere se ipsum. 
3.1.3. Comparison 
The above explanations show that the question of how the court should handle 
improperly obtained evidence has been a problem that has plagued both Turkish and 
English justice for a long time. As far as the traditional law of each country is 
concerned, the issue was far from settled. No attempt has been made by the higher 
courts of Turkey and England to decide once and for all what was the state of law. 
Although a coherent and principled approach to the problem cannot be said to have 
emerged, some form of exclusionary rule was recognised in exceptional cases in both 
31 [1979] All E. R 1222. 
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jurisdictions. Traditionally, both jurisdictions, however, gave more weight to 
controlling crime than to protecting society from improper harassment by the law 
enforcement officer. 
Establishing the existence of an exclusionary rule in Turkey and in England is 
in conflict with the commonly held assumption that the exclusionary rule is "unique 
to American jurisprudencei3'. Indeed, one of the leading American commentators 
argued that non-adoption of the exclusionary rule by any other civilized nation is one 
of the proofs of the irrationality of the exclusionary rule37. The above explanations, 
however, reveal that this is a misconception; European nations including England and 
Turkey have also recognised some kind of exclusionary rule in their, criminal justice 
systems, and thus there is nothing, at least any more, unique to the United States. 
Moreover, it is argued by Pakter that exclusion was discussed by European scholars 
and courts long before the American counterparts and a form of exclusionary rule was 
adopted in France and Germany before the adoption of the exclusionary rule in the 
United States. 38 
36 According to Chief Justice Burger, exclusion of improperly obtained evidence is 
"unique to American jurisprudence", Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Breou 
of Narcotics, 403 U. S. 388 (1971); see also Macdougall, 1985, "The Exclusionary Rule and 
Its Alternatives- Remedies for Constitutional Violations in Canada and the United States", 
76 The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 608, at 627. 
37 Wilkey, 1978, "The Exclusionary Rule: Why suppress valid Evidence? " 62 Judicature 
216 
38 Pakter maintains that " in France, as early as 1672, a proceeding based on illegal 
search was 'nullified' which, in effect, excluded the evidence. Proceedings were nullified 
frequently in the nineteenth century. In this century, the first French case to reserve a 
decision due to an illegal search and seizure occurred in 1910, four years before the first 
United states case. 
... 
Evidence obtained from an illegal search and seizure was excluded in 
Germany as early as 1889. " (footnotes are omitted). Pakter, 1985, "Exclusionary Rules in 
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3.2. Recent Legislations 
In recent years both English and Turkish legal systems have been reformulating 
their approaches to the admission of improperly obtained evidence. Indeed, the 
legislature in both countries passed a law regulating this issue; The Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for England and the 1992 Amendment on the Code of 
Criminal procedure for Turkey. 
3.2.1. In Turkey 
In spite of the fact that the search for truth is the dominant function of the 
Turkish Criminal Justice System, the 1992 Amendment added two important 
provisions which require the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence to the Code 
of Criminal Procedure (CMUK). 
3.2.1.1. Section 254/2 
The new sub-clause 254/2 governs the admissibility of improperly obtained 
evidence generally in the following terms; 
"evidence obtained in breach of law (unlawfully) by 
investigative authorities cannot be taken as a basis for 
the judgment" 
France, Germany, and Italy", 9 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 1,4. 
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The phraseology of this provision strictly prohibits the admission of evidence 
in any criminal case which is obtained unlawfully, regardless of the probative value 
or reliability of such evidence. It may, therefore, be applied to the situations where 
the officers have acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct does not 
violate the law or to irregularities which are rather minor or merely technical. The 
original version of the provision required bad faith on the part of the law enforcement 
officer39, but this requirement was omitted from the formulation of the section 
without given any reason. 
Article 254/b has now been in operation for a short time. It is still too early 
to say how it has been interpreted by Turkish courts. The most dramatic possibility 
would be that any evidence obtained in a situation which did not meet the legal 
standards laid down would be inadmissible at the trial. 
Although a specific rationale is not being given by the Parliament, with the 
exclusion of all improperly obtained evidence it would have been hoped, firstly, that 
the citizen's procedural rights would become more than a "form of words". Secondly, 
the integrity of the court system or the legitimacy of the verdict would be upheld since 
the courts would not be condoning or actually participating in improper behaviour by 
using evidence that had been improperly obtained. Thirdly, the exclusion of 
improperly obtained evidence would discourage the police and the gendarmerie from 
engaging in such activities since they would have nothing to gain from evidence so 
39 The Bill Proposed by the Government, 11 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Journal of Parliamentary Debates), p. 24. 
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obtained. The question of whether this provision has brought Turkey close to having 
an American style exclusionary rule4° is discussed in the next chapter. 
3.2.1.2. Section 135/A 
The other provision of the 1992 Amendment 
-135a-, which contains specific 
exclusionary rules that prohibit the use in court of any statements obtained through 
violation of the statutory provisions that prohibit certain behaviours, reads as follows; 
to Statements of the suspect and interviewee should 
be the result of their free will. The freedom to 
determine and exercise free will shall not be impaired 
by physical and psychological abuse such as ill- 
treatment, torture, giving drug by force, fatigue, 
deception, physical force and violence, using any device. 
Promising an advantage which is against the 
statute is prohibited. 
Statements obtained in violation of these 
prohibitions may not be used in evidence even if the 
accused consents to its use. " 
This section seems not to exclude statements on the ground of unreliability, it is rather 
intended to protect human dignity and to serve as a symbol separating liberal from 
authoritarian proceedings. The detailed analysis of this provision will be made in 
chapter five. 
ao A short time after the enactment of the Bill the deputy prime minister of Turkey 
stated that "the law on judicial practices has brought American standards to bear on our 
criminal procedures". See The Financial Times 7 May 1993. 
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3.2.1.3. Historical Backgrounds of These Provisions 
When the preamble and the Parliamentary debate of the Bill are examined, it 
becomes evident that the off-quoted statements from official quarters to the effect that 
Turkey accepted 
, 
inter alia, the above cited provisions of its own will and just 
because the Turkish nation deserves this4' seems to be incorrect, or at least 
incomplete. Since the military coup on 12 September 1980 not only put an end to the 
parliamentary democracy in Turkey but also left the country with a bad reputation in 
the field of human rights42, the western countries felt the need to freeze relations and 
cooperation with Turkey. Indeed, Turkey's membership of the European parliament 
was blocked43, five other members of the Council of Europe brought applications 
against Turkey before the European Commission of Human Rights alleging major 
violations of several articles of the European Convention on Human Rights44, and the 
Association Agreement of Turkey with the European Economic Community was 
41 See, Cumhuriyet (Daily Newspaper) 02/09/1992, "Demirel (then prime minister): 
Yargi Reformu Halk Icin". 
42 See, inter alia, Amnesty International, 1986, Turkey: Testimony on Torture; 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Political Affairs Committee, 1984, 
Report on Fact-Finding Visit to Turkey, (17 May, Doc. 5208); PACE Legal Affairs 
Committee, 1984, Opinion on the Situation in Turkey (7 May, Doc 5216); More recently, 
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, The Public Statement on Turkey (15 
December 1992), printed in 4 European Journal of International Law 199 (1993). 
a3 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Order 398 (14 May 1981), 
excluding Turkish delegates, Res. 803 (30 Sept 1983), 982 (9 May 1984), 822. (10 May 
1984), 840 (23 April 1985). 
as France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Turkey (Apps. 9940-9944) 
(1982) 35 D&R 143, Declared admissible 1983, printed in 6 Human Rights Law Journal 331 
(1985). 
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suspended4S. All these actions naturally put pressure on Turkey and since 1983 the 
Turkish governments have endeavoured to improve Turkey's image abroad by 
adhering to a number of international conventions46 concerning human rights and by 
a number of national law reforms47. More recently, however, the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT) organised three visits to Turkey. The first two visits, carried out 
from 9 to 21 September 1990 and 29 September to 7 October 1991, were of an ad hoc 
nature. The negative conclusions reached by the CPT as a result of these visits are 
followed by a number of suggestions to the effect that legal safeguards against torture 
and other forms of ill-treatment need to be reinforced and new safeguards introduced. 
Although after the third visit, which took place from 22 November to 3 December 
1992, the Committee concluded that the Turkish authorities failed to improve the 
situation in the light of its recommendation, the Turkish Parliament at that time was 
about to legislate the law amending some provisions of the Code of Criminal 
procedure and of the law relating to the organisation and procedure of state security 
courts. Indeed, the legislation going in the direction of the recommendation made by 
the CPT on the strengthening of legal safeguards against torture and other form of ill- 
as See, Keesings Contemporary Archives (May 1987) p. 31287. 
a6 Turkey has ratified both the 1984 UN and 1987 Counsel of Europe Conventions 
Against Torture, see The Guardian, 8 Apr. 1988 and The Independent, 9 May 1988, see also 
Turkish Official Gazette, 27.2.1988, sayi: 19738 and 10.8.1988 sayi: 19895 ; On 29 January 
1987 Turkey made a declaration under article 25 of European Convention on Human rights 
recognising the competence of the Commission to receive applications from individuals 
alleging violations of their rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. See Chapter 
Two 3.3. 
47 Article 141,142 and 163 of the Penal Code, which were aimed at combating 
communism, separatism and advocacy of a religious state, were repealed in 1991. Statute 
no; 3713 of 12 March 1991, The Official Gazette, no: 20843 of 12 March 1991. 
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treatment had been approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 21 May 
1992, but it was subsequently returned by the President of the republic to the assembly 
for reconsideration. At the end a revised version of the Bill came into force on 1 
December 1992. This Bill was introduced by the government as a device enabling 
democratisation of the country and catching up with the procedural standards of 
member states of European Council48. During the parliamentary debate of it, several 
spokesmen on behalf of the government firmly stated that the Bill, if it became a law, 
would improve the reputation of the country and stop the recurrence of criticism of 
Turkey by the international community in the field of democratization and human 
rights49. 
To conclude, firstly, the 1992 Amendment was introduced as a result of 
external pressure. Since the West is economically and strategically very important to 
Turkey, reports of Western governmental and non-governmental organizations about 
human rights abuses in Turkey, particularly involving torture, were, and still are, a 
matter of great concern in Turkey. Secondly the possible effect of this legislation was 
exaggerated, if not stated optimistically, by the Turkish government. The social role 
48 The Preamble of the Bill. 
a9 For the benefit of Turkish readers it may serve a purpose to quote the spoksmen's 
exact words: "Bu degisiklerle, iskence ve iskence iddialari ortadan kalkacak.. " (These 
amendments will cease allegations of torture), Seyfi Oktay, the Minister of Justice; 
".. Turkiye uluslararasi platformlarda suclamalardan kurtulacak.. "and ".. tasari tartismalara son 
verecek, ulkemize yoneltilen suclamalara set cekecek.. " (This Bill, if it becomes law, will 
stop allegations of torture against Turkey in international level), Adnan Keskin (SHP, 
Denizli); ".. artik ulkemizde iskence iddiasinin sozu dahi edilemeyecektir.. " (from now on it 
will not be possible to mention allegations of torture in our country), Melih Papuccuoglu 
(DYP, Balikesir), TBMM B: 79 21.5.1992 0: 3,11 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Journal of 
Parliamentary Debates) 338. 
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of the law enforcement officers remains essentially unchanged; CMUK has done little 
to alter the culture and organization of law enforcing. Altering the procedural rules 
will not necessarily have any impact on behaviour and certainly will not lead to 
predictable or uniform change. The very fact that pre-1992 Amendment practices did 
not in many respects correspond to the formal rules5° should make this point obvious 
enough. 
3.2.2. In England 
3.2.2.1. In General 
The existence of the judge's discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence 
was recognised at common law. In 1984, however, the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act regulated the issue of the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence. 
Accordingly, PACE contains three sections which are relevant for our purposes: 
section 78, which deals with the exclusion of unfair evidence generally, section 76, 
which relates to the admissibility of confessions, and section 82(3), which preserves 
the common law discretion to exclude relevant evidence. 
so The use of torture or any other cruel or inhuman treatment has always been prohibited 
in Turkish national law. See Article 26 of the Constitution dated 1876 (Dustur, I. Tertip, C. 4, 
s. 4-20), Article 73 of the 1924 Constitution (Dustur, 3. Tertip, C. 5, s. 1019-1032), and article 
14 of the 1961 Constitution (RG, 20/07/1961). Finally, Article 17, paragraph. 3, of the 
Constitution states: "No one shall be subjected to a penalty or to treatment incompatible with 
human dignity". Article 245 of the Criminal Code punishes law enforcement officers who 
ill-treat or cause bodily injury to persons with whom they come into contact in the fulfilment 
of their duties. Article 243 of the criminal Code punishes any public official who tortures 
an accused person in order to make him confess his offence. 
0 
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3.2.2.2. Section 78/1 
The basic provision is section 78(1) which states that 
"In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow 
evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be 
given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all 
the circumstances, including the circumstances in which 
the evidence was obtained, the admission of the 
evidence would have such an adverse effect on the 
fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to 
admit it. " 
This section has chosen a middle ground between admitting all evidence, however 
obtained, and excluding all improperly obtained evidence, by giving the judge a 
discretion to exclude evidence. A certain amount of help by the Act was provided as 
to the extent of this discretion; the evidence may be excluded if its admission would 
adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings. There is, however, still room for 
controversy as to when the admission of the evidence in question adversely affects the 
fairness of a trial. The concept of "adverse effect upon the fairness of trial" will be 
examined in the following chapter. 
3.2.2.2.1. Background of Section 78 
When the PACE was first presented before the Parliament, this section was not 
included. Section 78 emerged after an amendment o the PACE Bill was proposed in 
the House of Lords by Lord Scarman and approved by the House. This amendment 
become known as the Scarman amendment which stated that: 
"if it appears to the court in any proceedings that any 
evidence (other than a confession) proposed to be given 
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by the prosecution may have been obtained improperly, 
the court shall not allow the evidence to be given unless 
(a) the prosecution proves to the court beyond 
reasonable doubt that it was obtained lawfully 
and in accordance with a code of practice (where 
applicable) issued, approved, and in force, under 
Part VI of this Act; or 
(b) the court is satisfied that anything improperly 
done in obtaining it was of no material 
significance in all the circumstances of the case 
and ought, therefore, to be disregarded; or 
(c) the court is satisfied that the probative value of 
the evidence, the gravity of the offence charged, 
and the circumstances in which the evidence was 
obtained are such that the public interest in the 
fair administration of the criminal law requires 
the evidence to be given, notwithstanding that it 
was obtained improperly. 
To put this into more simple words it means that the judge, faced with evidence 
improperly obtained 
, 
is bound to exclude it except in certain circumstances which are 
specified in the subsections. 
A number of important features of this proposal may be identified. First, the 
amendment is said to restore the wider power to exclude improperly obtained evidence 
which many had thought was part of the law until the decision in R. v Sang. s' There 
is, however, a slight difference between the pre-Sang discretion and the discretion 
proposed in this amendment in that the former was a discretion to exclude otherwise 
admissible evidence while the latter is one to include otherwise inadmissible evidence. 
Contrary to the Lord Chancellor's observation that the Scarman amendment introduces 
the American style "total exclusioniS2, it follows very much the position of "a reverse 
s' The Parliamentary Debates (Hansard); House of Lords (vol: 455) (1984) col: 672. 
32 The Lord Chancellor, ibid, col 667. 
121 
onus exclusionary rule" proposal made by the Australian Law Reform Commission in 
their report on criminal investigation. " Second, it gives some guidelines to the court 
as to how the discretion is to be exercised. The guidelines such as "gravity of the 
offence charged", "the probative value of the evidence", and "material significance" 
were, however, criticised for their lack of clarity. " Third, although the objective of 
the amendment was not to discipline the police it was acknowledged by the Lord 
Scarman that it would place upon the courts a deterrent power by operating "as a 
deterrent to abuse of power by the police"". Finally, the onus of proof to justify 
inclusion is placed upon the prosecution. 
When the Bill returned to the House of Commons the Government decided not 
to accept the Scarman amendment on the grounds of, firstly, the lack of desire for 
improperly obtained evidence to be excluded to mark society's disapproval of the 
improper police conduct. 56 It was clearly stated by Mr L. Brittan, the then Home 
Secretary, that "disciplinary matters should be dealt with by disciplinary 
procedures""', and the only purpose for the exclusion should be to avoid an unfair 
trialSB. The second reason for unwillingness on the part of the Government for 
s3 Criminal Investigation: Report No: 2, An Interim Report, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1975 para: 295 ; This formulation is practised in the common 
law of Scotland, see Lord McCluskey, The Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Lords, vol 455, para: 666,31 July 1984. 
sa The Lord Chancellor, ibid, col. 670. 
ss Ibid, col. 672 and 657. 
s6 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard): House of Commons (vol: 65) (1984) col. 1012. 
57 Ibid, col. 1029. 
58 Ibid, col. 1012. 
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accepting the Scarman amendment was attributed to the heavy onus of proof which 
is placed upon the prosecution and to the excessive burdens on the courts of "trial 
within trials" S9 Finally, the guidelines laid down in the Scarman amendment were 
considered to be too complex for a court in the course of ordinary criminal 
proceedings 60 Eventually, to replace the Scarman amendment the Government 
brought forward its amendment which was described as "simple and clear in form, yet 
suitably flexible" 61 The Government amendment was enacted and now appears as 
section 78. 
3.2.2.2.2. The Important Features of Section 78 
3.2.2.2.2.1. Applicability to various situations 
Section 78(1) may be implemented in a variety of situations, with or without 
the presence of some elements of impropriety in the way in which the evidence was 
obtained. In order to apply section 78(1), it is not necessary that there should be any 
impropriety on the part of the police or anyone else. It includes an "unfairness" 
discretion unhampered by the need to establish impropriety. Indeed, in R. v 
O'Connor", where a conspiracy charge was in issue, the Court of Appeal held that 
S91bid, col. 1013 and 1023. 
60 Ibid, col. 1014 and 1029; Mr Lyell identified nine different matters which the court 
will have to go through every time the subject is raised 
, 
see col. 1014. 
61 Ibid, col. 1014. 
61 (1987) 85 Cr. App. R. 298; see also more recent leading authorities R. v Kempster [1989] 1 W. L. K 1125 and R. v Mattison [1990] Crim. L. R. 117. 
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section 78(1) is applicable to evidence of a co-accused's conviction for conspiracy 
with the defendant. The reason given for this is that the defendant had not been 
present at the other man's trial and had no opportunity to cross-examine him. To 
admit the conviction as an evidence therefore would enable the prosecution to put a 
statement made by the co-accused in the absence of the defendant to the jury without 
the co-accused being present to be cross-examined. The list of possible sample cases 
is endless, but this study is confined to the application of section 78(1) to exclude 
evidence which has been improperly obtained. Implementation of s 78(1) to exclude 
properly obtained evidence which, if admitted, may diminish the chances of reaching 
a fair judgment is left out of the scope of this study. 
3.2.2.2.2.2. Covers all the evidence 
Despite the draftsman's intention not to omit any specific form of evidence 
from the section63 some writers argued that section 78 is designed for evidence other 
than confessions". No such restriction appears in the section. The Court of Appeal 
also did not agree with this restricted approach and adopted a position which is in 
conformity with the "mind of the legislature"" in several cases. In the case of R. v 
63 Mr Brittan, the then Home Secretary, stated that "there is no restriction in our clause 
on applying the test of admissibility to confession evidence...... Our amendment will 
... 
provide a framework for considering the fairness of admitting all forms of evidence.. ", 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1983, vol. 65, col. 1014. 
64 Robertson, 1989, "The Looking-Glass World of Section 78", New Law Journal, 
(September 15), p. 1224. 
65 Although it is often difficult to find out the legislature's intention the point in question 
is clear in the parliamentary record of the section. See, supra note 63. 
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Mason", for example, it was held that the word "evidence" in the section in question 
means all the evidence which may be introduced by the prosecution to the court: it 
even includes a confession which has passed the admissibility test under section 76(2). 
Another example would be the case of R. v Gaynor6'. in which the failure on the 
part of the police to observe identification procedures laid down in the Codes of 
Practice resulted in the exclusion of the identification evidence. Furthermore, the 
section also would seem to widen the scope of the discretion at common law by 
removing restrictions on the exclusionary discretion imposed by the House of Lords 
in R. v Sang to the effect that evidence obtained from the defendant after the 
commission of the offence is incapable of being subject to the discretion 68 
Accordingly, section 78(1) potentially applies to evidence obtained by entrapment: 
however exclusion in such cases is rare. "' 
66 [1988] 1 W. L. R. 139. 
6' [1988] Crim. L. R. 242; For the fact that English judiciary are prepared to use their 
powers of exclusion to ensure that identification procedures are complied with see R. v 
Ladlow [1989] Crim. L. R. 219; R. v Grannell (1989) 90 Cr. App. R 149, R. v Samms 
[1991] Crim. L. R. 197, and R. v Nagah (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 344. 
68 R. v Christou and Wright [1992] 4 All E. R. 559, at 564; R. v Edwards [1991] Crim. 
L. R. 45; R. v Gill and Ranuana [1989] Crim L. K 358. 
69 It was even decided in the case of Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Chinoy 
- [1992] 1 All E. R. 317- that the fact of entrapment did not infringe English law in that the 
detection and proof of certain types of criminal activity such as drug trafficking offences 
may necessitate the employment of covert and unlawful means. 
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3.2.2.2.2.3. Confined to the Prosecution Evidence 
Section 78 empowered a court to refuse to admit only the evidence on which 
the prosecution "proposes to rely". It naturally covers the evidence proposed by other 
parties but relied upon by the prosecution in that accepting the contrary would enable 
the prosecution to bring the otherwise inadmissible evidence into the trial by indirect 
route. 0 
3.2.2.2.3. The Process of Exercising the Discretion 
3.2.2.2.3.1. No guidelines 
Both the Parliament and the courts have refused to lay down any guidelines 
clarifying precisely how the discretion should be exercised. During the Parliamentary 
debate of section 78 in the House of Commons it was stated by the Home Secretary 
that; 
"... we must recognise that the multiplicity of 
circumstances in which that may arise makes it 
impossible, or at any rate undesirable, to confine the 
matter to a set of specific criteria"" 
The judiciary has also expressly declined to set any general guidance by making the 
following typical comments: 
70 See Murdoch v Taylor, [1965] A. C. 574. 
71 House of Commons Official Report, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), vol. 65, no. 212, 
p. 1014. 
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"it is undesirable to attempt any general guidance 
as to the way in which a judge's discretion under s. 78 
or his inherent powers should be exercised, 
circumstances vary infinitely. "n, 
"every case has to be determined on its own facts. i73, 
"the circumstances of each case are almost always 
different, and judges may well take different views in 
the proper exercise of their discretion even where the 
circumstances are similari74, 
"we are concerned with the exercise of discretion by the 
trial judge. This should not lightly be overruled. "" 
This approach can be disputed by maintaining that it is not realistic to say that 
"circumstances vary infinitely", different facts of individual cases should have to be 
examined in the light of general discretionary principles. As argued by Ashworth the 
choice of principle -whether disciplinary, protective or reliability- cannot be avoided 
in the practical exercise of such a discretion. 76 The judicial reluctance to set certain 
criteria to govern judicial discretion has a number of disadvantages. First, judicial 
attitude cannot be predicted and therefore it would be hard to know when the 
discretion will be exercised. Second, in the absence of some clear guidelines to 
regulate judicial discretion rational criticism of its exercise can hardly be possible. " 
' R. v Samuel [1988] 1 Q. B. 615, at p. 629. 
73 R. v Parris (1989) 89 Cr. App. R. 68. 
" R. v Jelen and Katz (1990) 90 Cr. App. R. 456, at p. 465. 
's Lord Mustill, in R. v Preston and others (1994) 98 Cr. App. R. 405, at p.. 434. 
76 Ashworth, 1977, "Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights", Crim. L. R. 723, at 734. 
"Allen, 1990, "Discretion and Security: Excluding Evidence Under Section 78(1) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984,49 Cambridge Law Review 80. 
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Guidelines, on the other hand, are expected to be capable of ensuring more 
open and rational decision making. A number of reasons are given for this. First, 
they make accountability possible by acting as a criterion for testing decisions, and 
therefore minimize the extent of reliance upon irrelevant, improper or arbitrary factors. 
Second, they encourage consistency in judicial decisions. Third, they prompt the law 
enforcement officer to be more careful and critical about the evidence to be obtained 
and the policies to be followed. " 
Adopting guidelines, however, is not free from disadvantages: By their very 
nature, the factors which will be considered in individual cases will be limited. The 
more precise and indisputable they are , the less consideration to other factors will be 
given. Moreover, guidelines tend to became fixed and difficult to change, and instead 
of being reviewed in view of experience and objectives, become unalterable. "' In the 
light of these pros and cons it is now clear that the strict adherence to guidelines will 
contrast with the idea of giving discretion. 
Due to the lack of judicial guidelines to govern judicial discretion it is 
maintained that it may be worthwhile to look at other jurisdictions such as the 
Scottish, Irish, Canadian and Australian where a similar wide discretion has been 
operated for some time and a number of guidelines have been identified. " These 
78 Galligan, 1987, "Regulating Pre-Trial Decisions" in Criminal Law and Justice: Essays 
from the WG Hart Workshop, ed. by Dennis, p. 177. 
'91bid, 186-7 
8° See, Yeo, 1981, "The Discretion To Exclude Illegally and Improperly Obtained 
Evidence: A Choice of Approaches", 13 Melbourne University Law Review 46; Allen, supra 
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include taking into account factors such as the importance of the rights breached; 
whether the impropriety in question was deliberate; the gravity of the offence charged; 
the probative value of the improperly obtained evidence; the presence or otherwise of 
circumstances of urgency, emergency or necessity; and the availability or otherwise 
of a direct sanction against the law enforcement officer responsible for impropriety. 
From the Parliamentary history of the section it is clear that some of these guidelines 
were included in the Scarman amendment which has not been enacted on the ground, 
inter alia, that it is unnecessary for Parliament to set out the criteria by which a judge 
should be guided. In the light of the Parliamentary history of the section one may 
argue that had the legislature intended to authorize the courts to apply such a test, it 
would have said so. Although it is true that the courts are not being authorised to do 
so, they are not openly being banned from applying guidelines adopted by other 
jurisdictions in exercising their discretion. 
Despite the judiciary's unwillingness to lay down some guidelines to clarify the 
process of exercising the discretion, where the argument for exclusion of evidence 
under section 78(1) is based on the effect of alleged breach of the procedural rules 
two points have to be considered before exercising the discretion. These are; 
3.2.2.2.3.2. Impropriety 
The first stage is to identify whether there has been an impropriety. As far as 
English law is concerned, the "impropriety" covers not only evidence which obtained 
note 77, p. 85; Pattenden, 1990, Judicial Discretion and Criminal Litigation 288. 
129 
through violation of a statute, a rule of common law, or a provision of the Codes of 
Practice8', but also evidence obtained by way of unfair or unethical manner. The 
meaning and the scope of the term "improperly" has been clarified in the Introduction 
Chapter. 92 
3.2.2.2.3.3. Unfairness 
The second step is to decide whether admitting improperly obtained evidence 
will have an adverse effect on the fairness of proceeding. The heart of the matter here 
is the concept of "unfairness" which will be examined in some detail in the following 
chapter. 
One may ask whether, if the courts have the opinion that both conditions have 
been satisfied, there is any further component of the discretion to exclude evidence. 
With regard to this question two possible answers, derived from different interpretation 
of the phraseology, may be given. The first interpretation of s. 78 is that when the 
courts reach the conclusion that conditions described in s. 78 exist they should not have 
any other discretion but to exclude the evidence. According to this interpretation the 
meaning of "may" in s. 78 is "shall". 83 The second is that when the court has the 
opinion that the infringement of procedural norms had adverse effect on the fairness 
" R. v Absolam (1988) 88 Cr. App. R. 332, at 337; R. v Delaney (1988) 88 Cr. App. 
R. 338. 
82 See Chapter One 1. 
83 Allen, supra note 77, p. 83; R. v Middlebrok and Caygill, 1994, Lexis, Court of 
Appeal (18 February), Transcript by J. Larking. 
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of proceedings the evidence may be excluded, but exclusion is not automatic; as 
pointed out in R. v Walsh84, "the test to be applied is whether the evidence would 
have such an adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings that it ought not to be 
admitted. There must therefore be some attempt to estimate the degree of unfairness 
which creeps into the proceedings if the evidence is allowed. "" On the latter 
interpretation clearly the scope of the discretion is much wider. Nevertheless, 
whichever interpretation is adopted the vague phraseology of s. 78 is capable of 
providing a wide discretion to the trial judge to exclude otherwise admissible evidence. 
3.2.2.3. Section 76(2) 
Subsection 76(2) of PACE Act specifically regulates the issue of the 
admissibility of confession evidence in the following form: 
"If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes 
to give in evidence a confession made by an accused 
person, it is represented to the court that the confession 
was or may have been obtained 
(a) by the oppression of the person who made it; or (b)in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, 
in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable 
any confession which might be made by him in consequence 
thereof, 
the court shall not allow the confession to be given in 
evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution 
proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the 
confession was not obtained as aforesaid. " 
" (1989) 91 Cr. App. R. 161. 
83 Birch, "Commentary on R. v Walsh" [1989] Crim. L. R. 824. 
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To put it into simple terms this subsection requires the exclusion of confessions 
obtained by oppression or induced in circumstances conducive to unreliability. 
Detailed examination of this provision will be conducted in Chapter Six. 
3.2.2.4. Section 82(3) 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 also preserves all existing common 
law discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence. Subsection 82(3) provides; 
"nothing in this part of this Act shall prejudice any 
power of a court to exclude evidence whether by 
preventing questions from being put or otherwise) at its 
discretion". 
3.2.2.5. Comparison of Section 78 Discretion with Common Law 
Despite the draftsman's pronouncement that " we are making new lawi86, 
when section 78(2) became a law there was not much hope that it would make 
considerable difference to the approach of the court at common law. 87 Subsequent 
cases have also produced conflicting opinions. According to the Court of Appeal view 
expressed in the case of R. v Mason88, section 78 did no more than re-state the power 
which judges had at common law before the PACE came into force. Looking at the 
86 House of Commons Official Report, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) vol: 65, no: 212, 
col 1017. 
$' Zuckerman, 1987, "Illegally-Obtained Evidence-Discretion as a Guardian of Legitimacy", 40 Current Legal Problems 55. 
88 [1988] W. L. R. 139, at 144; (1988) 86 Cr. App. R. 349; see also R. v Harwood [1989] Crim. L. R. 285. 
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problem from this point of view, it would seem that the existence of s. 82(3) which 
preserved the common law exclusionary rule can hardly be explained. It may be said 
that the existence of s. 82(3) gives rise to the only conclusion which can safely be 
drawn which is that Parliament intended section 78 to be independent and wider than 
the position at common law. In addition to this, the phraseology of the section in 
question does not restrict the applicability of it to any particular evidence: It applies 
to "any evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely". In this sense it widens 
the "Sang discretion"- widely believed to be equivalent to the common law discretion- 
which was restricted to cases in which the prejudicial effects of evidence outweighs 
its probative value, and to evidence obtained from the accused after the commission 
of the offence. "' Moreover, section 78, being a part of a codifying Act90, is to be 
interpreted in the light of the principles set out in Bank of England v Vagliano91. 
The principle expressed in that case was that the court had to examine the language 
of the statute and ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any consideration 
derived from the previous state of law. 
It seems to me that the scope of section 78 is much wider than the common 
law power to exclude illegally or improperly obtained evidence. The concern of the 
section in question is the effect of the admission on the fairness of the proceeding. 
89 See, R. v Christou and Wright, (1992) 97 Cr. App. R. 264; R. v Smurthwaite [1994] 
1 All E. R. 898 at 902; for the contrary view see Smith, 1993, "Commentary on Williams 
and O'Hare v DPP" Crim. L. R. 776; also R. v Khan [1994] 4 All E. R. 426. 
90 R. v Fulling (1987) 85 Cr. App. R. 136 at 141. This view is also held by Professor 
Birch, 1994, "What is a Fair Cop? ", 47 Current Legal Problems 73. 
91 [1891] A. C. 107 at 144. 
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Since to admit evidence the prejudicial effect of which outweighs its probative value 
is highly likely to have adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings, evidence which 
could properly be excluded in common law also may be excluded under the section 
in question92, but not vice versa. One may reasonably respond to this argument by 
asking what is the function of section 82(3). A possible answer is that the Section 
82(3) discretion may be applied after the evidence is given93 in cases such as where 
improperly obtained evidence arises out of cross-examination or where in the light of 
fresh evidence the judge changes his earlier admission of evidence 94. 
3.2.3. Comparison 
Certain similarities and differences between Turkish and English approaches 
may be identified from the above examination. They will be examined in the 
following pages. 
92 Matto v Wolverhampton Crown Court, [1987] R. T. R. 337 at 346. This fact, 
however, is explained by Professor Smith with the "enlargement of the notion of what is 
unfair", see Commentary on R. v Christou and Wright [1992] Crim. L. R. 732. 
93 The section 78 power, on the other hand has to be applied before the evidence is 
given. See below note 120 and accompanying text. 
94 R. v Sat-Bhambra (1888) 152 J. P. 365; (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 55; see also May, 1988, "Fair Play at Trial: An Interim Assessment of Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984", Crim. L. R. 722. 
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3.2.3.1. Recent Parliamentary Legislation 
In recent years both countries have shared some degree of parallel 
developments: In 1984 the English and in 1992 the Turkish legal systems reformulated 
their approaches to the admission of improperly obtained evidence. The issue in 
question in both countries was brought about by the legislature, rather than by the 
courts. Regulating by legislation is the typical method of a Civil Law country. With 
regard to English law it is, however, a departure from traditional common law in 
which judges go on to develop law from case to case, as new circumstances arise. 
The similar attitudes of the Parliaments is the clear illustration of the fact that 
both countries are moving towards a more careful review of methods of pre-trial 
investigation. Such a trend is probably the result of the influence of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. "' Many of the European countries including England 
and Turkey, by adhering to the European Convention on Human Rights, have 
subjected themselves to general standards of procedural fairness. Although the 
European Commission has consistently held that the admissibility and probative value 
of evidence are essentially matters for national law96, a number of complaints to the 
effect that the introduction of certain evidence in a criminal trial breached the 
9S See generally, Linke, 1971, "The Influence of the European Convention of Human 
Rights on National European Criminal Proceedings", 21 De Poul Law Review 397-420. 
96 App. No: 8876/80 v. Belgium, 16.10.1980,23 D&R 233; App. No: 7450/76 v. 
Belgium, 28.2.1977,2 Digest 243. 
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applicant's rights under Article 6 of European Convention on Human Rights have been 
examined under the general rule of a fair evidence-taking procedure. 
"' 
3.2.3.2. Recognition of the Exclusionary Rules 
What really emerges as the outstanding feature of English and Turkish 
legislation is the principle that when other sanctions attached to procedural 
requirements fail to ensure compliance with the latter, exclusion of improperly 
obtained evidence provides an additional device for the judge to protect the procedural 
safeguards, to ensure fair trial, or to reach legitimate verdicts. 
3.2.3.3. Different or Similar Solutions 
Establishing that England and Turkey both have exclusionary rules founded on 
statutory provisions does not help the question of whether the exclusionary rules in 
these countries are the same or not. Under the Turkish exclusionary rule governed by 
article 254, exclusion of improperly obtained evidence is mandatory in the sense that 
whenever unlawfulness is established, the resulting evidence must be excluded. Once 
the unlawfulness is proved, a trial judge has no discretion in its exclusion: no further 
principle such as fairness or trustworthiness may be invoked against exclusion after 
that finding. Decisions as to which evidence will or will not be excluded depends 
principally upon the meaning attributed to the word "unlawfulness", rather than upon 
97 Nielsen v Denmark (European Commission of Human Rights: Art 31 Reports) 
15.3.1961,4 Yearbook 494, para. 52. 
anything inherent in the exclusionary rule. The English position, on the other hand, 
is quite clear that exclusion is discretionary. Under Section 78 of PACE the court has 
a discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence if its reception would adversely 
effect the fairness of the proceedings. In both jurisdictions the amount of evidence 
which will be excluded depends on the meaning attached to the single words; 
"unlawfulness" in Turkey and "unfairness" in England. The meaning of these terms 
will be subjected to examination in the next chapter. 
When consideration is shifted from the exclusion of improperly obtained 
evidence generally to the admissibility of confession evidence, greater and clearer 
similarities are to be found between Turkish and English law. "' 
3.2.3.4. The Special Regulation of Confession and Possible Causes for it 
It should be noted that the admissibility of confessions (statements) has been 
subject to special rules of evidence both in England and Turkey 99 It is worth 
examining possible causes for the special regulation of confession evidence. A 
number of possible causes may be identified as follows; 
98 See Chapter Five. 
" Even before PACE came into force a distinction was drawn between confessional and 
non-confessional evidence in R. v Sang 
-[1979] 3 W. L. R. 263- which was concerned with 
non-confessional evidence. 
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3.2.3.4.1. Existence of a Fundamental Difference Between Confession and Other 
Evidence 
Since confession evidence is made by, or elicited from, the suspect, it does not 
exist until the suspect makes it. It, therefore, requires to be tested for admissibility 
primarily by the manner in which the suspect was led, or came, to produce a 
statement. The same consideration does not necessarily apply to the question of 
admissibility of non-confessional evidence. Unlike confessions, the inculpatory 
character of non-confessional evidence is generally unaffected by the manner of its 
acquisition. 
3.2.3.4.2. High Risk of Untrustworthiness 
The special regulation of confession evidence may arise from being aware of 
the fact that confessions are more likely to be unreliable than other evidence. Some 
recent and widely publicised cases such as the Birmingham Six, the Guilford Four, 
The Tottenham Three and the Confait Case illustrate the point that reliability of 
confession may be extremely doubtful1°°. It was recognised in one of the research 
studies on which the Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure" was 
based that "there are powerful social and psychological forces operating in 
interrogation which 
... 
may effectively destroy the voluntariness of statements so 
10° See Chapter Six 1. 
101 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1981, Report, Cmnd 8092. 
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obtained. ""' There will no doubt always be instances in which innocent people seek 
to confess crimes103. Indeed psychological researches on the reliability of confession 
show that circumstances may make the suspect confess to a crime which he did not 
commit. Accordingly, false confession may derive from variety of reasons. Kassing 
and Wrightsman104 suggested that there are three psychologically different types of 
false confession. These are voluntary, coerced-compliant, and coerced-internalized 
confessions. These three psychological types are described by Gudjonsson in 
detail1 ". Voluntary false confessions are made without any external pressure. Four 
different motives are said to lead to voluntary false confession; (i) a ghoulish desire 
for publicity or notoriety, (ii) a desire to protect the real criminal, (iii) the need to 
atone for guilty feelings through receiving punishment, (iv) lack of adequate capacity 
to distinguish between reality and fantasy. The coerced-compliant confession is caused 
by the persuasive interrogation where the suspect perceives that he will gain some 
benefit such as being allowed to go home for confessing, though he is fully aware of 
not committing the crime. In this situation the suspect generally believes that sooner 
or later the truth will come out and he will than be released. The coerced-internalised 
confession results from psychological manipulation of the suspect into believing that 
102 Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980, Police Interrogation- Psychological Approach Royal 
Commission Research Study, p. 24. 
X03 The question of whether it should be possible to convict on the strength of a pre-trial 
confession is subjected to an examination by Pattenden, 1991, "Should Confessions be 
Corroborated? ", 107 The Law Quarterly Review 317-339. 
104 Kassing and Wrightsman, 1985, Confession Evidence. The Psychology of Evidence 
and Trial Procedure, p. 76. 
pos Gudjonsson, 1992, The Psychology of Interrogations Confessions and Testimony. 
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he has committed the crime he is accused of. Here the suspect does not trust his 
memory and begins at least temporarily to accept suggestions offered by the police. 
3.2.3.4.3. Frequent Introduction of Confession in the Court; 
Although we are in ignorance of the exact frequency with which confessions 
are made and introduced in the courts, it has been reported by several American 
researchers1°6 and has also been noted in a number of English studies1°7 that a high 
proportion of defendants make such admissions. The proportions founded by the main 
English studies vary 
-Bottoms and McClean 70 per cent, Zander 76 per cent, Irving 
65 per cent, Softley 61 per cent-; but they all clearly indicate that suspects frequently 
confess when they are interrogated. Even if it is a fact that a majority of suspects 
make a confession, it does not necessarily follow that the prosecution introduces such 
106 Younger, 1968, "Results of a Survey Conducted in the District Attorney's Office of 
Los Angeles County Regarding the effect of the Miranda Decision upon the Prosecution of 
Felony Cases", 5 American Criminal Law Quarterly 32-39; Souris, 1966, "Stop and Frisk 
or Arrest and Search- The Use and Misuse of Euphemisms", 57 Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology and Police Science 251; Witt, 1973, "Non-Coercive Interrogation and the 
Administration of Criminal Justice: the Impact of Miranda on Police effectuality", 64 Journal 
of Criminal law and Criminology 320-332. 
lo' Bottoms and McClean, 1976, Defendants in the Criminal Process; Zander, 1979, "The 
Investigation of Crime: A Study of Cases Tried at the Old Bailey", Crim. L. Rev. 203-219; 
Irving, 1980, Police Interrogation: A Case Study of Current Practice, Royal Commission on 
Criminal Procedure Research Study no: 2; Softley, 1980, Police Interrogation: An 
Observational Study in Four Police Stations, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 
Research Study no: 4; McConville, 1993, Corroboration and Confessions: The Impact of a 
Rule Requiring that no Conviction cab be Sustained on the Basis of Confession Evidence 
Alone, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Research Study No: 13; The Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993, Report, Cmnd. 2263. 
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evidence to a great extent or relies upon it to prove its case. Many commentators108, 
however, have asserted that confessions constitute an essential part of the case for the 
prosecution in a majority of criminal trials. 109 This assertion might be true for the 
case of Turkey, but in England a written or verbal confession is likely to lead to a plea 
of guilty. If this is so, the proportion of reliance upon confession by the prosecution 
in trial may be expected to decrease in England. 
3.2.3.4.4. High Impact of Confession Upon the Outcome; 
The literature on the role played by confessions in the prosecution of criminal 
cases is not massive. Without reference to the empirical evidence the assertion 
generally is presented that confession can be decisive of a defendant's fate. As stated 
by McCormick " the introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a trial in 
court superfluousi11° Recently a number of studies concerned with the role of 
confession evidence, however, have appeared in the United States. There is no 
apparent reason for not assuming that the findings can be relevant to both Turkey and 
England. In a mock jury experiment, Miller and Boster"' had read to the subjects 
a description of a murder trial that include (1)only circumstantial evidence, (2) 
108 See, Devlin 
, 
1979, The Judge, p. 79; Inbau, 1968, "Popular Misconceptions 
Regarding Police Interrogation of Criminal Suspects", 14 Buffalo Law Review 274. 
109 For the contrary view see McConville and Baldwin, 1981, Courts. Prosecution and Conviction. 
1'o McCormick, 1972, Handbook of the Law of Evidence. 
"' Miller and Boster, 1977, "Three Images of the Trial; their Implications for 
Psychological Research", In Psychology in the Legal Process, ed. by Sales. 
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eyewitness testimony, and (3) testimony alleging that the defendant had confessed to 
the police. The result was that those subjects who received the confession evidence 
were more likely to find the defendant guilty than the other groups. A similar 
conclusion has also been reached by Kassin and Wrightsman12. Moreover, 
McConville and Baldwin found that only about 3 per cent of those making written 
confessions and 9 per cent of those making verbal confessions were acquitted at 
trial13. Although no one knows exactly what reliance the court or juries place upon 
confession evidence, the fact that few defendants making confessions to the police are 
acquitted at trial is perhaps an indication of the confession's great impact over the 
outcome. 
4. Procedures to be Followed 
As has been shown in Chapter Two, there are structural differences between 
the Turkish and English trial. The effect of these divergencies upon the procedures 
when relying on the above examined sections is be considered in this section. 
In order to show a measure of independence from the preliminary work done 
by the participants to the case and inform himself of the nature of the case involved 
and decide accordingly how to plan and direct his own conduct, the Turkish trial judge 
is permitted to read the entire file in advance of the trial. ' 14 Before the trial he, 
12 Kassin and Wrightsman, supra note 104. 
13 McConville and Baldwin, supra note 109, p. 159. 
"' See Chapter Two 3.5.2.2. 
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therefore, may have knowledge about the every piece of evidence regardless of 
admissibility. During the trial the dossier is also placed on the desk in front of the 
judge or the presiding judge in more serious cases. In addition to this, every point 
which may have evidential value may be presented as evidence during the course of 
trial. Since the jury does not exist in Turkish trials"', any challenge for exclusion 
of evidence that the defence might wish to raise16 is presented to the same judge 
or to the same panel of judges"' that will ultimately decide the case. If the 
evidence is excluded, the judge or the panel of judges should disregard the prohibited 
(excluded) evidence while deciding the issue of guilt or innocence. 
One may quite rightly wonder how realistic it is to expect from the judge or 
the panel of judges to disregard the evidence which has been already known by them. 
The solution to this aspect of the problem is said to be the written judgment with 
detailed reasons. Although according to Turkish law the judge may find the accused 
guilty if he is "convinced" of his guilt, the conviction of the judge must be a rational 
rather than a psychological one. The judge or the panel must justify its verdict by a 
written opinion expounding the reasons for the decision in detail"'. This 
requirement is also backed by a comprehensive system of appellate review which 
allows the Appeal Court to scrutinize the judge's reasons for the decision. Indeed, if 
"s See Chapter Two 3.5.2.1. 
116 The judge may consider the issue of admissibility without a motion to suppress of 
evidence by the defendant. 
"' The least serious cases are tried before a single judge, while the more serious cases 
are tried by a panel of judges. 
"a CMUK 260. 
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evidence which falls within the boundaries of "evidentiary use prohibition" (suppressed 
evidence) constitutes a substantial part of the prosecution's case, the court may not be 
able to defend a guilty verdict in writing and may be forced to acquit the accused 
regardless of the court's own feelings about the defendant's guilt. Moreover, since the 
trial before the appellate court is regarded as a fresh search for the truth, the appellate 
court, on its own motion, may examine whether the trial judge employed any 
prohibited evidence in reaching his verdict regardless of whether there was any motion 
to suppress by the defendant at the prior trial. "' 
This explanation reveals that the decision as to admissibility of improperly 
obtained evidence in Turkey is made by the trier of fact while in England the position 
is quite different in some cases and deserves closer examination. 
As far as the English law is concerned, objections to the admissibility of 
evidence on the ground that it was obtained improperly may be raised either by 
counsel for any accused against whom the evidence may be used or by the court of 
its own motion. Principally, submissions to exclude improperly obtained evidence 
under section 78(1) or section 76(2) should be made before the disputed evidence is 
adduced into trial. 120 In exceptional cases, however, a trial judge may also be asked 
to exclude improperly obtained evidence during trial under Section 82(3) of PACE in 
order to prevent injustice. 121 Since there is a vital difference between the structure 
119 CMUK 320. 
120 R. v Dutton, 1988, Lexis, Court of Appeal, (11 November). 
'Z' R. v Sat-Bhambra (1988) 88 Cr. App. R. 55. 
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of the Crown and Magistrates court 122 it seems reasonable to examine the procedure 
in each of them separately. 
In Crown Courts: In some cases the objection as to the admissibility of 
improperly obtained evidence can be raised on the basis of papers without the need 
for evidence to be called, while in other cases it may be necessary to adduce evidence. 
As far as the latter situation is concerned the admissibility is decided in the absence 
of the jury by the judge at a trial within a trial; "a voir dire", which is designed to 
assist the defence by preventing the jury hearing possibly inadmissible evidence unless 
and until the judges rules it admissible. 123 This regulation reflects the division of 
functions between the judge and jury; questions about the exclusion of evidence are 
for the judge to decide while questions regarding the truthfulness of the evidence are 
for the jury to decide. If certain evidence is ruled inadmissible the jury hears nothing 
of it. In this way it is aimed to ensure that the jury's decision is reached only on the 
basis of admissible evidence. Looking at the problem from another point of view it 
would seem that this regulation reveals the feeling that the jury are not able to 
discount 
, 
or give the correct weight to, certain sorts of evidence, and thus 
demonstrates the limited trust placed in the discernment of the jury by the legal 
profession. 124 
122 See Chapter Two 3.5.2. 
123 R. v Manji [1990] Crim. L. R. 512. 
124 Duff and Findlay, 1982, "The Jury in England 
, 
Practice and Ideology" 10 Int. J. Soc. L. 253, at 256. 
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Where the evidence is adduced into the trial and as a result disputed evidence 
is known by the jury, the judge is still not powerless to act; he may discharge the jury 
or may direct the jury to disregard the evidence they heard. 1 ' 
In Magistrates' Courts: since the magistrates are the judges of both fact and 
law, the procedure to be followed in magistrates' courts where the defence object to 
the admissibility of evidence proposed by the prosecution has been the subject of 
controversy amongst justices and commentators. 
It is maintained that the voir dire is not suitable in magistrates' courts on the 
ground that the main function of a trial within a trial is to allow the trier of law to 
decide a legal point in the absence of the trier of fact. The procedure for dealing with 
the way in which the admissibility of evidence was determined at common law was 
that the justices had a discretion to consider whether or not, in any particular case, it 
was appropriate for them to undertake a separate trial within a trial. "' That 
common law discretion has not been affected by the PACE, and thus the magistrates 
are not bound to conduct a trial within a trial and there is no general rule as to when 
the decision on admissibility should be announced. The magistrates must within 
statutory constraints determine their own procedure. 127 
'2s R. v Sat-Bhambra (1988) 88 Cr. App. R 55 at 62; For detailed information on 
"discharge of jury" see Sprack, 1992, Criminal Procedure 114-115. 
'26 S. F. J. (An Infant) v Chief Constable of Kent, [1982] Crim. L. R 682, The Times, 17 
June 1982; A. D. C. (An Infant) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, (unreported) cited 
in Regina v Liverpool Juvenile Court [1988] Q. B. 1; Conway v Hotton [1976] 2 All E. K 
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127 R. v Epping and Ongar J. J, ex p. Manby [1986] Crim. L. R. 555. 
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With regard to confessions, by virtue of section 76(2) it is no longer a matter 
for the exercise of discretion. Section 76(2) of PACE requires justices conducting a 
summary trial to hold a trial within trial to determine the admissibility of confessions 
challenged on one of the grounds referred to in that section. 128 By this requirement 
it is firstly aimed to give protection to the defendant to give evidence without being 
crgss"examined as to the truth of the alleged confession. The second goal of this 
requirement is to entitle the defendant to know the strength of the case which he has 
to meet at the at the end of prosecution case and make it easier for him to decide 
whether to go into the witness box. 129 
Under 121(6)(7) of the Magistrates Court Act 1980, the same justices should 
hear the entire case: there is no question that if justices rule a particular evidence 
inadmissible, following a trial within a trial they should disqualify themselves from 
the substantive trial. Since the magistrates learn the nature of the evidence in the 
course of the presentation of arguments about its admissibility, one may ask how they 
can put it out of their mind when they become the trier of fact. It would be very 
difficult for a magistrate genuinely not to be influenced by the fact that, for example, 
the accused had confessed, even though the circumstances of the confession rendered 
it inadmissible. 
128 Since the admissibility of confession evidence is generally challenged both under 
section 76 and section 78, the procedure for the two sections would be expected to be the 
same. But where the confession is challenged only under section 78 there should not be a 
requirement for holding a trial within a trial. See Vel v Owen [1987] Crim. L. R. 496, (1987) 151 J. P. 287; (1986) The Times, February 14. 
'29 Regina v Liverpool Juvenile Court [1988] Q. B. 1 
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To sum, the distinction between the question of law and the question of fact, 
and the entitlement of different bodies to deal with these matters in England, to some 
extent, differentiate the procedures of the countries in question when determining the 
admissibility of evidence. But when both fact-finding and law-applying is entrusted 
to a single body 
- 
the magistrate- English procedure is very similar to its Turkish 
counterpart. 
5. Conclusion 
The recent ratification of the legislation in both countries show that there is an 
agreement between Turkish and English legal systems as to the fact that Parliament 
should take the responsibility for deciding what the rules regarding the admissibility 
of improperly obtained evidence should be. In addition to this, both regulate the 
admissibility of confession evidence and exclude involuntary confessions on a 
mandatory basis. With these respects the two systems are approaching each other 
though each of them belongs to different legal systems. 
In spite of these similarities, the difference between Turkish and English law 
about the general rule as to the treatment of improperly obtained evidence still exists. 
In England, under section 78(1) the impropriety does not affect the admissibility of 
evidence unless it has an adverse effect upon the fairness of the proceedings. Whereas 
the position in Turkey is that not the possible effect of the improperly obtained 
evidence upon the trial that has to be considered but the impropriety itself, regardless 
of the nature of the evidence. Once the unlawfulness or impropriety is established, no 
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argument based on a further criterion such as fairness or credibility is permitted under 
section 254(2). Although the Turkish model does not seem, at first sight, to have the 
flexibility of English law, the question of whether the same amount of improperly 
obtained evidence will be excluded in each system depends on the interpretation of the 
concept of "unlawfulness" in Turkish law and concept of "unfairness" in English law. 
These concepts will be examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CONCEPTS OF "UNLAWFULNESS" AND "UNFAIRNESS" 
1. Introduction 
Having reviewed the statutory provisions relating to improperly obtained 
evidence in Turkey and in England, it became apparent in the previous chapter that 
both jurisdictions are not denying the judicial control over the manner in which 
evidence was obtained. In England there is clearly a discretion in the trial judge to 
exclude improperly obtained evidence where admission of it may have an adverse 
effect upon the fairness of the proceeding; in Turkey, where evidence is secured 
hukuka aykiri olarak ( hereafter unlawfully)', it is required to be suppressed. 
Obviously, the terms "unlawfulness" and "unfairness" gain importance in deciding the 
characteristic and scope of exclusionary rule respectively in Turkish and in English 
law. The concern of this chapter is, therefore, to seek an answer to the questions of 
"what is hukuka aykirilik (hereafter unlawfulness)? " in Turkish law and "what is 
unfairness? " with regard to English law. This chapter inevitably falls into two distinct 
halves, with the first looking at the meaning likely to be attributed to "unlawfulness" 
under the Turkish rule of exclusion, and the second dealing with unfairness under the 
English rule. An attempt will also be made to compare them. 
'Note the difference that the English language uses the same word "law" for two 
distinct notions, the sum total of legal norms and a particular enactment, whereas the 
word "hukulk' in ordinary Turkish language may be used for a whole set of legal rules (mevzuat), but not for an act issued by the legislator. 
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2. The Concept of "Unlawfulness" 
2.1. Unlawfulness & illegality 
As has been seen in the previous chapter, when a court in Turkey finds that 
there has been a violation of law, the evidence obtained by means of this violation 
must be excluded without any further consideration. Therefore, what matters most in 
Turkish courts is whether the evidence is the product of unlawfulness. It might seem 
at first sight that the Turkish admissibility test requires a mandatory exclusion of 
evidence in the sense that whenever a breach of a procedural rule occurs, subsequently 
obtained evidence cannot be admitted, or conversely, that non-existence of a breach 
of any technical rule will save the evidence. The correctness of this impression, 
however, depends on the interpretation of unlawfulness. Such ambiguity would not 
be raised if one of the terms "kanuna aykirilik", "yasaya aykirilik" or "mevzuata 
aykirilik" (hereafter illegality) was used by the Turkish legislature. They all refer to 
infringement of rules recognised by the positive law, whereas unlawfulness may go 
well beyond this. 
Turkey, at present, possesses an undeveloped and relatively undefined notion 
of "unlawfulness" with regard to section 254 of CCP. The concept of unlawfulness 
clearly indicates a violation of law, it is a departure from and goes contrary to 
lawfulness, whatever it is. 
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2.2. What is the Law? 
In attempting to explain the meaning of the term "unlawfulness" it may be 
helpful to begin by seeking to clarify what "the law" is 
. 
Similar to trying to define 
and describe the proverbial elephant, this question is not quite so easy as might be 
imagined. The question "what is law? " has been answered by serious philosophers in 
so many different, strange, and even contradictory ways. To illustrate, a number of 
definitions which have been made in different times may be worth citing. The law is: 
"the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and 
nothing more pretentiousi2 
"not counsel but command; nor a command of any man 
to any man; but only of him whose command is 
addressed, to one formally obliged to obey himi3 
"a rule of human conduct sanctioned by human 
displeasure"4 
"the aggregate of rules set by men as politically 
superior, or sovereign, to man as politically subject"' 
"highest reason, imbedded in nature, which commands 
what should be done and forbids the contraryi' 
"a device and gift of God, a decree of wise men, a 
setting right of all wrongs done voluntarily or 
2 Holmes, cited by Hart, 1994 The Concept of Law 1. 
3 Hobbes, 1651, Leviathan, (Reprint 1952), Part 2, Chapter 26, page 203. 
4 Clark, 1883, Practical Jurisprudence: A Comment on Austin 188. 
1 Austin, cited by Clark, ibid, p. 104. 
6 Chrysippus, cited by Friedrich, 1969, The Philosophy of Law in Historical 
Perspective 29 
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involuntarily, a common agreement of all the state, 
according to which all in the state ought to live"' 
"a rule of moral actions obliging to that which is righti8 
"the rules, not of action in general, but of human action 
or conduct; that is, the precepts by which man, the 
noblest of all sublunary beings, a creature endowed with 
both reason and free will, is commanded to make use of 
these faculties in the general regulation of his 
behaviour"9 
"an order of commands whose obligatory force rests 
ultimately on the conformity of these commands with 
ethical postulatesi1° 
The amount of material on the meaning of the word "law" is enormous. 
Understood in their contexts, Hart states, such statements are both illuminating and 
puzzling; "they throw a light which makes us see much in law that lay hidden: but the 
light is so bright that it blinds us to the remainder and so leaves us still without a clear 
view of the whole". " Williams takes this observation a stage further, the only wise 
manner to bring the controversy to an end is to renounce thinking and arguing about 
it. 12 
' Demostheness, cited by Clark, supra note 4, p. 97. 
8 H. Grotius, cited by Clark, supra note 4, p. 101. 
9 Blackstone, 1809, The Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, 
(Reprint 1982), vol. 1, p. 39. 
1° Coing, Grundzuge der Rechtsphilosophie, p. 18; cited by Bodenheimer, 1954, 
"German Legal Philosophy Since 1945", 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 385. 
' Hart, supra note 2, p. 2. 
12 Williams, 1945, "International Law and The Controversy Concerning the Word 
'law' ", 22 The British Yearbook of International Law 146, at p. 163. 
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Although the endless theoretical discussions have not enabled a final answer 
to be reached to the basic question of "what the law is", two basic approaches may be 
identified as legal positivism and natural law. " 
Under legal positivism, law is regarded as a body of legal provisions which 
have been produced largely as a result of the activities of a legislature and a body of 
courts. The characteristic feature of this approach is that it is not directly concerned 
with any ideal law but only with actually existing law. Accordingly, the entire law 
of Turkey may be seen in terms of a hierarchy of sources of law, the highest of which 
is the constitution, while the lowest is by-laws, and in between are found international 
agreements, statutes, decrees having force of statutes, degrees, regulations, customs, 
precedents. 14 The phenomenon of the breach of law (unlawfulness) is essentially a 
contravention of such norms. A morally iniquitous norm is not for that reason alone 
unlawful. As argued by Hart, courts have no alternative but to apply a properly 
enacted statute however evil its aim may be. " 
Natural law doctrine, on the other hand, defines the law in a more flexible, if 
not vague, way. Accordingly, the law involves a dualism of norms, in the form of the 
superior norms, which would be discovered via the exercise of human reasoning, and 
13 Reynolds, 1993, "Natural Law v. Positivism: The Fundamental Conflict", 13 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 441. 
14 See Chapter Two. Questions as to compatibility of a lower norm with a higher 
norm are decided by the competent court. 
's Hart, 1958, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals", 71 Harv. L. R. 
593. 
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the inferior positive norms which are the product of legislation or court decisions. 
Positive norms have to match up to some standards in order to qualify as law. 
The division of opinion between the natural law doctrine and legal positivism 
should not be assumed to have only academic significance. It has already caused 
practical problems in a variety of cases which came before the post-Nazi courts for 
decision. It has been recognised in a number of cases that positive legal norms which 
were enacted in Germany under Hitler, and which legalised cruelties and injustices 
were invalid. " Typical comments made in these cases reflect Radbruch's opinion 
that "the incompatibility of positive law with justice may reach such an intolerable 
degree that law becomes 'non-law"'. " 
2.3 Has Turkish Law Vacillated Between These Doctrines? 
It is clear from the huge amount of discussion, which may be traced back to 
the days of ancient Greeks, that the term "law" can be employed in different contexts. 
The result of the inquiry into what the law- or breach of law (unlawfulness)- means, 
with regard to section 254 of the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure, is strongly 
16 For the detailed examination of these cases see, Bodenheimer, supra note 10, 
p. 374; Pappe, 1960, "On Validity of Judicial Decisions in the Nazi Era", 23 Modern 
Law Review 260; Rommen, 1959, "Natural Law in Decisions of the Federal Supreme 
Court and the Constitutional Courts in Germany", 4 Natural Law Forum 1; Hippel, 
1959, "The Role of Natural Law in the Legal Decisions of the Federal Republic of the 
Germany", 4 Natural Law Forum 106. 
On Radbruch see, Friedman, 1949, Legal Theory 117-121; Bodenheimer, 1962, 
Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of Law 296-299; Wilk, 1950, The Legal 
Philosophies of Lask. Radbruch and Dubin, vol. 4 of Twentieth-Century Legal 
Philosophy Series. 
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related to the issue of whether Turkish jurisprudence is under the influence of legal 
positivism or natural law doctrine. 
In Turkey, the law is stated in several forms. The 1982 Turkish Constitution 
is a legal text which holds pride of place in the theory of the sources of law. It 
basically determines the foundation and operation of the state and individuals' 
fundamental rights and arranges the relations between the individual and the state. It 
dictates the principles of the "binding force of the Constitution" and "the supremacy 
of the Constitution", by maintaining that 
"the provisions of the Constitution are the fundamental 
legal norms binding upon legislative, executive and 
judicial organs, and administrative authorities and other 
agencies and individuals. Statutes shall not be in conflict 
with the Constitution". 18 
This provision reflects Kelsen's definition of the law. According to him, the law is 
a system of norms19 which mean criteria referred to for solving a problem and 
obtaining a satisfactory result; there is a hierarchical structure among the norms; thus 
the plurality of norms constitutes a unity or a system; all norms are derived from a 
single hypothetical norm called "the basic norm"20. Kelsen defines a basic norm as 
"a norm the validity of which cannot be derived from a superior norm". ' 
18 Article 11 of the Constitution. 
19 Kelsen, 1992, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, (translated by B 
L Poulsen and SL Poulsen), p. 56. 
20 Ibid, p. 56. 
21 Kelsen, 1949, General Theory of Law and State 111. 
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At first sight, the above cited Article gives the impression that the norm at the 
top of the hierarchy in Turkey is the Constitution. Detailed examination of the 
subject, however, reveals that this is not the case. Indeed, in pursuant of their duty to 
ensure that legislation conforms to the constitution, not only constitutional norms but 
also supra-constitutional norms have been used by the Turkish Constitutional Court to 
justify their decisions. " 
Supra-Constitutional norms may be divided into two main groups as "written 
norms" which are based on the thesis of positive law, and "unwritten norms" which 
are derived from the thesis of natural law. 
Supra-Constitutional Written Norms: The typical examples of these kinds 
of norms are bilateral, multilateral or international conventions or treaties of which 
Turkey is a party. Although these transnational23 norms, duly put into effect, carry 
the force of statute, non-conformity of the transnational norms to the Constitution 
cannot be claimed. " This regulation makes clear the superiority of the transnational 
norms over statutes. It does not, however, clarify whether there is a hierarchical order 
or an equal value between the constitutional norms and the provisions of the 
transnational agreements. The possible conflict between the constitutional norms and 
the transnational norms accepted by the Turkish Parliament seems to be solved in 
u See, for example, the Constitutional Court's Judgment of 29/1/1980 E 79/39. 
K 80/1,18 Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlari Dergisi 97-98. 
23 This term is intended to cover bilateral, multilateral and international 
conventions and treaties. 
Z4 Article 90 of the Constitution. 
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favour of the transnational norms for a number of reasons. 5 First, the preamble of 
the 1982 Constitution maintains that "Turkey with equal rights is an honourable 
member of the world family of nationsi26 Being an honourable member of this 
family requires an acceptance that norms of international (or transnational) law are 
superior to the national norms. "' Second, the general structure of the 1982 
Constitution implies the adaptation of the monist view derived from Kelsen's thesis28 
that national and international norms form an integrity and there is a superiority 
relationship between them in favour of the latter. Third, the transnational bodies such 
as the European Commission and Court of Human Rights examine and decide claims 
of non-conformity of domestic norms to the treaty and its protocols. Fourth, Article 
15 of the Constitution maintains that " in times of war, mobilisation, martial law, or 
the state of emergency the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms provided by 
the Constitution can be partially or entirely suspended.... provided that obligations 
under international law are not violatedi29 This provision also implies the 
superiority of international law to national law. 
23 See for the detailed discussion of the subject, Bilge, 1989, "Insan Haklari 
Sozlesmesinin Turk Hukukundaki Yeri" (The Place of the Human Rights Conventions 
in Turkish Law), Ankara Barosu Dergisi (The Journal of Ankara Bar), p. 988; 
Gozubuyuk, 1992, "The European Convention on Human Rights in the Legal Order 
of Turkey", in The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms, p. 19. 
26 The Preamble, para. S. 
27 Akipek, 1970, Devletler Hukuku (International Law), 3 rd ed, p. 28. 
28 Kelsen, supra note 19, p. 61. 
29 emphasises added. 
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It is clearly evident from the above explanation that transnational norms are 
another source of Turkish law. Infringements of these norms may be classified as 
"unlawful". At present Turkey has ratified a number of transnational treaties including 
the European Convention on Human Rights, the United Nations and the European 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 3° The Turkish Courts at all levels have the obligation to apply the 
provisions of such treaties. In case any of these treaties include any provisions 
relating to obtaining evidence, the Turkish law enforcement agencies are bound to 
obey them. Non-obedience to these norms will constitute a breach of law 
(unlawfulness) and is capable of resulting in exclusion of evidence under article 254 
of the CCP. 
Supra-Constitutional Unwritten Norms: these types of norms are the concept 
of human rights, general principles of law, and the requirements of the democratic 
order of society. 
Human Rights are said to be all the positive conditions in which a human 
being is expected to live in peace, security, happiness and free from anxiety. " Just 
being human is enough to entitle one to these rights which are innate, untouchable, 
untransferable and unalterable within time and space. 2 Existence of these rights in 
30 For detail see Chapter Two 3.3. 
" Dogan, 1979, Insan Haklarinin Milletlerarai Himayesi (International Protection 
of Human Rights), p. 260. 
32 See generally John Locke, 1954, Essays on the Law of Nature, ed. by Leyden. 
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the past, at the present and in the future is not dependent upon recognition of them by 
a legal system. Obviously, the concept of human rights is derived from the doctrine 
of natural law. 
Although some of the human rights have been concretised in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and several 
Constitutions, the abstract nature of the concept of human rights does not allow a 
definite catalogue of them. The concreted forms of human rights in these texts are 
called the fundamental rights. The concept in question covers not only the written 
forms by the positive law, but also unwritten ones inspired by the doctrine of natural 
law. However, the phrases "fundamental rights" and "human rights" are sometimes 
used as equivalents. The two concepts have been separated by the 1982 
Constitution. " 
"Being respectful to human rights" has been described as one of the 
characteristics of the Turkish Republic by Article 2 of the 1982 Constitution. The 
Turkish Constitutional Court also confirms the superior quality of the concept of 
human rights in its various decisions. To illustrate, despite non-existence in the text 
of the Constitution, "the right to resistance" was created by the Constitutional Court 
referring to the concept of human rights 3a 
33 See Article 11 and Article 2 of the Constitution. 
3a The issue in this case was the dissolution of the new-founded Socialist Party 
which has included the right to resistance in its program. E. 1988/2, K. 1988/1; RG 
16.5.1989/220167, p. 57. 
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Accordingly, one may challenge the admissibility of evidence on the ground 
that it has been obtained in breach of the concept of human rights. 
The General Principles of Law: Although there is a lack of agreement as to 
what the general principles of the law are, the Constitutional Court, in one of its 
decisions, maintains that being a state governed by rule of law3S requires the 
recognition of the existence of the general principles of law which cannot be destroyed 
by the legislator. Accordingly, legislations contrary to the general principles of law 
in Turkey will be invalidated. 36 The significance of this case, for present purposes, 
is that the general principles of law are recognised as a source of Turkish law, and 
thus admissibility of evidence may be challenged and excluded by making reference 
to the general principles of law. 
The Requirements of the Democratic Order of Society: Article 13 of the 
Constitution states that "... restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms shall not 
conflict with the requirement of the democratic order of society". Although there is 
obvious need for the clarification of this phrase, it was not the subject of detailed 
discussion in legal literature, and without any clarification the Constitutional Court 
used it in several decisions. " At the risk of possible over-simplification, one may 
3s Article 2 of the Constitution. 
36 E. 1985/31, K 1986/1, dated 17 March 1986,22 Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlar 
Dergisi (Journal of The Constitutional Court's Decisions), p. 115. 
31 See for example, E. 1985/8, K. 1986/27- 22 Anayasa Makkemesi Kararlari 
Dergisi (Journal of the Constitutional Court Decisions), p. 365- in which it is stated 
that " kisinin sahip oldugu dokunulmaz, vazgecilmez, devredilmez, temel hak ve 
ozgurluklerin ozune dokunulup tunuyle kullanilmaz hale getiren kisitlarnalar, 
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identify one of the elements of the democratic society as maintenance of a high degree 
of autonomy by individuals with regard to their behaviour. In other words, the 
autonomy of, individuals can only be restricted in a democratic state when it is 
absolutely necessary for the continuity of democratic society. Seen in a comparative 
perspective, there is, however, little consensus among the alleged democratic countries 
as to the conditions which necessitate the restrictions. The only thing which is clear 
from the logical interpretation of this provision is that 
, 
however vague they are, "the 
requirements of the democratic order of society" are further source of Turkish law. 
Thus, admissibility of evidence may be challenged on these grounds. 
Furthermore, Article 1 of the Turkish Constitution, establishing the 
characteristics of the Turkish Republic, states, inter alia, that "the Republic of Turkey 
is a hukuk devleti (a state of law or a state governed by the rule of law)". This 
characteristic of the state cannot be amended, nor can its amendment be proposed. 38 
It is a guarantee for individuals against the arbitrariness of the legislature. The state 
of law, as understood by the Constitutional Court, is a state which regards itself bound 
by the superior norms and open to judicial review, and it is a state which 
acknowledges the existence of basic principles of law over the will of the legislator, 
demokratik toplum duzenini gerekleriyle uyum icinde sayilamaz. (Restrictions 
intervening in the substance of untouchable, indispensable and untransferable rights of human beings in changing them do not conform with the requirements of the order of democratic society)". See also, E. 1985/21, K. 1986/23; 22 Anayasa Mahkemesi 
Kararlari Dergisi (Journal of the Constitutional Court Decisions), p. 224. 
38 Article 4 of the Constitution. 
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which even the law-maker cannot destroy, and legislations will be invalid if they 
depart from them. 39 
What has emerged from the argument thus far in this section is that both the 
Constitution and the Constitutional Court keep the door open from natural law to legal 
positivism, that is to say, the judiciary should prevent conflicts from taking place 
between existing legal norms and justice. Practically, the unconstitutionality, and 
hence unlawfulness of a statute can be claimed any time by way of defence before an 
ordinary court; in this case the Constitutional Court decides in the last resort and has 
power of invalidating the norm. "' Thus, legal positivism with its thesis that "any 
legislative act is unconditionally binding upon the judge" is not acceptable in Turkey. 
This approach should be welcomed in a country whose legal system has been 
interrupted thrice by military interventions in the last half of this century 4' 
2.4., Unlawfulness in the Context of Article 254 
Although the meaning of "unlawfulness" has not been, or cannot be, stated with 
any mathematical precision in an universally applicable formula, the point to be noted 
39 The exact words of the decision may worth quoting: "Hukuk Devleti 
..... 
anayasa ve hukukun ustun kurallariyla kendini bagli sayip, yargi denetimine acik olan, 
yasalarin ustunde, yasa koyucununda bozamayacagi temel hukuk ilkeleri ve anayasa 
bulndugunu, ondan uzaklastiginda gecersiz kalacagini bilen devlettir". E. 1985/31 
K. 1986/11 T. 27.3.1987,22 Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlar Dergisi (Journal of the 
Constitutional Court Decisions), p. 115. 
ao Article 152 of the 1982 Constitution. 
41 See Chapter Two 3.3. 
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is that "unlawfulness", in its widest sense, does not only derive from the act of the 
legislature, but also emanates from a body of written or unwritten norms. The 
phraseology of section 254 is wide enough to take such a broad view and to 
distinguish the concept of "unlawfulness" from the notion of "illegality". Accordingly, 
the term "illegality" refers only to the infringement of norms in positive law; the 
decisive element here is that the norm should exist. Obviously, the notion of 
"illegality" is relatively easy to interpret and enforce; evidence which is obtained by 
the law enforcement officers through violation of a written norm is illegally obtained. 
The notion of "unlawfulness" is much wider than the concept of "illegality" in 
that although not illegally obtained, evidence procured in an unfair or unethical 
manner may be classified as unlawfully obtained evidence. For example, the method 
employed by the law enforcement officers may be so extraordinary that a norm 
forbidding it does not exist. Indeed, this was the case in the Rachel Nickell42 
undercover operation in which an undercover woman officer offered to the suspect not 
only sex but also an intimate and loving relationship in order to persuade him to 
confess or to reveal enough for the police to mount a case. The use of such an 
unusual tactic can hardly be considered as illegal in Turkey since there is no special 
provision prohibiting it. This practice may, however, be regarded as unlawful for the 
purpose of Article 254 in that it is hardly possible to claim that the line had not been 
crossed. 
42 The Times, 15 September 1994. 
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Similarly, evidence obtained illegally does not necessarily have to be, at the 
same time, unlawful. To elaborate this point the following example may be given. 
Conducting a search during the night in homes, working places or other premises close 
to the public is not allowed unless a flagrant offence, danger in delay, or necessity to 
recapture a detained person exist. 43 The term "night" is defined in article 502 of the 
Tyrkish Criminal Code as the period of time which starts one hour after sunset and 
ends one hour before sunrise. Unlike the search carried out at midnight, conducting 
a search just 10 minutes before or after the permissible time may not constitute 
unlawfulness, though it is technically illegal. 
To sum up, it is submitted that in Turkey there is great resemblance between 
"unlawfulness" and "inadmissibility"; in short, the courts are required to refuse 
evidence if it has been obtained unlawfully and not otherwise. Therefore, the standard 
of unlawfulness governing the process of obtaining evidence and the admissibility of 
improperly obtained evidence are two facets of the same phenomenon and are bound 
to overlap. What determines whether police activity is unlawful also determines 
whether evidence is inadmissible. Although it is correct, this explanation may create 
an inaccurate impression that whenever evidence is obtained in breach of rules, and 
however technical is the infringement complained of, the court will have to exclude 
the evidence. Such a conclusion is only correct if we equate "unlawfulness" to 
"illegality". It appears that "unlawfulness" and "illegality" in Turkish law are not the 
same concepts. Unlike illegality, unlawfulness is not a technical conception with a 
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Having said that the legality 
43 CMUK 96. 
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of the process of obtaining evidence is a relevant consideration in determining whether 
evidence is obtained unlawfully. 
Expressing differences between these two concepts, however, does not rule out 
altogether the possibility of narrow interpretation of the concept of "unlawfulness" and 
equalization of "unlawfulness" to "illegality" by the Turkish Court of Appeal with 
regard to Section 254. The effect of such an approach will be that whenever evidence 
is obtained in breach of rules, and however technical is the infringement complained 
of, the court will have to exclude the evidence. It is not possible to state with any 
degree of certainty along which lines the court will interpret the concept of 
unlawfulness. At the present time, only one single decision has emerged or been 
reported from the Court of Appeal; in the case of Alpaslan44, the accused, aged under 
18, was prosecuted and convicted in compliance with then applicable procedural rules 
which did not require the involvement of an appropriate adult. After the initial court's 
decision to convict, new legislation (1992 Amendment) which required the compulsory 
involvement of a lawyer as an appropriate adult in the investigation and prosecution 
of those who need special care was enacted by the Parliament. According to Turkish 
law the initial court's decision is not a final one unless there is waiver of the right to 
appeal by the defendant or approval of the decision by the Court of Appeal. On 
appeal, which took place after the enactment of new provisions, it was argued that 
" Yargitay Ceza Genel Kurulu, E. 1993/5-15 K 1993/62 T. 15.3.1993,19 Yargitay 
Kararlari Dergisi (Journal of the Court of Appeal Decisions), May 1993; In Turkey 
it is rare to refer to a case by the names of the parties. Citations normally include the 
court, date and registration number of the cases in the court. Following the English 
style, in citing to cases I have used the names of the parties where available. For some 
cases that did not appear in official public reports but rather were published only in 
private case reporters, the names of the parties did not appear. 
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non-involvement of a lawyer during the investigation and prosecution constitutes 
unlawfulness and the conviction should be quashed. By avoiding the employment of 
the concept of unlawfulness in this case the Court of Appeal, in effect, refused to 
apply the unlawfulness concept retroactively. It was held that the current provisions 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be taken into account when considering 
ille ali (yasaya aykirilik)4S of something done before the 1992 amendment came into 
effect. This statement is perfectly understandable with regard to the concept of 
illegality, but the existence of a new norm might well be relevant, although not 
decisive, when considering unlawfulness. As has been held by the English judiciary 
in the case of R. v Ward36, a court could have regard to the current norm (Codes of 
Practice) when considering the fairness of something done before the norm came into 
force, since the new norm reflects current thinking of what is fair. Perhaps the use 
of the word "illegality" rather than "unlawfulness" in the case of Alpaslan is the first 
indication of how the exclusionary rule under section 254 will operate. As far as this 
single case is concerned, it is clear that application of the exclusionary rule has been 
restricted to technical illegality. 
2.5. The Undesirability of Enforcing "Hukuka Aykirilik" as "Kanuna Aykirilik" 
Equalising the concept of "unlawfulness" to the notion of "illegality is another 
way of stating that Turkey adopts a rule of mandatory exclusion. As has been 
as The term "yasaya aykirilik" (illegality) was employed. There is no indication 
whether this has been done intentionally. 
46 (1994) 98 Cr. App. R. 337; For the contrary judgment see, R. v Purcell [1992] 
Crim. L. K 806. 
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examined in Chapter Three, such an approach requires exclusion of any evidence 
obtained in a situation which did not meet the standards laid down. The mandatory 
exclusionary rule has the advantage of being relatively easy to apply; once it is 
decided that a piece of evidence was obtained in breach of any rule, it must be 
excluded without any further consideration. One should not, however, ignore the 
American experience which clearly indicates a dissatisfaction with the mandatory 
exclusionary rule. In order to eliminate its disproportionate effects, there is recently 
a trend to modify it. It seems useful at this point to examine briefly the experience of 
the United States. 
The first American case declaring the exclusionary rule was Body v United 
States47. The law enforcement officers in this case seized plate glasses which were 
allegedly brought into the country without having paid the required duty. At the 
initial trial, the defendant had to produce invoices and other import records in 
accordance with a statute requiring the production at trial of self-incriminating 
documents. The defendant's case on appeal was that the charge should be dismissed 
since the statute requiring production of the papers violated his constitutional rights. 
The U. S. Supreme Court held that the statute required the owner of the goods to be 
a witness against himself within the meaning of the fifth amendment48, and 
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
47 116 U. S. 618 (1886). 
48 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent 
part: 
"No person shall 
... 
be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself 
... 
". 
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amendment49. Thus, such papers could not be admitted into evidence by any federal 
courts. " The justification for the exclusionary rule was given as being to make 
meaningful the protection provided by the Constitution. " The rule is not confined to 
those rules derived from the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has applied it 
to confessionS52, police line-ups", identification evidenceS4 and the denial of due 
process". 
The crucial feature of this exclusionary rule is that it results in absolutely 
mandatory exclusion. Where there is a violation, the resulting evidence must be 
excluded. Trial judges have no discretion; no further concepts such as fairness, 
trustworthiness, or lawfulness may be employed against exclusion. Consequently, 
failure of a trial judge to exclude such evidence is enough reason to reverse the verdict 
on appeal. 
a9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent 
part: 
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated 
... 
". 
so Until 1961, the exclusionary rule was applicable only to cases in the federal 
courts. The scope of it was expanded to state violations in the case of Mapp v Ohio 
- 367 U. S. 643 (1961). 
sl Weeks v United States 232 U. S. 383 (1914). 
52 Miranda v Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). 
53 US. v Wade, 388 U. S 218 (1967). 
sa Gilbert v California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967). 
 Rochin v California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952). 
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The practical operation of the rule led to release of many suspects on 
technicalities. The far-reaching consequences of the mandatory exclusionary rule is 
well illustrated by the example that it was almost impossible to convict the murderer 
where the body of the murdered man is found as a result of illegal search. 56 Not only 
the body of the victim but also verbal evidence obtained as a result of illegal search 
cannot be taken into account since it could not have been obtained without illegal 
search. " Such cases led to severe criticisms of the rule by judges and legal 
scholars58 and members of the federal judiciary increasingly urged its reconsideration 
in the 1970'sS9. Recently, the Supreme Court has been willing to find exceptions to 
the mandatory exclusionary rule. 
In the case of United States v Leon60 the Supreme Court modified the 
mandatory exclusionary rule by creating a major exception: the good faith exception. 
The facts of the case were as follows; the judge issued a warrant authorizing searches 
of two houses and two cars connected to suspected drug traffickers. Drugs were found 
56 People v Defore, 242 N. Y. 13 (1926); Killough v U. S. 114 U. S. Appl D. C. 
(1962). 
 Wong Sun v United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963). 
58 See, Burger, 1964, "Who Will Watch the Watchman? ", Am. U. L. Rev. 1; 
Burns, 1969, "Mapp v Ohio: An All-American Mistake", 19 De Paul L. Rev. 80; 
Oaks, 1969-70, "Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure", 37 University 
of Chicago Law Review 1169; Schlesinger, 1977 Exclusionary Injustice. 
 See, Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971); Stone v 
Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976); Brown v Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); California v 
Minjares 443 U. S. 916 (1979); Stone v Powell 428 U. S. 536 (1976); Coolidge v New 
Hampshire 403 U. S. 443 (1971). 
60 468 U. S. 897 (1934). 
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in the execution of the warrant. The initial court excluded drugs on the ground that 
the affidavit for the warrant did not establish probable cause, although the officers 
requesting the warrant reasonably believed it did. The Court of Appeal affirmed, but 
the Supreme Court quashed the decision of exclusion, stating that the mandatory 
exclusionary rule should 
"be modified so as not to bar the use of 
... 
evidence 
obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a 
search warrant issued by a detached and neutral 
magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by 
probable cause". " 
Another example of the employment of the good faith exception is the case of 
Massachusetts v Sheppard52 in which the officers had difficulty in finding a search 
warrant application form since it was Sunday. A form was finally found, but it was 
printed for a different district and was designed to search for controlled substances. 
The affidavit accompanying the warrant application form listed the murder evidence 
that the police were looking for. The judge who granted the warrant was informed 
about the problem with the form. In the execution of the warrant incriminating 
evidence was found. The defence submitted at the voir dire (suppression hearing) that 
since the reference to controlled substances was not deleted in the warrant form, the 
officer had executed a warrant for which there was not probable cause, and therefore 
the evidence obtained in the execution of this warrant should be excluded. The initial 
court's decision to admit the evidence for the reason that the officer acted in 
objectively reasonable good faith reliance on the warrant was confirmed by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
61 Ibid, p. 900. 
62 468 U. S. 981 (1984). 
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The good faith doctrine is not only the exception to the mandatory exclusionary 
rule. In Nix v Williams", the "inevitable discovery" exception was adopted, holding 
that evidence should not be excluded if it ultimately would have been discovered by 
legal means. In this case, the body of a murdered child discovered as a result of 
illegal interrogation was admitted into evidence since the prosecution established that 
searchers would have discovered the body irrespective of interrogation. Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court developed the third exception, known as "the public safety rule", 
in the case of New York v Quarter". This exception allows the prosecution to 
introduce improperly obtained evidence if impropriety occurs to protect public safety. 
The facts of the case were that a woman approached two police officers and 
complained of being raped by a man who had just entered a nearby supermarket 
carrying a gun. In the store a man who matched the description given by the woman 
was caught. After handcuffing him, but prior to cautioning him, the officer asked 
where the gun could be found, and he revealed the location of it. At the initial trial, 
the judge excluded the statement "the gun is over there" and the gun since the man 
had not been cautioned. The Supreme Court, however, held that the evidence should 
be admitted because the need to ask questions to protect public safety outweighs the 
need for caution. 
To sum up, recent judicial decisions undermine the mandatory exclusionary 
rule in the United States, restricting its application in a variety of situations. There 
63 467 U. S. 431 (1984). 
64 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). 
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are valuable lessons to be learned from the American experience. Interpretation of 
"hukuka aykirilik" as "kanuna aykirilik" is to bring Turkey close to having the 1960's 
American exclusionary rule which is out of date in that recognition of significant 
exceptions to the general application of the exclusionary rule has minimised its 
automatic effect. To try to predict the future is very difficult, but if the concept of 
unlawfulness is being equalised to the notion of illegality one should expect the 
Turkish Court of Appeal to create exceptions emphasizing the difficulties that would 
be caused by the mandatory exclusionary rule. The American experience strongly 
indicates that the mandatory exclusion is likely to be, eventually, abandoned to arrive 
at a more flexible approach in dealing with particular cases. 
3. The Concept of Unfairness 
As has been seen in the previous chapter the English courts are not required 
to exclude improperly obtained evidence automatically. Such evidence ought to be 
excluded if it is established that its admission would have an adverse effect upon the 
fairness of the proceedings. Thus when trying to ascertain the admissibility of 
improperly obtained evidence in English law, the crux of the matter lies in the concept 
of "unfairness". The clarification of the meaning of the term "unfairness" is, therefore, 
likely to shed light upon the circumstances in which the exclusionary discretion is 
exercisable. The following pages are devoted to the analysis of what the nature of 
unfairness is and how one can identify the existence of unfairness. 
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3.1. Unfairness in International Law 
Although this study is concerned mainly with national laws, in order to arrive 
at a sufficiently concrete view of the concept of unfairness related to trial, it may be 
helpful to look at international law. 
The notion of fair or unfair trial has been the concern of the international 
community for a long time. Until recently, this interest was restricted to the protection 
of aliens abroad by their national State 6S The developments reached after the Second 
World War by enactment of international treaties have certainly been remarkable. 
Provisions concerning fair trial have been, inter alia, included in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights`', in the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights6' as well as the European Convention on Human Rights68. They all provide 
that anyone charged with a criminal offence is entitled to a fair hearing. None of the 
international agreements give a general definition of the term "fair trial", instead they 
list certain requirements which are essential for ensuring the fairness of the 
proceedings. It is a fact that the list does not include provisions relating to the 
prejudicial effect upon the fairness of the trial of acceptance of improperly obtained 
6s It was almost accepted by all the States that every State must treat foreigners 
in accordance with an international minimum standard of fairness, no matter what 
treatment the State concerned gives its own nationals. 
" For the text, see Resolution 217(III), General Assembly, Third Sess, Off. Rec., 
pt. I, 71. 
67 In force since 1976. See Harris, 1991 Cases and Materials in International Law 
610. 
68 European Treaty Series, No: 5. 
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evidence as a basis for conviction. However, one should not assume that the 
conventions represent a comprehensive list of all the conditions which must be 
fulfilled for a trial to be fair. Indeed, it is stated before enumeration by all the 
conventions that "everyone 
... 
has the following minimum rights". The term "minimum 
rights" indicates that there may be some other requirements which are not included in 
the conventions but are essential to a fair trial. 
As far as European case law is concerned, there are some cases in which it has 
been held that the introduction of improperly obtained evidence in a criminal trial 
prejudices the fairness of the trial. To illustrate, in the case of Austria v Italy69 the 
European Commission on Human Rights expressed the opinion that the fair trial 
requirement could be violated where confessions obtained by means of torture or ill- 
treatment were admitted as evidence. Furthermore, in the case of Schenk v 
Switzerland' it is proposed as a dissenting opinion that the necessity to scrutinize the 
law enforcement officer's behaviour in the course of investigation and to ensure 
esteem for the right of the individuals can only be served by the exclusion of 
improperly obtained evidence. However, the European Court on Human Rights, 
despite its overall responsibility to ensure the proceedings were fair, frequently 
recognises that admissibility of improperly obtained evidence is primarily the concern 
of domestic law. " The reason for taking this approach is said to be the lack of a 
69 6 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 740, (1963). 
70 Eur. Court H. R., Schenk Judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A, No; 140. 
" Vidal v. Belgium, Eur. Court H. R, 1992, Series A, No: 235-B ; Ludi v. 
Switzerland, Eur Court H. R, 1992, Series A, No: 238. One should also note that in the 
case of Corfu Channal Case (Judgment of 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949,32) the 
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common European ground in favour of exclusion of such evidence. 72 The hesitation 
to consider trial fairness with regard to admittance of improperly obtained evidence 
indicates that the concept of fairness in international law or in European law has not 
been developed as much as the idea of fairness in English law. This is understandable 
in that international norms generally fall behind the norms of developed legal systems 
since they are the result of a compromise between developed and less developed legal 
systems. 
3.2. Two Different Types of Unfairness 
When considering the exclusionary discretion bestowed by section 78(1), the 
distinction between unfairness arising from the use of the evidence at trial and 
unfairness in the method by which the evidence was obtained should be borne in mind. 
Although specific reference is made in section 78(1) to the circumstances in which the 
evidence was obtained as a factor to be taken into account, the evidence is to be 
rejected only where its admission would have such an adverse effect upon the fairness 
of the proceedings. In other words, the unfairness in the use of evidence at trial is the 
concern of the section in question; the fact that the police have acted unfairly will not 
necessarily lead to the exclusion of evidence unless the fairness of the criminal process 
is adversely affected. Some pre-PACE cases such as R. v Court' and R. v Payne74, 
International Court of Justice, confronted by evidence obtained illegally by British 
ships in Albanian waters, treated the evidence as admissible. 
n Stavros, 1993, The Guarantees for Accused Persons Under Article 6 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights 277. 
73 [1962] Crim. L. R. 697. 
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however, demonstrate a confusion between these two types of unfairness. They 
concentrate upon unfairness in the manner in which evidence was obtained rather than 
unfairness in the actual of the accused by reason of its admission. But in R. v 
Sangs there was unanimity over the fact that the rule of exclusion is concerned with 
trial fairness. This was clearly reflected by Lord Diplock's statement that 
"the function of the judge at a criminal trial as respects 
the admission of evidence is to ensure that the accused 
has a fair trial according to law. It is no part of a 
judge's function to exercise disciplinary powers over the 
police or prosecution as respects the way in which 
evidence to be used at trial is obtained by them. "' 
Nevertheless, the significance of the unfairness of police methods could hardly be 
entirely denied. 
It should be noticed that this distinction provides a basis for comparison of the 
unlawfulness concept, in the sense suggested above, in Turkish law and the notion of 
fairness in English law. It is a fact that the state possesses enormous manpower and 
economic resources to aid in the process of criminal investigation 
, 
whereas the 
individual does not have similar resources at his disposal. The formulation of 
procedural rules relating to obtaining evidence may be seen as an attempt to establish 
a right balance between the law enforcement officers and the suspect. The strict 
adherence to these rules, however, would operate to tip the balance in concrete cases. 
The concept of unlawfulness is, therefore, another device to ensure the right balance 
74 [1963] 1 W. L. R. 637. 
75 [1979] 2 All E. R 1222. 
76 ibid, p. 1230. 
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in the context of the particular facts of a case. Accordingly, the Turkish unlawfulness 
test resembles unfairness in the manner in which evidence was obtained rather then 
trial unfairness. 
The establishment of the balance between the law enforcement officers and the 
suspect regarding the collection of evidence is not an aim in itself. The overriding 
purpose of it is to ensure, or to contribute to ensuring, fairness of the criminal 
proceedings as a whole. In light of this assumption, one may speculate that fairness 
of the proceedings will be automatically affected where there exists unfairness in the 
manner in which evidence was obtained. The English Court of Appeal clearly 
confirms the interdependence of two types of unfairness. In the case of R. v 
Keenan" and R. v Walsh" a connection between the aims of the provisions and trial 
fairness was identified. Accordingly, infringement of the provisions, which had been 
designed to achieve fairness at the pre-trial stage, is likely to affect the fairness of the 
trial's 
3.3. Subjective or Objective Unfairness 
Another crucial distinction can be made between fairness as a subjective 
psychological response and fairness as an objective state of affairs. The concern of 
77 (1990) 90 Cr. App. R 1; [1989] 3 All E. R. 598. 
78 (1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 161. 
79 See Chapter Seven 2.1.2. See also Birch, 1994, "What is a Fair Cop? ", 47 Current Legal Problems 73. 
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objective procedural fairness is mainly the capacity of a procedure to conform to 
normative standards of fairness, while the concern of subjective procedural fairness is 
the capacity of a particular procedure to reflect the fairness in judgement of those who 
are involved in such procedures. The possible effect of the admission of improperly 
obtained evidence upon procedural fairness can be discussed with reference to either 
objective or subjective standards. For example, instead of concentrating on the 
normative standards, one may examine the trial fairness in the context of persons with 
personal experiences of criminal proceedings. "' Such an assessment may be based 
on interviews or questionnaires of judges, prosecutors, police officers, defence lawyers, 
suspects, or even ordinary citizens on the issue of whether the way in which evidence 
obtained in a particular case affects the fairness of the trial. " Although not 
empirically tested, one may expect different evaluations from each group of people 
depending upon the characteristic of the role they played in the criminal procedure. 
Since judges are the holders of discretionary power to conclude that admission of 
improperly obtained evidence would undermine the fairness of the trial, it may be 
worth concentrating on whether they do 
, 
or should, exercise this power in the day to 
day application of law. 
The Law Lords in R. v Sang avoided making any exhaustive statement as to 
the parameters of trial fairness in this respect. Lord Scarman put it: 
80 See generally, Thibaut and Walker, 1975, Procedural Justice: A Psychological 
Analysis. 
81 The idea that the results of public opinion pools can be taken into consideration in determining admissibility was rejected by the Canadian Supreme Court. See R v. Collins (1987) 56 C. R. (3 rd) 193, at 209. 
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"each case must, of course, depend on its own 
circumstances. All I would say is that the principle of 
fairness 
... 
is not susceptible to categorisation or 
classification". 82 
Similarly, Lord Fraser states, 
"I do not think it would be practicable to attempt to lay 
down any more precise rules because the purpose of the 
discretion is that it should be sufficiently wide and 
flexible to be capable of being exercised in a variety of 
circumstances that may occur from time to time but 
which cannot be foreseen". 83 
As has been examined in the previous chapter, their Lordships' views have been 
shared by the House of Lords84 and the Court of Appeal after the enactment of 
section 78.85 
This rhetoric, however, does not-offer much help on the practical operation of 
the concept of fairness. Unlike analysis of reported cases, there appears to be no 
academic interest in the empirical assessment of how the fairness discretion is 
exercised in practice. However, the pioneering study of Hunter, which may stimulate 
empirical studies, should not be ignored. 86 Hunter's empirical study is based on, inter 
alia, interviews with four Crown Court judges and one High Court judge. The 
principal question asked to the judges was whether they considered the reliability, 
82 R. v Sang [1979] 2 All E. R. 1222, at 1247. 
93 Ibid, p. 1242. 
R. v Preston and Others, (1994) 98 Cr. App. R. 405, Lord Mustill maintains, 
"we are here concerned with the exercise of discretion by the trial judge. This should 
not lightly be overruled" (p. 434). 
83 See Chapter Four. 
86 Hunter, 1994, "Judicial Discretion: Section 78 in Practice", Crim. L. R. 558. 
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disciplinary or protective principles when exercising unfairness discretion. Although 
the question put by her to judges was flawed in omitting the principles of the 
legitimacy of the verdict and judicial integrity, the Crown Court judges' answers 
clearly indicate that they use their subjective sense of fairness rather than any 
normative test. For example, it is maintained that "we ask ourself 'is it fair to allow 
this evidence to be adduced? ' If it is not fair, we don't admit it". Similarly, a feeling 
obtained through experience is said to be involved by another judge. 87 
Although the number of judges involved in this research makes hard any 
generalisation, it is perfectly enough to raise the issue of whether the standard of 
fairness is necessarily a matter of judges' personal moral judgement. If so, one could 
expect little more than irreconcilable opinions reflecting the moral sentiments of 
individual judges. This should not be the case, at least, for the sake of consistency. 
There should be attempts to condition or to structure the judges' subjective response 
to the circumstances of the individual case. 
Attention has been devoted by legal scholars for a considerable time to 
establish some objective criteria the general procedural fairness, but there is hardly any 
consensus; what is fair and unfair with regard to criminal proceedings is still in 
dispute. This lack of agreement may derive from the fact that the meaning of 
procedural fairness changes according to cultural beliefs shared by members of 
87 Ibid, p. 562. 
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society. " We should not ignore the fact that previous conceptions of fairness, 
although they may have been imperfect and unjust according to our current standard, 
were thought to be fair at one time. Thus, the concept of fairness has the advantage 
of not being static. As the perception of fairness changes with the lapse of time, it 
enables the courts to give effect to such changes without any formal change in the law. 
Although disagreement as to the content of " the fairness of the proceedings" 
is possible, the judge's discretion is not unconstrained. The judge's task is to take into 
account all the circumstances of the case, and then answer the statutory question of 
whether the admission of the evidence does effect the fairness of the proceedings that 
it should not be admitted. The Court of Appeal will not interfere with the judge's 
decision unless he failed to take into account all the circumstances or he took into 
account irrelevant considerations, or he answered the statutory question 
unreasonably. " An illustration of failing to take into account relevant circumstances 
is the case of R. v Twaites and Brown9° where a betting office manager and a clerk 
charged with theft made certain admissions to their employer's own company 
investigators, who failed to abide by relevant provisions of the Codes of Practice. The 
$$ As stated by May, "the concept of fair play which is at the heart of this section 
is very much part of our culture". May, 1988, "Fair Play at Trial: An Interim 
Assessment of Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984", Crim. L. 
R. 722, at p. 730. 
89 R. v Christou, [1992] 1 Q. B. 979; 95 Cr. App. R. 264; R. v O'Leary, 87 Cr. 
App. R. 387. 
90 92 Cr. App. R. 106; [1990] Crim. L. K 863; see also, Joy v Federation Against Copyright Theft Ltd, Queen's Bench Division, 14 January 1993, Lexis, Transcript by 
Martin Walsh Cherer. 
182 
trial judge failed to consider whether by virtue of section 67(9)91 of PACE the Codes 
of Practice apply to commercial investigators. The Court of Appeal held that the 
verdict based on these admissions was unsafe and unsatisfactory in that failure to ask 
the right question must, to some extent, affect the answer to the question of whether 
the admission of the interview evidence would have such an adverse effect on the 
fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. 
One may also ask what unreasonableness means. It is said to be a situation 
that the material in the case discloses a state of affairs in which a reasonable judge 
must have concluded another way. 2 Although there is much room for differences 
of opinion as to what the reasonable judge would decide in a particular situation, the 
emergence of the reasonable judge concept is a clear sign of an objective test. 
Analysis of the cases in the following pages is likely to clarify who is a reasonable 
judge for the purpose of section 78. 
3.4. Unfairness and Injustice 
When examining the nature of the concept of unfairness one has to notice the 
existence of a distinction between the procedures (how decisions are made) and 
91 Section 67(9) provides: 
"Persons other than police officers who are charged with 
the duty of investigating offences or charging offenders 
shall in the discharge of that duty have regard to any 
relevant provision of such a code". 
92 R. v Middlebrok and Caygill, Court of Appeal, 18 February 1994, Lexis, 
transcript by John Larking. 
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outcomes (what the verdict is). It is a distinction between being fairly treated and 
receiving a fair outcome 93 The latter, which is a matter of the right outcome of the 
criminal justice system, is stated by the term "justice", while the former which is a 
matter of the right structure for that system is called "fairness". " One may ask 
whether we can make the same distinction with regard to the concept of fairness 
regulated by section 78. If so, can the admission of improperly obtained evidence 
render unfairness of the procedure (unfairness), unfairness of outcome(injustice), or 
both? Which one is the focus of section 78? Although the phraseology of the section 
in question gives the impression that its main concern is procedural fairness, one has 
to accept that the fairness of the procedures is strongly linked to whether the 
procedures produce fair outcomes (justice). The concepts of fairness and justice are 
not totally independent from each other. 9S Justice is one thing which is expected to 
be produced by a fair procedure; a procedure that consistently produces unfair 
outcomes (injustice) will eventually be seen as unfair itself. This normative statement 
is supported to some extent by the empirical research conducted by Landis and 
Godstain using survey data collected from 619 prison inmates 96 The data suggests 
11 Tyler, 1990, Why People Obey the Law 5. 
94 Dworkin 
, 
1986, Law's Empire 404. 
" They often are used interchangeably, see Lord Scarman' speech in R. v Sang, [1979] 2 All E. R., p. 1247. 
% Landis and Godstein, 1986, "When is Justice Fair? An Integrated Approach to 
the Outcome Versus Procedure Debate", 4 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 
675. 
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that procedural issues are more important than outcome issues in shaping the 
offender's perception of outcome fairness. 97 
In attempting to explain the conception of what is meant by the "fairness of 
proceedings", Dennis suggests that assessment of unfairness under s. 78 should be 
based on fairness of the outcome (legitimacy of verdict) 98 As far as his theory of 
the legitimacy of the verdict is concerned, justifying the claim for condemnation and 
punishment includes both a factual and a moral dimension. "Guilt" is a word used 
internally in the criminal law and it must not be confused with lay views of whether 
"he did it". A guilty verdict requires two judgments. The first is a factual judgment 
which provides that the defendant did in fact commit the alleged offence. The second 
is a moral judgment which states whether the defendant deserves to be convicted and 
punished for it. These two judgments should exist in a conviction at the same time. 
A factually accurate conviction may not be legitimate if it lacks moral authority and 
vice versa. The publicly acceptable verdict is the one which is perceived as being 
factually accurate and as having moral authority. In the ordinary course of events the 
two dimensions of verdict march together; the defendant will not deserve to be 
convicted unless he committed the crime, and if he committed it, he deserves 
97 If this is so, admission of unfairly obtained evidence may create, from a 
behavioral perspective, in the suspect a sense of unfairness that undermines the 
legitimacy of verdict and thereby allows justification for past criminal activity and 
increases the likelihood of future criminality. See generally Casper, 1972, American 
Criminal Justice: The Defendant's Perspective. 
98 See Dennis, 1989, "Reconstructing the Law of Criminal Evidence", Current 
Legal Problems 21; see also Arenella, 1983, "Rethinking the Functions of Criminal 
Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies", 72 Georgetown 
Law Journal 197. 
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conviction. However, the moral authority of the verdict should not be equated with 
the factual judgments; they may be separate. Dennis attempted to clarify this point 
by giving the example of a confession obtained by torture; 
"the confession may be perfectly reliable in proving that 
the defendant in fact committed the offence. But would 
a verdict of guilty be acceptable as a justification of 
punishment and as an expression of the values of the 
criminal law? I suggest it would not. The use of torture 
amounts to a gross violation of the principle of 
according all citizens respect and dignity. Such a 
violation destroys the moral authority of the verdict. 
This is because a verdict which is derived from a 
disregard for the core principle of criminal law is self- 
contradictory. It cannot function as an expressive 
message that the criminal law incorporates values which 
it is necessary to uphold while appearing to be based 
itself on a deliberate flouting of those values. This must 
inevitably lead to a loss of respect both for the trial 
process and for the criminal law itself. "" 
Dennis' work addresses the link between the admission of improperly obtained 
evidence and the legitimacy of the verdict. When he refers to the issue of fairness, 
the theory evaluates admissibility in terms of the outcome it produces. He focuses on 
legitimacy of verdict as a major determinant of the fairness of the proceedings because 
he believes that control over the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence leads 
to fairer outcomes (legitimate verdict). Thus, fairness (procedural fairness) is 
explained in terms of justice (outcome fairness). In other words, 6 trial is unfair if 
admission of improperly obtained evidence would harm the legitimacy of verdict. 
There is no doubt that this theory should be credited with producing a convincing 
explanation for the unfairness principle. 
" Dennis, ibid, p. 37. 
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Similar arguments may be found in the writings of other academics. Nesson 
argues, even before Dennis, in his Harvard Law Review article that many evidentiary 
rules may be explained by the need to promote the acceptability of the judicial 
verdict. 100 Accordingly, the goal of producing acceptable verdicts is not satisfied 
simply by choosing the verdict that is most probably accurate. Since one apparent 
way to achieve public acceptance is to search for truth, acceptable verdicts and 
probable verdicts might often coincide. The correlation between these two is not, 
however, precise: a probable verdict may not be acceptable. Choo, on the other hand, 
contends that the most appropriate rationale for the admissibility of improperly 
obtained evidence is the principle of le itimacy which is concerned with safeguarding 
both the legitimacy of the verdict and the legitimacy of the criminal process., " 
Such legitimacy, according to him, depends on two basic functions of criminal justice: 
the conviction of guilty which favours admission, and the moral integrity of the 
criminal process which favours exclusion. The admissibility of improperly obtained 
evidence involves an assessment of whether the public interest in the conviction of the 
guilty outweighs the public interest in the moral integrity of the criminal process. 
The connection between the legitimacy of outcome and the admissibility of 
improperly obtained evidence is submitted to be very powerful. Accordingly, the 
10° Nesson, 1985, "The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the 
Acceptability of Verdicts", 98 Harvard Law Review 1357. 
101 Choo, 1990, The Relation Between Pre-Trial Executive Improprieties and the 
Outcome of the Criminal Trial 96, PhD Thesis, University of Oxford; See also Choo, 
1993, Abuse of Process and Judicial Stays of Criminal Proceedings 98. 
187 
judicial duty to exercise the fairness discretion arises in cases where the legal system 
is likely to generate unacceptable or illegitimate verdicts. Can one criticise this 
rationale for lack of clarity? It is not accurate to assume that this principle has no 
guiding force since individual judgments cannot be derived automatically from rules. 
The need to balance fairness to the public with fairness to the accused is in itself a 
powerful device. Indeed, unlike the pre-PACE fairness discretion which was 
concerned with fairness to an accused, 1°2 the phraseology of "fairness of the 
proceedings" used in the legal text of section 78 implies that the court should take into 
consideration fairness not only to the accused but also to the public. "' 
How does the English judiciary respond to this theory? Does it consider the 
legitimacy of the verdict principle when it is confronted with an item of improperly 
obtained evidence? One can hardly find any judicial statement pronouncing this 
approach. At the same time, the judiciary has not disassociated itself from the idea of 
exclusion for the legitimacy of the verdict purpose, which it did more than once with 
regard to the deterrent rationale. "' It is a fact so far that the judges have not 
articulated any theory, but have set out a number of factors which need to be taken 
into consideration. As will be seen below, the relevant factors which emerged case 
102 R. v Sang, [1979] 2 All E. R., Lord Scarman's speech, at p. 1242; Murphy [1965] NIR 138, Lord McDermott, at p. 142. 
103 R. v Smurthwaite, [1994] 1 All E. R. 898, at 903; R. v Pattemore, [1994] Crim. 
L. R. 836. 
"'It is a typical comment of the judiciary that the object of a judge in considering 
the application of section 78 is not to discipline or punish police officers. R. v Mason [1987] 3 All E. K 481; R. v Delaney (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 338; R. v Hughes (Patrick), [1994] W. L. K 876. 
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by case, do not conform with the classic well-known rationales such as the reliability, 
the deterrent, the protective. One needs, therefore, to examine these factors to assess 
whether the legitimacy of the verdict is the key. 
3.5. Relevant Factors and the Legitimacy of the Verdict Theory 
In spite of the fact that the notion of procedural unfairness is quite new and it 
is still in its infancy, certain noticeable features of it are gaining clarity. Thus, without 
giving a definition or rationale of the concept of unfairness, a number of factors which 
may be relevant in applying the "unfairness test" to determine whether improperly 
obtained evidence should be excluded are identified by the English judiciary. In the 
following pages, these factors will be analyzed to see whether they give any support 
to the legitimacy of the verdict principle. 
3.5.1. Unreliability of evidence 
There is no doubt about the fact that an accused should only be convicted on 
the basis of evidence possessing a degree of trustworthiness. In cases where the 
reliability of evidence is in dispute, admission would substantially reduce the chances 
of the fact-finder reaching a correct decision. This danger is recognised and dealt with 
by the common law discretionary power to exclude evidence when its probative value 
is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 105 Although this common law discretion is 
preserved by section 82(3) of the PACE Act, such evidence can be excluded under 
pos Selvey v. D. P. P. [1970] A. C. 402. 
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section 78(1). 106 Accordingly, the evidence most likely to have adverse effect upon 
the fairness of proceedings is evidence which is unreliable. To illustrate, in the case 
of R. v Gaynor107 section 78 was employed to exclude evidence of a formal "group 
identification" which had taken place in lieu of an identification parade which was 
practicable and was requested by the defendant. Since the regulation of an 
identification parade by Code of Practice D is based on the notion that the parade is 
the most reliable method of identification, the trial judge concluded that the breach of 
the Code of Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police Officers is capable of 
throwing the reliability of identification evidence into doubt and thus admission of it 
could adversely effect the fairness of the proceeding. 
Excluding evidence depending on the risk of unreliability in the circumstances 
of the particular case is pretty consistent with the principle of the legitimacy of 
verdict. A conclusion that the evidence should be included despite its unreliability 
would be unacceptable since a factually inaccurate or doubtful conviction can never 
be legitimate. 
Unlike unreliability, reliability is not considered by the judiciary as decisive, 
but as an important relevant factor in favour of inclusion. Non-existence of any 
dispute as to the accuracy of the disputed evidence consistently leads to inclusion, 
106 Matto v Wolverhampton Crown Court [1987] R. T. R. 337, at p. 346 "in any 
case where the evidence could properly be excluded in common law it can certainly 
be excluded under section 78". 
107 [1988] Crim. L. R. 242; See also following commentary by Professor Birch. 
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especially in cases where secret electronic recording is involved. "' Indeed, the 
reliability of evidence in these cases will not be the issue unless the methods employed 
provide the police with the opportunity to fabricate or tamper with the evidence. 109 
Evidence, including electronic recordings1°, may, however, be excluded under 
section 78 where there is no significant risk of unreliability. "' This is remarkable 
in that the courts are disassociating themselves from the reliability rationale. It may 
also be seen as a move towards the adoption of the principle in question. The factually 
accurate verdict and the legitimacy of verdict will coincide in most cases, given that 
one obvious way to gain legitimacy of the verdict is to search for truth. They may, 
however, fall apart in some cases. "2 Reliable evidence may be excluded if one 
accepts that the ultimate goal of the trial process is the legitimacy of the verdict, not 
108 See R. v Jalen and Katz (1990) 90 Cr. App. R. 456; R. v Bryce [1992] 4 All 
E. R. 567; R. v Christou and Wright [1992] 4 All E. R. 559; R. v Maclean and R. v 
Kosten [1993] Crim. L. R. 687; R. v Bailey and Smith [1993] Crim. L. R. 681; R. v 
Khan [1994] 4 All E. R. 426, [1994] 3 W. L. R. 899. 
109 There are, in England, no statutory provisions which govern the use by police 
of secret listening devices on private property. It should, however, be noted that the 
Interception of Communications Act 1985 prohibits the interception of public 
telephone calls and postal communications. 
1'o Section 9(1) of the Telecommunications Act 1985; R. v Preston (1994) 98 Cr. 
App. R. 405, Lord Templeman states that "the Act makes it impossible for a record 
of telephone conversation to be given in evidence", at p. 410; R. v Effick and Mitchell [1994] 3 All E. R. 458. In the case of R. v Smurtwaite and Gill, [1994] 1 All E. R. 
898, at p. 908, it was stated that "the existence or absence of a total record (in 
undercover operations) is but one factor for the judge to consider when applying s. 
78". 
"' See Chapter Three 3.1.2 and Chapter Seven (for the exclusion of improperly 
obtained evidence which does not carry significant risk of unreliability). 
12 One obvious example of such cases is given above. See accompanying text of 
the footnote 99. 
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the discovery of truth which is only an important means by which the legitimacy of 
the verdict is secured. 
3.5.2. State of Mind of the Police Officer (Acting in Good or Bad Faith? ) 
Whether the law enforcement officers knowingly acted improperly is another 
factor which ought to be taken into account in applying the unfairness test. Bad faith 
on the part of the police will usually lead to an adverse effect upon the fairness of the 
trial. ' 1' A clear example of bad faith leading to the exclusion of evidence is the case 
of R. v Nagah14 in which the suspect, on his way home after being released from 
the police station but required to participate in a parade later, was identified by his 
alleged victim who had been brought there in a police car, obviously for that purpose. 
By identifying the attitude of the police as a deliberate disobedience of the rules the 
Court of Appeal held that admission of such identification evidence would prejudice 
the fairness of the trial. 
Existence of deception or trickery suggests a lack of good faith. Thus in R. 
v Mason"' the admission made by the suspect after advice from his solicitor is held 
to have an adverse effect upon the fairness of the trial, because of the fact that the 
police had falsely told the accused and his solicitor that the accused's fingerprints had 
been found on the bottle used in an arson attack. The deceit practised by the police 
13 R. v Alladice (1988) 87 Cr. App. R 380. 
14 (1991) 92 Cr. App. R 344. 
"s [1987] 3 All E. R. 481; (1988) 86 Cr. App. R 349. 
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was considered by the Court of Appeal as "a most reprehensible thing to do". "6 The 
cases decided after R. v Mason, however, suggest that not all deceits indicate bad faith. 
In R. v Bailey and Smith"', for example, two suspects, who remained silent at the 
interview, were placed together in a bugged cell with an intent to obtaining an 
incriminating statement from them. In order to defuse their suspicions of being 
trapped, the investigating officers loudly displayed their anger at putting both men into 
the same cell. In actual fact this was conducted with the cooperation of the custody 
officer and the investigating officers. The operation worked and the suspects had a 
conversation which contained admissions of the charges. The Court of Appeal saw 
"no reason to decry the police's conduct" despite its awareness of the facts that the 
suspects were in custody and the questioning of those in police custody was strictly 
regulated by the legislation and the relevant Code. 18 One may reasonably argue that 
the trick was used, or at least such a risk was taken, so as to circumvent the provisions 
of the Code governing the detention, treatment and questioning of suspects. Even if 
the court accepted this argument and recognised the existence of bad faith on the part 
of the police, the admission of such self-incriminating evidence induced by trick could 
be justified by the existence of other evidence19 or by the public interest in 
behaving improperly in serious crimes120. A somewhat different analysis may be 
116 (1988) 86 Cr. App. R. 349, at p. 354. 
"" (1993) 97 Cr. App. R. 365. 
18 Ibid, p. 375. 
19 Ibid, p. 367. 
120 Ibid, p. 375. 
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applied to the case of R. v Christou and Wright", in which a jeweller's shop was 
set up by undercover police officers in order to recover stolen property and collect 
evidence against the thieves and handlers. Transactions in the shop were recorded by 
hidden cameras and tape recorders. Admissibility of such evidence was challenged by 
the defence on the ground that the accused persons had been tricked into expressly or 
implicitly incriminating themselves. Besides acknowledging involvement of the police 
with a trick to produce evidence against the accused, the court pointed out that the 
police did not have any "dishonest intent" but acted in public interest to obtain 
evidence. The case of R. v Christou and Wright should be distinguished from the case 
of R. v Bailey and Smith in that the suspects were not in the control of the police and 
therefore the provisions of Code C did not apply. Thus, although importance is 
attached to the question of whether the police acted in bad faith, the answer to that 
question is not conclusive in every case. 
Non-obedience of more than one part of the Code may also be held to imply 
deliberate breach of the rules by the police. In the identification case of R. v 
Finley"' infringements of many parts of the Code, such as; showing the witnesses 
a photograph album containing 12 pictures only one of which bore a very good 
likeness to the suspect, keeping the witnesses together before the parade and failure 
to warn them about not discussing the case, and putting the suspect into a parade with 
others who did not resemble him good enough to conclude the existence of deliberate 
flouting of the Code and to exclude the evidence. The important point to be noted 
121 [1992] 4 All E. R 559. 
1" [1993] Crim. L. R 50. 
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here is whether the violation of the procedure was an isolated incident or part of a 
deliberate pattern of infringements. 
Like the existence of bad faith, the lack of bad faith or existence of good faith 
on the part of the police is also not conclusive. 123 In order that a premium is not 
placed on ignorance, in such a case the court should consider whether the breach was 
excusable by taking into account other factors. This view was supported by R. v 
Anderson124 in which a misunderstanding by the police officer leading to non- 
involvement of a legal adviser before the crucial interview, did not itself result in the 
admission of the confession but some other factors such as the prior willingness of the 
suspect to be interviewed without legal advice did. 
The fact that neither the existence not the absence of bad faith is conclusive 
may be seen as a natural consequence of the Court of Appeal's general approach to 
disassociate itself from the idea of exclusion for deterrent purposes. As has been seen 
in chapter 3 the officer's state of mind is crucial in the deterrent rationale. Although 
the officer's state of mind is not as decisive as to give support for the deterrent 
rationale, it is still a significant factor. It seem that the more a police officer acted in 
bad faith, the more the chance of excluding the evidence. Neither is such an approach 
consistent with the protective principle in that the harm which an individual suffers 
as a consequence of the violation is independent of the intention with which the act 
is performed. This approach is not, however, in conflict with the legitimacy of the 
u3 R. v Alladice (1988) 87 Cr. App. R. 380. 
124 [1993] Crim. L. R. 447, see also subsequent Commentary by Professor Birch. 
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verdict principle in that deliberate disregard of procedural rules would have a higher 
tendency to harm the legitimacy of the verdict than some genuine mistake on the part 
of the police. 
3.5.3. The Non-Existence of Any Other Evidence 
Allowing the accused to be convicted solely on the basis of improperly 
obtained evidence may also adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings. In R. v 
Cochrane125, a first instance decision, it was held that under section 78, where 
evidence obtained in breach of the PACE was the only prosecution evidence, to admit 
it would have an overwhelming effect upon the "fairness" of the proceedings. This 
approach was backed by the Court of Appeal in R. v Lawrence and Nash126. In this 
case an undercover officer offered to buy cannabis resin from the suspects. There had 
been several unrecorded meetings between them. The officer's account was that the 
conversations in these meetings involved admissions. Although the contents of these 
conversations were challenged by the defence, the accused persons were convicted by 
the initial court. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the lack of corroboration of 
the officer's account of his conversations with the accused was a factor which the 
judge should have taken into account when considering the admissibility of the 
officer's admission. 
121 [1988] Crim. L. R. 449, Acton Crown Court. 
u6 Court of Appeal, 14 December 1993, Lexis, Transcript by John Larking. 
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A diametrically opposite situation may also be relevant. In cases where other 
evidence is available, admission of improperly obtained evidence is unlikely to cause 
unfairness since the same verdict would have been reached with or without the tainted 
evidence. If this is so, the legitimacy of the verdict principle gains explicit 
recognition. This point has been pronounced by the judiciary in the case of R. v 
Okofor127. The facts of the case were as follows: Pockets of cocaine were found 
in the accused's bags on his arrival at an airport in England. The accused was not 
informed of this fact in the hope that he would lead the police to others involved in 
drug trafficking. A conversation, which was technically an interview since the 
customs officers had reason to believe that an offence had been committed, took place 
between the custody officer and the accused without following the provisions of the 
Code. There were clear breaches of requirements relating to the caution, informing 
the suspect of his entitlement to legal advice and recording contemporaneously. The 
defence submission that the conversation ought to be excluded and thus the conviction 
should be quashed was rejected by the Court of Appeal. It was maintained that, 
although the interview had been wrongly admitted in evidence, admission of it did not 
cause unfairness since even if the conversation of the interview had been excluded, the 
jury could have come to no other verdict than the one they did. 
127 (1994) 99 Cr. App. R. 97; See also R v. Joseph [1994] Crim. L. R. 48; R. v 
Rowe, [1994] Crim. L. R. 837. 
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3.5.4. The Significant and Substantial Breach 
The relevance of the nature of violation has been acknowledged several times 
by judicial decisions. 121 Accordingly, a breach should be "significant and 
substantial" in order to have an adverse effect upon the fairness of proceedings. Such 
form of infringement is held to reveal that "prima facie at least the standards of 
fairness set by Parliament have not been met" 
. 
12' The more serious the breach, the 
greater the likelihood that trial fairness would be adversely affected and vice versa. 
This fact is likely to derive from the overall agreement that the courts can ignore the 
technical breaches since such an attitude is unlikely to have any effect upon legitimacy 
of verdict. 
The purpose of the rule broken is highly relevant in assessing the significance 
and substantiality of the violation, and hence the effect of the breach of a rule upon 
the fairness of proceedings. In its several decisions the Court of Appeal has 
recognised that fairness of the trial is likely to be affected by the infringement of 
provisions which are intended to achieve the right balance of fairness at the pre-trial 
stage of criminal procedure. In the case of R. v Keenan 130, for example, it is held 
that the trial fairness has been affected by the infringement of the recording provisions 
aimed at preventing "verballing" and securing a record upon which the prosecution can 
128 R. v Absolam (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 332; R. v Walsh (1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 
161; R. v Keenan (1990) 90 Cr. App. R. 1; R. v Weekes, [1993] Crim. L. R. 211. 
129 R. v Walsh (1990) 91 Cr. App. K 161. 
130 [1989] 3 All E. R. 598. 
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rely. Similarly, in R. v Welsh13', breaches of the provision related to the involvement 
of a legal adviser led to an adverse effect upon the fairness of the trial on the grounds 
that the object of the provision, which was to protect legal rights of the suspect and 
to lessen the occurrence of insubstantial allegations of malpractice, had not been met. 
Also, in the case of R. v Weekes12 there had been a breach of the requirement of 
an appropriate adult's involvement. By considering the purpose of the provision, 
conversations which were not recorded in the presence of an appropriate adult were 
excluded under section 78 without examining the possibility of unfair questioning or 
the risk of an unreliable confession being obtained. The emphasis as to the link 
between the goals of the provisions and trial fairness also gives support to the 
legitimacy of the verdict principle since contributing to the legitimacy is not the 
purpose of all the procedural provisions. 
3.5.5. Public Interest in Behaving Improperly 
Another factor, which is clearly relevant under the principle of legitimacy, is 
the existence of a public interest in acting improperly. In the case of R. v Chinoy133 
it was held that the detection and proof of certain types of criminal activity may 
necessitate the employment of underhand and even unlawful means. Such a dictum 
may be, inter alia, the result of the recent sharp increase in the crime rate and in the 
number of sophisticated and violent criminals. The public, however, also have an 
131 (1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 161. 
132 [1993] Crim. L. R 211. 
'" [1992] 1 All E. R. 317. 
interest in police compliance with the procedural rules. Thus, there is a need for 
balancing the rights of the suspect against the public's need for criminal procedure 
which will adequately protect the public. 134 The extent to which public interest 
allows limited infringement of procedural rights in the investigation of certain types 
of criminal activity cannot be determined with mathematical precision. It is possible, 
however, to identify certain types of situations where the police are allowed greater 
investigative freedom to protect public interest without threatening the fairness of the 
trial. 
One criterion is the degree of danger the offence may cause to society. '" 
The more serious the crime, the more flexibility the police are given. In the case of 
R. v Smurthwaite and Gill136, (two separate cases the appeals in which were heard 
together because of their similarities) Smurthwaite solicited a contract killer to murder 
his wife, and Gill similarly to murder her husband. In each case the person solicited 
was, unknown to the accused, an undercover police officer. Incriminating 
conversations between the undercover police officers and the suspects were secretly 
tape-recorded. The Court of Appeal held on appeal that the admissions of such 
conversations is unlikely to cause unfairness of the trial in that undercover officers did 
not use their undercover pose to question suspects so as to circumvent the code but to 
prevent the commission of offences. 
'34 See, Fellman, 1976, The Defendant's Rights Today; Packer, 1964, "Two 
Models of Criminal Process", 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1. 
131 Classifying crimes as more or less dangerous to society is a judgment that the 
courts or the police must make according to the facts in a given situation. 
136 [1994] 1 All E. R. 898. 
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Necessity may be stated as an another criterion; as the Court of Appeal noted 
in R. v Christou and Wright"", to trap a blackmailer the victim may act as an agent 
of the police to arrange an appointment and false or marked money may be staked to 
catch the criminals. Such an arrangement or trick is said not to cause unfairness of 
the trial since it is not contrary to the public interest, and hence to the fairness of the 
trial. 138 
The public interest would also arise in cases where the police acted in the 
presence of circumstances of emergency. To illustrate, in the case of R. v Hughes13' 
the accused was seen to take something from a pocket and put it into his mouth. He 
refused to spit it out and began to chew. The officer failed to carry out what the 
Codes required in relation to a search, but managed to extrude the cannabis from his 
mouth by using force. The contention for exclusion of this evidence under s. 78 was 
withheld because of the public interest in preventing the destruction of evidence. 
3.5.6. The Place of Breaches 
As far as the deterrent or disciplinary rationale is concerned, evidence obtained 
by a foreign law enforcement officer in a foreign country should be admissible in 
English courts, even when the procedure does not meet the British standards. The 
137 [1992] 4 All E. R. 559; (1992) 95 Cr. App. R. 264; [1992] 3 W. L. R. 228. 
138 [1992] 4 All E. R. 559, at p. 564; see also R. v Williams, (1994) 98 Cr. App. 
R. 209; R. v Marshall, [1988] 3 All E. R. 683. 
139 [1994] 1 W. L. R 876. 
201 
rationale for this is that the English courts can do little, if anything, to deter improper 
practices by foreign officers. Although it is well established in England that the 
function of the judge in exercising his discretion under section 78 is not to discipline 
the police but to protect the fairness of the trial, one may observe that the Court of 
Appeal, without acknowledgment, has applied the deterrent rationale in deciding the 
admissibility of evidence obtained in a foreign country in breach of English procedural 
requirements. Such evidence was not required to be excluded by the Court of Appeal 
in the cases of R. v Quinn"' and R. V Konscol'41. In R. v Quinn, identification 
evidence had come into existence abroad as a result of an identification procedure 
which did not conform with the then applicable English standards on identification, 
nor with the current identification code which came into effect after the enactment of 
the PACE. It is maintained by the Court of Appeal that: 
"English courts cannot expect English procedural 
requirements to be complied with by the police forces 
operating abroad, even if, as in the present case, they 
have similar procedural requirements. The fact that 
identification was carried out in a way which did not 
conform with the requirements of the Home Office 
Circular 9/1969 cannot be disregarded if and insofar as 
it affects the intrinsic fairness of the identification 
procedure adopted. But the present case was not one 
where the procedural departures from the Circular were 
the responsibility of British authorities. " 142 
Similarly, in the case of R. v Konscol the fact that the suspect was interviewed by 
Belgian authorities without cautioning and without informing him of the availability 
of a legal adviser is held not to threaten the fairness of English trial. It seems unlikely 
Sao [1990] Crim. L. R 581. 
14' [1993] Crim. L. R. 950. 
142 R. v Quinn [1990] Crim. L. R. 581, at p. 582. Emphasises added. 
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that the Court of Appeal would take the same line if torture or other physical abuse 
was inflicted by foreign law enforcement officers. 
Unlike the aforementioned factors which to some extent give support to the 
legitimacy of the verdict principle, a dictum to the effect that improprieties committed 
abroad are not relevant in deciding unfairness could hardly be reconciled with the 
legitimacy principle. The dilemma facing the trial judge is precisely the same in such 
situations with the occurrence of the impropriety within the jurisdiction. An 
examination of the recent illegal extradiction case of ex parte Bennett143, however, 
casts doubt on the likelihood of this dictum to survive. The question faced by the 
House of Lords in this case was whether the English court has power to inquire into 
the circumstances under which a person had been brought within jurisdiction. The 
conclusion was reached by the Law Lords that to maintain the purity of the stream 
of justice 99144 and "to protect its own process from being degraded and misused"145, 
the court may not turn a blind eye to improprieties beyond the frontiers of its own 
jurisdiction. These words which almost pronounced the legitimacy of the verdict 
principle were used in the context of the abuse of process, but they are equally 
applicable to the improperly obtained evidence, given the fact that both the exclusion 
143 R. v Horseferry Road Magistrate Court, ex parte Bennett, [1993] 3 W. L. R. 
90; (1994) 98 Cr. App. K 114. 
'" ! bid, at p. 118. 
us ibid, p. 117. 
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of improperly obtained evidence and a stay of proceedings, as argued by Choo 
146, 
share the same foundation. 
4. Comparison and Conclusion 
The analysis so far presented has tried to establish a way of thinking about 
unlawfulness and unfairness in Turkish and English law respectively. It is noted that 
the Turkish legislature has not followed the English approach of determining the 
admissibility of improperly obtained evidence by making reference to the concept of 
an "unfair trial"; in the view of Turkish legislature evidence may be excluded if it has 
been obtained "unlawfully". Having said that, depending on the interpretation of the 
concept of unlawfulness and the concept of unfairness, Turkey and England may have 
a rigid or a flexible approach to the issue of admissibility of improperly obtained 
evidence. Narrow interpretation of the concept of unlawfulness may result in 
equalisation of it with the concept of illegality and may lead to an automatic 
exclusionary rule. By the same token, if the overriding purpose of procedural rules 
is to ensure fairness of the criminal proceeding as a whole, the breach of any of them 
may necessarily lead to an unfair trial and thus trigger to an automatic exclusionary 
rule. Such approaches, however, are unlikely to be taken in both jurisdictions. 
It is submitted that, although these two concepts are not identical, they might 
be quite similar in respect to providing a flexible solution. The evidence can be 
146 Choo, supra note 101, p. 107. For the contrary view see the speech of Lord 
Lowry in the case of ex parte Bennett (1994) 98 Cr. App. R. 114, at p. 136. 
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excluded by employing either unlawfulness and unfairness concepts, even if no breach 
of the express terms of the provisions was established. As has been established above, 
Turkish courts might be prepared to go direct to the supra-constitutional norms to 
exclude evidence, or to appeal to natural law or other extra-constitutional rules. This 
should also be possible for the English courts; the notion of unfairness is wide enough 
to allow taking into account breaches other than of specific statutory rules or the Code 
of Practice. Similarly, the fact that there have been breaches, even several breaches 
of the procedural norms, is not conclusive with regard to both notions. What is 
required in both jurisdictions is a balancing judgement. The possibility of whether the 
same amount of evidence may be excluded under these notions will be examined in 
Chapter Seven in the context of breaches of the rules safeguarding suspects in the 
police station. 
The principle of the legitimacy of the verdict can also be accommodated within the 
Turkish framework, given the fact that a process of arriving of a legitimate verdict is 
a necessary part of the rule of law. Verdicts cannot legitimise themselves simply by 
being verdicts, but require legitimization by reference, inter alia, to proceedings by 
which they were reached. As Nesson maintains, "the extent to which the judicial 
system facilitates the generation of acceptable verdicts may express the intensity of our 
commitment as a society to the idea of government under the rule of law". 147 
The exact determination of what circumstances must exist before the fairness 
of the proceedings is adversely affected or before the lawfulness of a procedure is 
147 Nesson, supra note 100, p. 1391. 
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breached will undoubtedly require decades of jurisprudence. Given the importance 
attached to the case law and the fact that the English statutory exclusionary rule was 
adopted several years before the Turkish counterpart, the concept of fairness is 
relatively well developed compared to the concept of unlawfulness. As far as Turkish 
judiciary is concerned, only one case so far has emerged from which the present 
judicial approach can hardly be deduced. For this reason, drawing a comparison 
between judicial approaches to these notions became hardly possible. Instead, 
attention has been concentrated on analyzing what English judges actually do, and 
what Turkish judges might decide to do. 
To conclude, neither the concept of unlawfulness nor the notion of unfairness 
are technical conceptions with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances. They are rather products of social context and history. One should not 
ignore the fact that in many times and places torture was thought a perfectly proper 
means of obtaining evidence. Both concepts encompass the feelings or common sense 
which have been evolved through centuries of legal history and civilization, and cannot 
be imprisoned within the limits of any formula. Adjustments of them to specific 
issues inescapably involves the exercise of judgments by those whom the legal system 
entrusts with applying them. Since no society is static, there is every reason to believe 
that as Turkish and English society change, so will the concepts of "unlawfulness" and 
"unfairness". What goes against our sense of lawfulness and fairness at the present 
time may not have done so in the past and may not do in the future. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONFESSIONS 
1. Introduction 
In several highly-publicized recent cases in England, individuals convicted of 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment have been released after the overturn of 
their convictions by the Court of Appeal. These so-called "miscarriage of justice 
cases"' generated great controversy and considerable reflection about the criminal 
justice system. A central, substantive issue presented by these cases relates to the 
procurement and the usage of confessions; each of these cases- and several other 
recent English cases in which there were breaches of the rules governing interrogation- 
turned on the admissibility of improperly obtained confessions. Nor is the Turkish 
criminal justice system immune from such miscarriage of justice. ' Not surprisingly, 
therefore, both legal systems have specifically focused on confessions. As has been 
seen in Chapter Four the admissibility of improperly obtained confessions has been 
regulated by special provisions both in Turkish and English law. Possible reasons 
behind such approaches have been discussed in the previous chapter and it is not 
Such as Callaghan and Others, (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 40 and Mcllkenny and 
Others (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 237 (the two "Birmingham Six" Appeals); Armstrong 
and Others, 1989, The Times, October 20, (The Guildford Four); Ward, (1993) 96 Cr. 
App. K1 (The Judith Ward); Maguire and Others, (1991) 94 Cr. App. R. 133 (The 
Tottenham Three), The Times, December 9,1991); For a detailed commentary on 
these cases see also Dennis, 1993, "Miscarriages of Justice and the Law of 
Confessions: Evidentiary Issues and Solutions", Public law 291. 
2 See generally Gemalmaz, 1992, "Turkiye Yargisinin Iskence Karsisinda Tavri 
(The Response of the Turkish Judiciary to Torture)", 14 Insan Haklari Yilligi (Turkish 
Yearbook of Human Rights). p. 65-107. 
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proposed to repeat that analysis here. In this chapter, by paying closer attention to 
these provisions an attempt will be made to compare and contrast them with each 
other. 
2. The Current Laws of Turkey and England 
Historically, there was a time in which confessions were regarded as the most 
cogent and satisfactory proof of guilt (regina probationum). This belief derived from 
the presumption that a person would not make an inaccurate statement against his own 
interest. Thus, all confessions, no matter how obtained, were admitted as evidence 
without any distinction? The heavy reliance on confessions subsequently led to the 
recognition of torture as a legitimate method for extracting confessions. ' As a 
response to such practice the other extreme was adopted after the French Revolution; 
confessions were considered as the most unreliable evidence (demens quide se 
confitetur) and the suspect or the accused were not permitted to give evidence on their 
own behalf. ' Obviously neither of these approaches reflects the current Turkish or 
English approaches to the issue. 
3 In fact, they were equivalent to the English plea of guilt, precluding the need for 
a formal trial. It was clearly stated in the sixteenth century that "a confession is a 
conviction", cited in Wigmore, 1970, vol. 3 (rev. by Chadbourn), p. 293. 
4 Langbein, 1976, Torture and the Law of Proof; Heath, 1982, Torture and 
English Law; Lowell, 1897, "The Judicial Use of Torture", 11 Harv. L. Rev. 290. 
S Man, 1965, "Ceza Mukakemesi Hukukunda Ikrar" (Confessions in the Criminal 
Procedure Law), Istanbul Hukuk Fakultesi Mecmuasi (Journal of Istanbul Law 
Faculty), p. 121. 
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Since under the principle of "free evaluation of the evidence" the hearsay 
problem is regarded as an evaluation issue rather than an admissibility 
issue, the 
Turkish trial judge is trusted to be able to give to a pre-trial confession, which is 
technically hearsay, whatever weight he thinks it deserves. That means a pre-trial 
confession is admissible in principle. Having said that a number of provisions which 
seek to limit the use of out of court statements at trial is included by CMUK. 
6 
In addition to Article 254 (examined in Chapter Four and Five), Article 135/A, 
which was also introduced by the 1992 amendment, specifically regulates the 
admissibility of improperly obtained confessions in the following form: 
" Statements of the suspect and interviewee should 
be the result of their free will. The freedom to 
determine and exercise free will shall not be impaired 
by physical and psychological abuse such as ill- 
treatment, torture, giving drugs by force, fatigue, 
deception, physical force and violence, using any device. 
Promising an advantage which is against the 
statute is prohibited. 
Statements obtained in violation of these 
prohibitions may not be used in evidence even if the 
accused consents to its use. " 
At the other end of the spectrum, confessions made by the accused person are 
generally accepted by the English criminal justice system as capable of being given 
in evidence against the accused in any criminal proceedings. Section 76(1) provides 
that: 
6 The principle of orality and immediacy in Turkish trials requires that testimony 
must be presented in court, and that documentary evidence such as the confession 
given by the accused to the prosecutor or police cannot principally be read at trial. 
(CMUK 247) 
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"in any proceeding a confession made by an accused 
person may be given in evidence against him in so far 
as it is relevant to any matter in the proceeding and it is 
not excluded by the court in pursuance of this section. "' 
It is clear from the wording of s. 76(1) that confessions may only be given in evidence 
provided that firstly, the confession is relevant to any matter in issue in the criminal 
proceedings and; secondly, the confession is not excluded by the court. In this latter 
regard, several "hurdles"' which enable confessions to be introduced into trial are 
contained in PACE. The first hurdle relates to section 76 which is a specific provision 
regulating admissibility only of confessions. The second hurdle comes into effect 
where the admission of a confession would have an adverse effect on the fairness of 
proceedings [s. 78(1)]. Thirdly, the trial judge may be invited to use his common law 
discretion to exclude a confession[s. 82(3)]. Exclusionary rules regulated by section 
78 (1) and section 82(2) have already been examined in previous chapters. Now the 
The theory behind their reception in evidence is stated in Sharpe 
-[1988] 1 All 
E. R. 65, at 68- as follows; 
"... provided the accused had not been subjected to any 
improper pressure, it was so unlikely that he would 
confess to a crime he had not committed that it was safe 
to rely on the truth of what he said. " 
It was also stated by the Criminal Law Revision Committee that "although the 
statement is hearsay, it is admissible because what a person says against himself is 
likely to be true". Eleventh Report, Evidence (General), Cmnd. 4991, (1972), para. 53. 
However, psychological researches-mentioned earlier- have not served to reinforce this 
theory. In the absence of any improper pressure the trustworthiness of confession may 
still be in doubt. One should note that Professor Smith in his recent article argues that 
the rationale for reception of voluntary statements is that "a party to litigation cannot 
invoke the hearsay rule in respect of his own statement". That is to say, in the words 
of Morgan, cited by Professor Smith, "a party can hardly object that he had no 
opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when 
speaking under sanction of an oath". Smith, 1995, "Exculpatory Statements and Confessions", Crim. L. R. 280. 
$ Legal tests are described as "hurdles" by Professor Birch, 1989, "The Pace Hots 
Up: Confessions and Confusions Under the 1984 Act", Crim. L. R. 94. 
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provision which specifically regulates admissibility of confession will be focused on. 
Section 76(2) provides; 
"If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes 
to give in evidence a confession made by an accused 
person, it is represented to the court that the confession 
was or may have been obtained- 
a)by oppression of the person who made it; or 
b) in consequence of anything said or done 
which was likely, in the circumstances existing 
at the time, to render unreliable any confession 
which might be made by him in consequence 
thereof, 
the court shall not allow the confession to be given in 
evidence against him except in so far the prosecution 
proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the 
confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not 
obtained as aforesaid. " 
Since more than one test for admissibility of confessions is provided by both 
CMUK and PACE it must be recognised that the tests are capable of overlapping each 
other's scope. Therefore, extra attention is required for the interpretation of the 
provisions. The underlying difference between article 254 and and section 78 on the 
one hand, and article 135/A and section 76 on the other is that the former are general 
provisions regulating admissibility of all improperly obtained evidence, while the latter 
are special provisions which regulate only admissibility of confession evidence. It 
seems to me that in the application of the admissibility test, priority should be given 
to the special provisions rather than the general ones (lex specials derogat generali)9 
9 For the detailed and comparative examination of statutory interpretation see, 
MacCormick and Summers, 1991, Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study. 
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3. What Kind of Statements are These Provisions Concerned With? 
Comparing and Contrasting Article 135/A and Section 76 without 
conceptualising a precise idea about what kind of statements these provisions are 
concerned with may be described as "playing Hamlet without the ghosti1°. It 
therefore seems necessary firstly to discuss what kind of statements in the Turkish and 
English legal systems are subjected to additional limitations to reception in criminal 
cases. 
3.1. Statements: In-Court or Out of Court 
A statement can be made either in or out of a court. Nowadays, it is unlikely 
that an in-court statement will be obtained improperly, but it is not impossible. Not 
only the law enforcement officials, but also judges, magistrates, prosecutors or even 
defence lawyers may ask questions to the accused in a manner which may be 
considered as oppressive or deceptive. Moreover, in the light of psychological 
findings" which show that people may admit a crime which they did not commit, 
not only confessions but also other admissions are susceptible to unreliability. 
Nevertheless, Turkish and English legal systems show some diversity as to the 
treatment of an in-court statement. 
'o This expression is used by Weisberg, 1962, "Police Interrogation of Arrested 
Persons: A Sceptical View", in Police Power and Individual Freedom, p. 155. 
" See, Gudjonsson, 1992, The Psychology of Interrogations. Confessions and 
Testimony. 
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In Turkey there is no reason why a statement made in court (which 
incriminates its maker in a crime) should not be subjected to the admissibility test in 
question. Article 135/A provides that "statements of ! fade veren ( the interviewee) and 
sanik (the suspect) should be the result of their free will.... ". In Turkey, "suspect" 
status is received when an individual is questioned by the magistrate involved in the 
pre-trial stage and by the trial judge, whereas "interviewee" status is conferred upon 
an individual when he is interviewed by the police and the prosecutor. 12 Thus, the 
use of the word sanik clearly implies that an in-court statement can be subjected to the 
admissibility test. Moreover, Article 135/A is a supplement to Article 135 which 
regulates both fade alma13 (interviewing) and sorgulama14 (questioning); both 
provisions are in the general part of the CMUK and, therefore, are applicable to whole 
criminal proceedings, not only to the preliminary investigation. In addition to these, 
Article 236, which is concerned with the commencement of trial, makes it more clear 
that, 
"[t]he trial is commenced with a roll-call of expert 
witnesses. This is followed by introduction of the 
registration of the identity of the suspect; reading of the 
accusation; and questioning of the suspect according to 
Article 135.... ". 'S 
12 See Chapter Two. An individual does not change his status when he is charged 
as "the accused". 
13 It is conducted by the police or the prosecutor. 
14 it is conducted by the magistrate involved in pre-trial stage or by the trial judge. 
Emphasis added. The original version of Article 236 reads as follows: 
"Durusmaya taniklarin ve bilirkisinin yoklamasiyla 
baslanir. Bundan sonra sanigin acik kimligi ve sahsi durumu tesbit olunur. Daha sonra iddianame okunur ve 135 inci addeye gore sanik sorguya cekilir.... ". 
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As far as English law is concerned, Section 82(1), which defines "a 
confession", does not include any restriction such as whether the statement should be 
made in or out of court. This omission, however, is not conclusive: Section 82(1) is 
a definition of "a confession" for a particular purpose; specifically for section 76. 
Since Section 76 applies where the prosecution proposes to tender an out-court 
admission as an exception to the hearsay rule16, in-court statements such as a guilty 
plea, formal admission and an incriminating statement made while testifying, which 
are tendered by the defence, cannot technically be subjected to the admissibility test 
under Section 76. Such a practice, it seems to me, is likely to increase the risk of 
false convictions. It is, however, consistent with the traditional adversarial thinking 
that a legal procedure is a contest between parties in a position of theoretical equality. 
Accordingly, the guilty plea, for example, may be seen as a vehicle to settle the 
dispute by enabling the suspect to waive the hearing, rather than having any evidential 
significance. 
To conclude, in Turkey the admissibility test in question applies to in and out 
of court statements alike and taking these statements as a basis for conviction can be 
controverted by the defence on appeal, whereas an in-court statement in England 
cannot be subjected to the admissibility test under Section 76. The above stated risk 
needs to be taken into account in any reform in England, and the defendant must be 
given a chance to show that no weight should be placed on his in-court statement. 
Otherwise, policy considerations, such as the desirability of reducing cost and 
16 This rule requires that witnesses must give their testimony orally in court and 
must testify only as to matters with their own first-hand knowledge. 
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workload, will override the normal judicial policy of convicting the suspect on 
evidence of probative value. 
3.2. Out of Court Statements: Formal or Informal 
Generally, out of court statements are made either to a person in authority or 
to a person who does not possess authority. They may respectively be called "formal" 
and "informal" confessions. The latter, unlike the former, are often made in ignorance 
of the possibility that they may be used in any subsequent criminal trial. Also, they 
are unlikely to have PACE or CMUK standards with regard to safeguards" against 
likelihood of falsity. 
Confessions were required to be formal in order to be subjected to the 
admissibility test at English common law. " This requirement obviously favoured 
informal confessions by allowing the introduction of them into trial without being 
subjected to the admissibility test. This favouritism, however, was not only difficult 
to justify19, but also problematic in its day to day application20. Therefore, in its 
17 Such as tape recording and contemporaneous note-taking of interviews, the right 
to legal advice. See Chapter Seven. 
18 R. v Wilson (1967) 51 Cr. App. R. 194; For a detailed discussion of this 
requirement at common law see Mirfield, 1981, "Confessions: The Person in Authority 
Requirement", Crim. L. R. 92. 
19 Indeed, informal statements carried no less risk of being untrustworthy than 
formal ones. This rule could only be justified by employing the deterrent rationale, 
which was not adopted as the underlying concern of the admissibility test by the 
English judiciary. 
20 In spite of the fact that literally a person in authority is one who occupies a 
position of authority over the suspect, there was no agreement on which categories of 
people qualified as persons in authority. See cases: R. v Nowell [1948] 1 All E. R. 
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Eleventh Report, the Criminal Law Revision Committee recommended that the 
requirement of confessions being made to a person in authority was unnecessary and 
should be abolished. " Consistent with this recommendation the common law rules 
have been superseded in that all statements by the accused are now by virtue of s. 
82(1) subjected to the admissibility test under s. 76(2) regardless of whether they are 
made to a person in authority. This move may be perceived as a clear rejection of the 
deterrent rationale with regard to confession evidence. 
The question of what happens to an informal statement in Turkey has not been 
subjected to any judicial decision yet. Article 135/A seems to be concerned with, "a 
statement of the suspect and interviewee". 2 Although an informal statement is made 
neither by the suspect nor by the interviewee, this omission, it seems to me, derives 
from the rare introduction of an informal statement into trial, and does not prevent 
Article 135/A being applied to informal statements as well as formal statements. 
Formal pre-trial statements may also take two forms; judicial and extra judicial 
statements. As far as Turkish law is concerned, the former are made to the sulh 
hakimi (the justice of the peace), while the latter are made to the prosecutor and the 
794; R. v Smith [1959] 2 Q. B. 35; R. v Cleary (1963) 48 Cr. App. R. 116; R. v Wilson 
(1967) 51 Cr. App. R. 194; R. v Moore (1972) 56 Cr. App. R. 373; R. v Grewal [1975] 
Crim. L. K 159; in the case of R v. Deokinanan [1969] 1 A. C. 20 the matter was 
said to be considered by employing subjective test; the question which had to be asked 
was said to be whether the suspect truly believed, at the time he made a statement, that 
the person he spoke to had some degree of power over him. 
Z' Eleventh Report, supra note 7, para. 58, p. 39. 
22 For specific meanings of these terms in Turkey see note 12 and accompanying 
text. 
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law enforcement officers. With regard to the probative value, there appears to have 
been a slight prejudice against formal extra judicial confessions and informal 
confessions. There is a general corroboration requirement with regard to them23; the 
accused shall not be convicted in a case where his own extra judicial or informal 
confession is the only evidence against him, unless it has been repeated before a judge. 
Having said that, the corroboration requirement is a different issue and does not affect 
the possible challenge of admissibility of such statements under Article 135/A. 
In England an out of court formal statement is generally equated to a statement 
made to the police. However, this may not always be the case; the prosecution may 
seek to use a formal statement which is not made to the police. To illustrate, a 
previous plea of guilty which was made at the same proceeding but subsequently 
withdrawn24, an unwithdrawn plea of guilty made in respect of another charge2S, a 
23 C. G. K 16.2.1987 E. 7/271 K. 50; C. G. K 2.2.1987 E. 314 K. 18; 6. C. D. 1.3.1990 
E. 1989/10255 K. 1990/1524; 6. C. D 10.5.1988 E. 1988/5307 K. 1988/6175; 6. C. D 
17.3.1987 E. 1987. K. 1987/2751 cited by Ozmen and Aktalay, 1993, Ceza 
Muhakemeleri Usulu Kanunu (the Code of Criminal Procedure), p. 341-342; Ahmet, 
Yargitay Ceza Genel Kurulu, E. 1993/6-236, K. 1993/255, T. 18.16.1993, Yargitay 
Kararlari Dergisi (Journal of the Court of Appeal Decisions), 1994, p. 804. 
24 In the case of R. v Rimmer 
-[1972] 1 All E. R 604 (CA)- the Court of Appeal 
disagreed with the proposition that a withdrawn plea of guilty "has simply no effect 
whatsoever"; it remains as "a confession of fact". For the detailed discussion of the use 
of a withdrawn plea of guilty as evidence see, Welch, 1962, "Propriety and Prejudicial 
Effect of Showing, in Criminal Case, Withdrawn Guilty Plea", 86 American Law 
Review 326,2 nd ser.; and Patzenden, 1983, "Informal Judicial Admissions of 
Criminal Activity: A Comparative Study of England, Canada and the United States", 
32 Int. Comp. L. Rev. 812. 
25 R. v Bastin [1971] Crim. L. R. 529 (CA). 
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voir dire statement26, a statement made during an earlier trial for the same offence27, 
and a statement made in other proceedings in which the accused was on tria128 are 
allowed to be used as evidence against the accused. If this is so, courts should, in the 
opinion of this researcher, be ready to subject them to the admissibility test in 
question. 
3.3. Statements: Inculpatory or Exculpatory 
A statement may be either inculpatory or exculpatory. Although an 
exculpatory statement mainly contains denial of involvement with the alleged offence, 
in some cases the prosecutor may wish to introduce it as evidence against the accused. 
To state such a situation in a more concrete form the following example may be given: 
a suspect accused of burglary states to the police that he was not in that part of the 
city at the time of the alleged offence. Obviously such a statement is exculpatory 
when it is made. However, if the prosecution were able to prove at trial that the 
suspect was near the scene at the time of offence the suspect's previous exculpatory 
statement would be used by the prosecutor to demonstrate his consciousness of guilt 
or creditworthiness of his possible testimony at trial. What may therefore have been 
intended as an exculpatory remark, may later turn to be inculpatory. One may ask 
26 In the case of Brophy 
-[1981] 2 All L. R. 705- it was recognised by the House 
of Lords that there can be circumstances in which a voir dire statement which is 
entirely unconnected to the issue raised on the voir dire would be admissible in the 
subsequent trial. 
27 R. v McGregor (1967) 51 Cr. App. R. 338. 
28 R. v Laurent (1898) 62 J. P. 250 (CCC); R. v Chidley (1860) 8 Cox C. C. 365. 
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whether such a statement could be subjected to the admissibility test under Article 
135/A or Section 76. 
As far as Turkish law is concerned the issue is not complicated. The use of 
the term "beyan" (statement) rather than "ikrar" (incriminating statement) in Article 
135/A suggests that there is no ground for discussion whether the exclusionary rule 
is applicable to a purely exculpatory statement. As a natural consequence of such 
terminology not only inculpatory but also exculpatory statements may be subjected to 
the admissibility test under Article 135/A. 
Such a wide approach, it seems to the present researcher, may be employed 
with regard to Section 76, even though there is considerable scepticism among English 
judges29 and leading academics3° to subject exculpatory statements to the 
admissibility test under section 76. 
Since section 76 can only be employed in respect of "confession" evidence, 
what constitutes a confession is the key in discussing applicability of s. 76 to 
exculpatory statements. Fortunately, PACE introduced a statutory provision defining 
29 See, R. v Sat-Bhambra (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 55; R. v Park [1994] Crim. L. 
Rev. 285; R. v Jelen & Katz (1990) 90 Cr. App. R. 456; R. v Pearce (1979) 69 Cr. 
App. R. 365; Anondagoda [1962] 1 W. L. R. 817. 
3o Smith, 1988, "Commentary on R. v Sat"Bhambra", Crim. L. R. 453; Birch, 
1990, "Commentary on R. v Ismail", Crim. L. R. 109; Birch, 1994, "Commentary on 
R. v Park" Crim. L. R 286, note that Professor Birch holds a contrary view in her 
article, "The Pace Hots Up", supra note 8, p. 115; Wigmore, 1940, A Treatise on the 
Anglo American System of Evidence in Trials of Common Law (3 rd ed. ), vol. III, 
section 821, p. 930; Tapper, 1990, Cross on Evidence (7 th ed. ), p. 609. 
219 
confession as including "any statement wholly or partly adverse to the person who 
made it... ". 31 
As far as literal interpretation32 of this definition is concerned, there is nothing 
in the wording of s. 82(1) about "the timing" of adverse affect to its maker; a 
statement may be adverse either when it is made or when the prosecution wants to 
present it. Furthermore, the usage of the term "include" leaves the possibility open 
that it extends to other statements as well 33 Having said that, the Court of Appeal 
has made a distinction between statements according to the timing of the adverse 
effect. 
In the case of R. v Sat-Bhambra34, the defendant's answers in the face of an 
accusation of drug dealing had consisted of: 
"obvious lies and prevarications compounded by an 
innate tendency to give convoluted and misleading 
answersi35 
His defence at trial was that he, a journalist, was paid by the Indian Government to 
investigate whether an extremist Sikh organisation was financed by dealing in drugs. 
He justified his lies to the Custody officers by stating that telling the truth at that stage 
31 PACE 82(1). 
32 In this method of interpretation we are bound by the very words of the 
provisions which we interpret. 
33 Mirfreld, Confessions, p. 85. 
34 88 Cr. App. R. 55 (1989). 
3S Ibid. at p. 5 8. 
220 
would risk his own and his family's life. There were also failures on the part of the 
Custody officers to charge the accused before the initial interview and to allow him 
to see a solicitor. Furthermore, the accused was a diabetic, and he did not receive 
adequate medication at the time of the questioning. After the trial judge's refusal to 
exclude these statements on the voir dire, fresh medical evidence suggesting their 
unreliability was given. The trial judge decided that he was powerless to reconsider 
his earlier decision on admissibility. The main concern of the appeal was whether this 
was the case. The Court of Appeal held, obiter, that even if this evidence had come 
to light earlier the statements could not have been excluded under Section 76 since 
they were not "confessions": a statement must have adverse effect when it is made in 
order to be subjected to the admissibility test under Section 76. It seems to me that 
considering the criminal procedure as a whole unit36 will prevent us from adopting 
this restricted approach. 
Leaving aside the failure of the Court of Appeal as to the literal interpretation, 
the case of R. v Sat-Bhambra is also unconvincing with regard to its perception of 
exculpatory statements: they are perceived as "containing nothing which the 
interrogator wished the defendant to say and nothing apparently adverse to the 
defendant's interests". " If this is so, there would be no question of the prosecution 
using them. Obviously, the prosecution does not wish to use them in favour of the 
accused but contrary to his interest. Moreover, the police may wish the defendant to 
make inconsistent exculpatory statements as well as inculpatory ones if the former 
36 See Chapter Three note 8. 
" Ibid, p. 61. 
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would be introduced to trial much more easily. For instance, in relation to a murder 
charge, instead of persuading the suspect to admit killing they may pressure him into 
stating that he did not know the victim. Proving at trial that he knew the victim is 
likely to damage the defendant. 
One may attempt to justify this restricted approach by referring to something 
technical and peculiar to English law such as the hearsay rule and the previous 
inconsistent statement rule. 8 Indeed, the hearsay rule and the previous inconsistent 
statement rule are not quite the same. The former deals with the use of previous pre- 
trial statements to prove their truth, while the latter deals with the use of such 
statements to attack the credit of maker (to show he is not a reliable witness). The 
two rules are working on different things. Differences between them, however, do not 
necessarily suggest that only the first of them should be subjected to safeguards 
provided by Section 76. The previous pre-trial statements should not prove anything 
if they are obtained by oppression. They should not be relied upon for any purpose. 
If the suspect is tortured, the value of his statement for any purpose should be 
doubted. Moreover, it could simply be argued that other common law countries such 
as the United States39 or Canada4° which have similar technical rules did not face 
any difficulty when they accepted that exculpatory statements should be governed by 
the same rules regulating inculpatory statements. 
38 See Smith, 1988, "Commentary on R. v Sat-Bhambra" Crim. L. R. 453; Tapper, 
Supra note 30. 
39 Miranda v Arizona, 384 U. S. 436,377 (1975). 
11 Piche (1970) 11 D. L. R 700. 
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The underlying rationales of Section 76 may also shed some light. If the 
concern of the section is to prevent reliance upon potentially unreliable statements, 
exculpatory statements in respect of which there is not only a danger of their being 
unreliable but which are already said by the prosecution to be unreliable should be 
subjected to the Section 76 test. The reliability of any inferences from them would 
be doubtful since there may be many reasons unrelated to the alleged offence, such as 
hiding something immoral, for making exculpatory statements rather than 
consciousness of guilt. The deterrent rationale leads to a similar conclusion because 
the contrary solution would encourage the police to employ improper tactics during 
the interrogation in the hope of obtaining, at least, some inconsistent exculpatory 
statements. The protective theory is remedial in nature and therefore concerned with 
ensuring the suspect is not placed at a disadvantage by evidence procured by improper 
conduct. Since not only inculpatory but also exculpatory statements will disadvantage 
the suspect, such a distinction cannot be justifiable. As far as the judicial integrity 
theory is concerned, the aim of section 76 is to prevent the judiciary from partnership 
in police impropriety. Accepting any statements obtained improperly is likely to make 
the judiciary a party to improper conduct. Thus, none of the rationales cited so far 
does dictate the applicability of s. 76 to only inculpatory statements. 
My position is further supported by Article 15 of the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment4' which provides; 
a' 10 December 1984, G. Re. 39/51, in force 26 June 1987. 
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"Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which 
is established to have been made as a result of torture 
shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, 
except against a person accused of torture as evidence 
that the statement was made". 
It clearly states that a statement made by a victim of torture cannot be used for any 
purpose. It is ratified by England as well as Turkey. 42 Unlike Turkish law, this 
provision does not have direct application in English law, but England, by signing it, 
undertakes a responsibility to change its domestic law in order to bring English law 
into conformity with the Convention. 
To sum up, it seems to me that making distinction between inculpatory and 
exculpatory statements with regard to the admissibility test cannot be justifiable. A 
proper scope of section 76 should cover any pre-trial acknowledgements of facts by 
the accused. The terms "statement" and "confession" may be used interchangeably. 
Professor Smith has already recognized that the term "voluntary statement" is 
commonly used when "confession" is meant. 43 So why cannot it be the other way 
around? In the case of R. v Ismair4, the Court of Appeal came close to taking a step 
towards the suggested direction by failing to criticise the trial judge who employed 
Section 76 to exclude a purely exculpatory statement as 
42 See Chapter Two 3.3. 
a3 Smith, 1988, "Commentary on R. v Sat-Bhambra", Crim. L. R. 455. 
44 [1990] Crim. L. R. 109. 
" This case, obviously, is not an authority to support the researcher's suggestion 
in that the Court of Appeal did not discuss the point 
, 
and, therefore, it could have failed to notice the fact that Section 76 was employed to exclude exculpatory 
statement. 
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3.4. Forms of Statements: Made in Words or Otherwise 
3.4.1. In General 
In both jurisdictions a statement may be made in speech or in writing, and in 
neither is it necessarily the case that words must be used. "' The question arises as 
to whether an artistic communication or physical gesture can be regarded as a 
statement. With regard to the former it may be said that relating something may be 
easier for illiterate and unsophisticated people in the way of demonstrating it in action 
rather than describing it in words. An interesting example of this situation has arisen 
under common law. In the case of Li Shu Ling47 the suspect re-acted the way in 
which the killing of the victim took place with a women police officer. The police 
made, with his consent, a video recording of the re-enactment. The filmed re- 
enactment of the crime by the suspect was regarded as a confession by the Privy 
Council. Indeed, as far as the evidential value of revealing the fact that the crime was 
committed by its maker is concerned, substantial differences do not exist between a 
confession made in words and an admission made by demonstrating in action. With 
regard to the recording provisions there is also no difference in England between a 
video recording of the re-enactment and the tape recording of an oral confession. 
Unfortunately Turkish law enforcement officials do not have such advanced 
a6 For English law see, Section 82(1) of PACE, For Turkish law see, Sahin, 1994, 
Sanigin Kolluk Tarafindan Sorgulanmasi (Questioning of the Suspect by the Law 
Enforcement Officers), 166. 
47 [1989] A. C. 270. 
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technological equipment at the moment, and therefore the re-enactments are generally 
written down. 
Related to the physical gesture it should be noted that not all behaviours are 
equivalent to speech in any society and implications of the physical gesture may be 
different in diverse cultures. Having said that, some conducts clearly indicating 
acceptance in response to an accusation may be regarded as a statement in both 
jurisdictions. This point may be illustrated by giving examples. Firstly, when a 
suspect faces the question whether he committed a particular offence, he may nod his 
head instead of replying 'yes'. Similarly, a person accused of murder may take the 
police to the scene and show them the location of the body, instead of saying where 
the body is concealed. 48 
3.4.2. Implied Confessions and Silence 
Written or oral confessions can be made expressly or impliedly. An express 
confession occurs where the person confesses to the commission of the offence in a 
very direct manner. A confession may be implied in cases where the only inference 
which can be drawn from words used in particular circumstances is the admission of 
the alleged offence. Naturally, in the presence of any ambiguity, such an inference 
cannot be safely drawn. The Turkish Court of Appeal, for instance, held that the offer 
by the suspect to pay the value of a ram in the face of an accusation of theft cannot 
41 These examples are commonly given. See, May, 1986, Criminal Evidence 170; 
Mirfield, supra note 33, p. 88; Murphy, 1992, Blackstones Criminal Practice 2052. 
226 
be taken as an implied confession 49 However, in some cases where the accused 
raises a defence, a confession could be implied. For example, in the face of a rape 
accusation, the fact that sexual intercourse took place could be inferred from a defence 
by the suspect that the woman consented. 
One may ask whether silence in response to an accusation gives rise to an 
inference that the accused accepts the truth of the accusation, and if so whether the 
admissibility tests under Article 135/A and Section 76 can be applied in such cases. 
As far as the first part of this question is concerned, the fact that individuals are 
entitled to refrain from answering questions put to them for the purpose of discovering 
whether they committed an offence is well known as the right to silence, and clearly 
recognised in both countries' procedural rules regulating the criminal investigation. " 
The interviewee and the suspect, according to Turkish law, should be notified that, "he 
has a legal right not to make a statement about the accusation". 51 This requirement 
makes it technically impossible to consider post-caution silence as an implied 
confession in that silence following "the caution" may be nothing more than the 
exercise of the cautioned right. Having said that, the level of appreciation of the right 
to silence in Turkey appears low among the public as a whole; the popular culture of 
Turkey is reflected by a common proverb that "sukut ikrardan gelir" (silence means 
guilt). One may expect to find the reflection of such culture in the form of prejudice 
49 Mehmet Case, Yargitay Ceza Genel Kurulu (The General Assembly of Court 
of Appeal), E. 1993/6-67 K. 1993/108 T. 19.4.1993,19 Yargitay KararlariDergisi (The 
Journal of the Court of Appeal Decisions), October 1993, p. 1564. 
so Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 Q. B. 414, the Turkish Constitution 38/5. 
s' CMUK 135/4. 
227 
against the suspect at the level of the courts, but it should not be possible to consider 
silence as an implied confession and thus there would not be any need for the 
application of article 135/A. 
In England, there has been a recent and dramatic change in respect to the 
drawing of adverse inferences from the suspect's silence by the enactment of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Until 1995, in English law a caution 
had to be administered before any period of questioning in the form that, "you do not 
have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be given in 
evidence" S2 Pre-1994 law allowed inferences from silence in limited circumstances. 
In the case of R. v MitchelP3 it was stated 
"when persons are speaking on even terms, and a charge 
is made, and the person charged says nothing, and 
expresses no indignation, and does nothing to repel the 
charge, that is some evidence to show that he admits the 
charge to be true. "" 
The question of when parties are on equal terms obviously needed clarification. In 
cases where accusations were made by the police it was held that the parties were not 
on even terms" unless a legal adviser was present56. The drawing of adverse 
52 The 1991 edition of Code C 10.4. 
13 (1892) 17 Cox C. C. 503. 
sa Ibid, p. 508; see also Parkes v R. [1976] 3 All E. R. 380. 
ss Hall v R. [1971] 1 W. L. R. 298 
sb R. v Chandler [1976] 1 W. L. R. 585; R. v Alladice (1988) Cr. App. R. 380. 
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inferences in the pre-1994 law was restricted to pre-caution silence in that the post- 
caution silence was considered the exercise of the cautioned right. 57 
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 introduces much wider 
circumstances in which adverse inferences may be drawn from silence. Section 34 of 
the Act enables adverse inferences to be drawn if the accused fails, on being 
questioned under caution or on being charged with the offence, to mention any fact, 
which he may reasonably be expected to mention and which he subsequently relies on 
in his defence later at trial. Section 36 and 37 permits the drawing of adverse 
inferences from pre-trial silence in cases where the suspect does not account for 
objects, substances or marks, or his presence in a particular place. SB The caution has 
also been replaced in order to notify the suspect as to the possible inferences. " 
As far as the present English law is concerned, silence may form the basis for 
some adverse inferences against the suspect. Having said that, the nature and the 
extent of the adverse effect of silence depends on the circumstances of individual 
 R. v Chandler [1976] 1 W. L. R. 585. 
" For the detailed examination of these provisions see Murphy, 1995, Blackstone's 
Criminal Practice, F. 19. Another provision, section 35, deals with the accused's 
silence at trial. In-court statements, let alone the use of silence, cannot be subjected 
to the admissibility test under section 76, because the section in question applies when 
the prosecution proposes to tender an out of court admission as an exception to the 
hearsay rule. See note 16 and accompanying text. 
s9 The new caution reads, 
"You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your 
defence if you do not mention when questioned 
something which you later rely on in court. Anything 
you do say may be given in evidence". (The 1995 edition of Code C 10.4) 
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cases. Silence, unlike statements, does not clearly connect the suspect with the 
commission of the alleged offence. An inference drawn under the new provisions is 
not by itself sufficient to support a determination of guilt 60 Rather, silence may 
make it less plausible for the suspect to raise a defence for the fist time at trial. One 
needs, therefore, to take a cautious approach to classifying silence as an implied 
confession and consequently subjecting it to the admissibility test under section 76. 
This does not mean to rule out the possibility that silencg may be obtained 
involuntarily. Nothing, however, prevents such silence from being subjected to the 
admissibility test under section 78 as, inter alia, section 34 of the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 refers to silence as evidence. 61 
4. The Criterion of Admissibility 
4.1. Under A. 135/A: Emergence of the Involuntariness Test 
It may be useful to repeat article 135\A which states that, 
" Statements of the suspect and interviewee should 
be the result of their free will. The freedom to 
determine and exercise free will shall not be impaired 
by physical and psychological abuse such as ill- 
treatment, torture, giving drugs by force, fatigue, 
deception, physical force and violence, using any device. 
Promising an advantage which is against the 
statute is prohibited. 
6o The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 34(2)(d). 
61 For the possible exclusionary scenarios of silence under section 78 see, Dennis, 
1995, "The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994: The Evidence Provisions", 
Crim. L. Rev. 4, at p. 14. 
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Statements obtained in violation of these 
prohibitions may not be used in evidence even if the 
accused consents to its use. " 
This article would seem the result of the postulate that individuals ordinarily have 
freedom of choice62 and of the moral conviction that persons should enjoy a degree 
of mental freedom to choose whether or not to confess. Lack of such "mental 
freedom" is required to result in the exclusion of any subsequent confession. At this 
point, one may ask whether factors such as mental disease or abnormality which 
impair the suspect's capacity to act voluntarily are covered by the article. Taken 
literally, the answer to this question should be negative; the concern of article 135/A 
seems to preserve a certain degree of mental freedom against improper practices which 
come from the outside world. That means confessions are only admissible under 
article 135/A provided that the suspect is not deprived of freedom of will by third 
parties. 
The article in question does not attempt to define the words "free will" or 
"voluntariness". Instead, it lists a number of improper techniques which are likely to 
create an unacceptable risk of depriving the suspect of his free will 63 Obviously, 
prohibiting certain categories of police tactics provide concrete guidance for the law 
62 Determinists contend that all incidents, including all human beings' preferences, 
are caused. From the determinist point of view, therefore, a person faced with a choice 
between alternatives is not free in a contra-causal sense; it would be possible to 
forecast accurately somebody's option in the face of particular alternatives provided 
that the person's genetic code and all his previous experiences are known. See 
generally Beardsley & Beardsley, 1972, Invitation To Philosophical Thinking. 
63 This list may be interpreted as the statement of improper techniques which result 
in an "involuntary" confession as a matter of law, regardless of the likelihood that they 
did or could produce a false confession and regardless of their effect on the actual 
confession. 
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enforcement officers and increased protection for the suspects. One has to accept, 
however, that a comprehensive enumeration of all the techniques is extremely difficult 
due to the evolutionary nature of police practices and the suspect's possession of 
varying degrees of sensitivity and resistance to improper tactics. Moreover, the impact 
of such a listing depends, of course, upon the interpretation given to the terms "ill- 
treatment", "torture", "giving drug by force", "fatigue", "deception", "physical force 
and force", "using any device", and "promising an advantage". Depending on a broad, 
or restricted interpretation of these terms, improper conduct may, or may not, be held 
to result in an involuntary confession. 
In any case, the listing does not enable us to restrict the Turkish notion of 
voluntariness to a single meaning. Since securing confessions by deceit or by 
promising an advantage that is illegal in itself is mentioned by the article, the 
voluntariness test is not only limited to coercive tactics. All methods that have the 
effect of damaging the suspect's free will may be included. 
4.2. Under S. 76/2: Re-Emergence of the Involuntariness Test 
Section 76(2) reads: 
"If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes 
to give in evidence a confession made by an accused 
person, it is represented to the court that the confession 
was or may have been obtained- 
a)by oppression of the person who made it; or b) in consequence of anything said or done 
which was likely, in the circumstances existing 
at the time, to render unreliable any confession 
which might be made by him in consequence 
thereof, 
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the court shall not allow the confession to be given in 
evidence against him except in so far the prosecution 
proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the 
confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not 
obtained as aforesaid. " 
Under this section a court is empowered to exclude a confession which was or may 
have been obtained by oppression or in consequence of anything said or done which 
is likely to render it unreliable. It is a general misconception that section 76 has 
replaced the common law test of voluntariness with a dual statutory test of oppression 
and unreliability to determine whether a confession is admissible. As far as the 
present researcher is concerned, this section does not represent a break with the 
traditional English test of voluntariness. In the following pages it will be advocated 
that section 76 requires a voluntariness test which the present researcher calls a 
"qualified voluntariness test". To put this argument as convincingly as possible, some 
clarification as to the admissibility of confessions prior to the enactment of PACE, and 
the Parliamentary history of the section in question would seem to be necessary. 
4.2.1. Can Oppression be Considered Separately From Involuntariness? 
Long before PACE came into force, it had been established that confessions 
should not be received in evidence unless voluntary. 64 A confession was regarded 
as voluntary if, in the phraseology of Lord Sumner, "it [h]as not been obtained 
... 
either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage... "". Such an explanation could 
'4R. v Warickshall (1783) 1 Leach C. C. 263; White (1741) 17 How. St. Tr. 1079; 
R. v Ibrahim [1914] A. C. 599. 
65 R. v Ibrahim [1914] A. C. 599. 
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hardly be seen as being comprehensive in that there was no reference to torture or 
other forms of physical compulsion. This omission was noticed in subsequent cases 
and "oppression" was recognised as an another factor which could lead to exclusion. " 
In the case of Callis v Gunn it was held that: 
"a fundamental principle of law that no answer to a 
question and no statement is admissible unless it is 
shown by the prosecution not to have been obtained in 
an oppressive manner and to have been voluntary in the 
sense that it has been obtained by threats or 
inducement" 67 
The important point to be noted in this case is that oppression was considered 
separately from voluntariness. In other words, oppression, which would obviously 
make a confession involuntary, was introduced into English law as an additional test 
to the existing test of voluntariness. This approach rightly did not receive the 
endorsement of the 1964 version of the Judges' Rules in which it was stated that: 
"... it is a fundamental condition of the admissibility in 
evidence against any person, equally of any oral answer 
given by that person to a question put by a police 
officer and of any statement made by that person, that 
it shall have been voluntary, in the sense that it has not 
been obtained from him b fear or prejudice or hope of 
advantage, exercised or held out by a person in 
authority, or by oppression". " 
" Callis v Gunn [1964] 1 Q. B. 495; R. v Priestley (1965) 51 Cr. App. R. 1; R. 
v. Prager (1971) 56 Cr. App. R. 151, [1972] 1 All E. R. 1114; see also the 
introduction of Judges' Rules. 
67 [1964] 1 Q. B. 495, at 501, [1963] 3 All E. R 667, at 680. Emphasis added. 
68 The preamble of the Judges' Rules. See Home Office Circular HO 31/1964, 
reissued in circular 89/1978. This pronouncement is confirmed by the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee as representing the law at that time. Eleventh Report, supra note 7, para. 60. 
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Accordingly, oppression was not a separate test for admissibility, but another element, 
like threat or inducement, of the notion of involuntariness. Thus, all three-threat, 
inducement, and oppression- were at that time capable of rendering a resulting 
confession involuntary and therefore inadmissible. Subsequently, s. 76(2)a has 
preserved the common law voluntariness test with regard to oppression. 
4.2.2. From "Threats or Inducements" to "Anything Said or Done" 
As far as sub-section 76(2)(b) is concerned, it has been stated in the 
Parliamentary Debates by Lord Denning that, 
"we are having new case law altogether in our criminal 
law. It is not a question of whether the confession was 
voluntary but whether it is reliable". 69 
This statement reflects a general misconception that section 76(2)(b) has introduced 
a new test based upon the likelihood of the confession's reliability. This is, however, 
not the case. 
As has been mentioned above, the voluntariness test had generally been 
expressed in the terms pronounced by Lord Sumner in the Case of Ibrahim. 
Accordingly, 
"... no statement by an accused is admissible... unless it 
is... a voluntary statement in the sense that it has not 
69 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Weekly Hansard, No: 1262,31 July 
1984, p. 688. 
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been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or 
hope of advantage... ". 70 
Although Lord Sumner's phrase, "fear of prejudice (threats) or hope of advantage 
(inducement)" was considered, after half a century", to be a sufficient guide to trial 
judges in deciding the voluntariness of a confession, articulation of it was naturally 
needed to state what circumstances are to be regarded as rendering a confession 
legally, rather than psychologically, involuntary. 72 
In 1972, the Criminal Law Revision Committee, besides expressing an opinion 
in favour of preserving the sub-notion of "oppression", recommended the modification 
of the other sub-notions "threat" and "inducement". The core of the recommendation 
was that not all threats or inducements, but only those likely to produce an unreliable 
confession, had to result in exclusion. 73 
These recommendations served as a model for section 76 of PACE. Indeed, 
s. 76(2)(a) preserves the common law voluntariness test with regard to oppression, 
while s. 76(2)(b) redefines the scope of the common law voluntariness test related to 
7° [1914] A. C. 599 at p. 609; approved in Commissioners of Customs and Excise 
v. Harz and Power, [1967] 1 A. C. 760, at p. 818 and 821. 
71 DPP v Ping Lin [1976] A. C. 574. 
n The Philips Report draws attention the divergence between legal and 
psychological definitions of "voluntariness". The Research of the Royal Commission 
on Criminal Procedure suggests that, "in psychological terms custody in itself and 
questioning in custody develop forces upon many suspects which so affect their minds 
that their wills crumble and they speak when otherwise they would have stayed silent". 
The Philips Report, supra note ?, p. 4.73. 
11 Eleventh Report 
, 
supra note 7, para 65. 
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threat and inducement. By replacing the terms "threats or inducements" with the 
phrase "anything said or done", the Act broadens the category of factors to be taken 
into account in determining the voluntariness of confession (e. g. prolonged detention 
or deception). At the same time it narrows the scope of the voluntariness test by 
qualifying the circumstances under which the tendered confession is made; "anything 
said or done" is limited to those things said or done which are likely to produce an 
unreliable confession. Accordingly, confessions will not be excluded simply because 
a person has been pressured, through the use of threats or inducements, into confession 
unless pressure (anything said or done) is likely to render unreliable any confession 
which might be made by virtue of things said or done. The important points to be 
noted are that the Act attempts to qualify, or to reconcile, the traditional voluntariness 
test with the reliability concern, and that s. 76(2)(b) is still focused on the types of 
pressure which may be applied to a suspect rather than reliability of the actual 
confession. 
The reliability of the actual confession is specifically excluded from 
consideration. Under subsection 76(2)(b) the court's duty to exclude the confession 
comes into play whenever 'anything said or done' may cause any confession to be 
potentially unreliable. " In other words, because of the words 'any' and 'might' this 
subsection is concerned not with actual but with potential unreliability. Even if a 
confession subsequently was admitted to be true, it may still be inadmissible under this 
" The first draft of PACE included a clause-60(4) which required that evidence 
of the truth or falsity of the confession might be admitted where it is relevant in determining the admissibility of confessions. The final version of the Act, however, does not contain this provision. 
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section. In the case of R. v Cox75, for example, a mentally handicapped suspect 
charged with burglary was interviewed by the police in the absence of an appropriate 
adult and admitted taking part in the commission of the alleged offence. The trial 
judge held that his confession should be admitted due to the fact that it was likely to 
be true in the light of the testimony he gave on the voir dire. The Court of Appeal 
held that the judge should have asked himself not whether the confession in the police 
interview was true but whether it was made in consequence of anything said or done 
likely to render it unreliable. " 
The 'potential unreliability' approach is derived from the recommendation of 
the Criminal Law Revision Committee in its Eleventh Reporte. The Committee not 
only recommended a hypothetical test but also noted the need to make clear its 
application for judges; it is said that the judge should imagine himself present at the 
interview and hearing anything said or watching anything done78. He then should 
consider whether any confession made as a result would be likely to be unreliable. 
If so, the confession would thus be excluded. To make it clearer two examples were 
given as follows; if the suspect faces a threat by the police of charging his wife jointly 
with him, this would be likely to render such a confession unreliable, even of a serious 
offence 
. 
Similarly, if the suspect confesses as a result of a promise to release him on 
'S [1991] Crim. L. R. 276. 
76 A Similar point was made in the cases of R. v Crampton (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 
372 and R. v Kenny [1994] Crim. L. R. 284. 
" Eleventh Report, supra note 7, para. 65. 
78 Note that, unlike PACE, the Committee used 'threat or inducement' instead of 
'anything said or done'. 
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bail to visit a sick relative, it would be unlikely to give rise to an unreliable confession 
of a serious offence, but likely to do so in the case of a minor offence. 
It is said that adopting the hypothetical test rather than the actual one is the 
result of the division of functions between the judge and jury. Accordingly, deciding 
as to the truth or falsity of the confession is an assignment belonging to the jury; if 
the judge decides whether the actual confession is reliable it would encroach on the 
jury's function. ' This line of reasoning may be disputed on the grounds that, firstly, 
even if the judge were to consider the circumstances likely to render the actual 
confession unreliable, he would only be deciding whether the jury should hear of the 
confession, not the weight they should give it. 8° Secondly, such a functional division 
cannot be said to be absolute. In some cases- for example, in the application of the 
admissibility test to "similar fact" evidence-the judge is allowed to assess the probative 
value of evidence. " Thirdly, the "division of functions" argument cannot be 
employed in the Magistrates' Courts in which the trier of fact and the trier of law are 
the same body. 
To conclude, the reliability of the actual confession itself is not able to dictate 
the admissibility of a confession. This approach should not only be welcomed for the 
support it gives to "the qualified voluntariness test", but also for the fact that it is 
79 Mirfield, supra note 18, p. 70. 
80 Zuckerman, The Principles of Criminal Evidence, p. 366. 
al DPP vP [1991] 3 W. L. R. 166; (1991) Cr. App. R. 267; [1991] 2 A. C. 447; 
[1991]3AllE. R. 337. 
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likely to create a normative test rather than a factual one. Indeed, it is likely to 
encourage the court to concentrate its attention on the propriety of the standard of 
interrogation to enable the exercise of free will, regardless of whether the particular 
confession was itself reliable. 
The assertion that s. 76(2)(b) is still focused on the types of pressure rather 
than reliability of a confession is also justified by the Court of Appeal's approach to 
the question of whether the phrase 'anything said or done' includes things said or done 
by the suspect himself. In R. v GoldenbergS2 the suspect was convicted of conspiracy 
to supply diamorphine on the basis of his confession which was made during the 
interview requested by the suspect. As a basis for appeal it was submitted that as he 
was a heroin addict his motive in requesting interview and making confession was to 
gain his release and feed his addiction. Therefore, the confession could be seen to 
have been made in consequence of what the suspect himself said or did, and thus the 
confession was unreliable and should have been excluded under s. 76(2)(b). The Court 
of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the words 'said or done' do not 
extend so as to include anything said or done by the person making the confession. 
In other words, it is limited to something external to the person making the confession 
and to something which is likely to have same influence on him. 83 This judgment 
is criticised by stating that it is capable of giving rise to an odd result in that a 
different conclusion may be reached where the suspect is given a drug by a police 
82 (1988) 88 Cr. App. R. ; [1988] Crim. L. R. 678. 
" R. v Goldenberg (1989) 88 Crim. App. R. 290. 
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doctor before confessing and where the drug is taken by the suspect himself 4. Of 
course the suspect's own act may cause a confession to be unreliable, but the correct 
mechanism to exclude such a confession seems to this researcher to be not section 76 
but section 78. Undoubtedly, accepting unreliable evidence into trial will have an 
adverse effect upon the fairness of the proceedings. 
4 
4.3. Comparison 
There are, to a great extent, similarities between the laws relating to the 
admissibility of confession in England and Turkey. As has been seen in chapter three, 
besides giving general authority to exclude improperly obtained evidence, the 
judiciaries of both legal systems have been specifically empowered recently to refuse 
to admit confession evidence in some cases. The above analysis in this chapter reveals 
that exclusionary rules of each country with regard to confessions are not as different 
from each other as might be expected. In order to ensure that questionable confessions 
have not been taken as evidence, both systems require an assessment of the facts and 
circumstances leading a suspect to confess. There is a clear consensus that 
involuntariness is a decisive criterion for the admissibility of confession evidence 
under section 76, and that exclusion is mandatory if involuntariness has been 
established. The question of whether a similar standard of voluntariness is required 
by each of them will be examined in the following pages. 
84 Birch, supra note 8, p. 112. 
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One should not ignore the fact that, unlike Turkey, the voluntariness testis well 
developed in England and it is particularly qualified by the enactment of PACE. In 
Turkey the question of admissibility of confessions obtained involuntarily has not yet 
reached the level of debate found in England. This derives, among other things, from 
the late introduction of this test (two years ago)85 and a lack of academic attention 
to the subject. Undoubtedly, determination of what circumstances have to exist for 
the voluntariness of a confession requires decades of jurisprudence. As far as Turkish 
law is concerned, this period of time may be shortened by benefiting from the 
experience of the English judiciary in the application of this test. 
5. The Burden and Standard of Proof 
It has been emphasised that voluntariness has emerged or reemerged as a 
central concept in determining the admissibility of confessions in both jurisdictions. 
The implementation of this concept, however, may become a source of controversy. 
The procedure to be followed in deciding voluntariness, or more generally 
admissibility, has already been examined in Chapter four. Now attention will be 
drawn to the questions of who bears the burden of proving voluntariness of a 
confession, and of what the standard of proof by which the judge assesses 
voluntariness should be. As far as English law is concerned, both aspects of the issue 
8S Compare the fact that the voluntariness rule has governed the admissibility of 
confessions in England for almost two centuries. 
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are statutorily regulated. 86 Accordingly, where there is an objection as to the 
admissibility of a confession under s. 76, the burden to prove, beyond reasonable 
doubt, that the objection is unfounded is imposed upon the prosecution. Failure to do 
so will prevent introduction of a confession into trial. To illustrate, in the case of R. 
v Harvey87 the confession was excluded on the grounds that the trial judge was not 
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was not obtained involuntarily. 
In contrast to the English position, in Turkish law there is no specific 
provision. This omission makes the formulation of Article 135/A important. Section 
135/A does not include standards to which a confession must comply in order to 
achieve the quality of voluntariness. Instead, a negative test has been chosen. The 
conclusion as to the voluntariness of a confession depends on the absence of factors 
which are likely to render a confession involuntary. In other words, to have the 
quality of voluntariness a confession should be shown not to be involuntary. Such a 
negative formulation is likely to draw judicial attention away from what is voluntary 
to what is involuntary; and therefore is capable of constituting a bias against exclusion 
of confessions in that all confessions may be considered voluntary unless 
involuntariness proved. This possibility is particularly supported by the fact that what 
exactly occurred during interrogation is difficult to know in Turkey since there is no 
tape-recording requirement of interrogation. At trial, there is little to prevent law 
enforcement officers from describing the condition of interrogation in favour of 
86 Section 76 (2). The position at common law was the same; see, DPP v Ping Lin [1976] A. C. 574, at 599. 
87 [1988] Crim. L. R. 241. 
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admissibility. Of course, the defendant could present his version. It is up to the trial 
judge or the panel to decide the relative credibility of the two sides' stories. Taking 
a cynical approach, judges may systematically resolve the credibility issue in favour 
of the police. Such a course is unlikely to be taken by the Turkish judiciary because 
of the general substantive law's principle that suspicion should be interpreted in favour 
of the suspect. In the case of Osman, Huseyin and Had Osman" the Turkish Court 
of Appeal ignored the issue of the burden of proving voluntariness though there was 
a opportunity to clarify it. In this case the suspects claimed at their trial that their 
confessions at the police station were obtained by coercion, but this claim did not 
prevent conviction. Confessions were held, by the Court of Appeal, to be involuntary 
and therefore inadmissible on the ground that the suspects' claims were supported by 
the report of the Forensic Medicine Organization in which it was stated that 
ecchymosis (signs of torture) were discovered on the bodies of the suspects. More 
recently, however, the suspect's claim that his confession at the gendarmerie station 
was obtained by coercion has led to exclusion, without support of any report. The 
Court of Appeal held that such a confession cannot be taken as a basis for conviction 
unless the contrary of the suspect's claim is proved by the prosecution. " 
88 Yargitay Ceza Genel Kurulu (General Assembly of the Court of Appeal's 
Criminal division), E. 1993/6-192, K. 19931217, T. 4.10.1993,20 Yargitay Kararlari 
Dergisi (Journal of The Court of Appeal's Decisions) 1994, p. 450. 
"Ahmet, E. 1993/6-236, K. 1993/255, T. 18.10.1993,20 Yargitay KararlariDergisi 
(Journal of the Court of Appeal's Decisions), 1994, p. 804. 
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6. The Theoretical Basis of the Involuntariness Notion 
In the process of attempting to provide standards to identify improper tactics 
that create an unacceptable risk to the voluntariness of a confession, examination of 
the possible rationales that dictate a requirement of voluntariness may provide some 
assistance. More than one rationale has been suggested. Each of them will be 
examined in turn. 
6.1. Untrustworthiness 
One of the common reasons that has been given for the rule excluding 
involuntary confessions is the "untrustworthiness" of such evidence. Tactics that 
would overcome the person's voluntariness are believed likely to create the risk of an 
untrustworthy confession. Since the state has no legitimate interest in convicting 
innocent people, conduct which is likely to produce involuntary confessions cannot be 
justified and, therefore, confessions obtained consequently should be excluded. One 
of the main advocates of this justification is Dean Wigmore; according to him, 
voluntariness guarantees the probable truthfulness of the confession; involuntary 
confessions should be rejected because of the risk that they may be untrue or at least 
untrustworthy 9° Support was also given to this view as early as 1783; in the case 
of R. v WarickshalP' it was stated that, 
9° Wigmore, supra note 30, vol III, para. 822. 
91 [1783] 1 Leach C. C. 263. 
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"a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of 
hope or by the torture of fear comes in so questionable 
a shape when it is to be considered as evidence of guilt 
that no credit ought to be given to it. " 
The interaction between the untrustworthiness and involuntariness of a 
confession is complicated. An involuntary confession is more likely to be 
untrustworthy than one elicited in the absence of such pressure. But the 
untrustworthiness of a confession is not a matter which is conclusively determined by 
the operation of an involuntariness test. Psychological researches have proved that 
people may voluntarily confess crimes which they have not committed 92 Similarly, 
involuntarily obtained confessions may be trustworthy; indeed, the discovery of real 
evidence as a result of the suspect's involuntary confession may remove the danger 
of untrustworthiness. A clear example of this is that when faced with coercion a 
suspect involuntarily discloses that he killed somebody and hid the body in a certain 
location, and the police subsequently discover the body in that place. The rationale 
in question cannot explain exclusion of confessions in such cases. However, one may 
assert that since the primary aim of the criminal process is to search for truth, 
accepting a trustworthy confession obtained by coercion, even by torture, would not 
be harmful to the public interest in bringing criminal offenders to justice in order to 
protect the community from crime. It is doubtful, however, that the public is only 
concerned with the outcome of criminal proceedings. The public also has an interest 
in being free from the exercise of excessive police power. There is normally a great 
need and public concern in a civilised society for the protection of the suspect against 
92 See Chapter Four 3.2.3.4.2. 
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human rights violations such as torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment. There is 
almost a consensus as to the fact that gross violations of human rights, such as torture, 
should not be regarded as an aid to fact finding in criminal investigation. Thus, this 
justification does not adequately explain the voluntariness test with regard to 
confessions obtained by gross violation of free will. It may, however, offer some help 
to explain involuntariness caused by minor improprieties. For example, under sub- 
section 76 (2)(b) involuntariness caused by minor violations would only render a 
statement inadmissible if it was capable of creating the risk of an inaccurate statement. 
6.2. Prevention (Deterrence) of Malpractice 
Another rationale behind the voluntariness rule is the concern that law 
enforcement officers must obey the criminal procedure law while detecting criminals. 
This reasoning suggests that in the absence of the voluntariness test with regard to the 
admissibility of a confession, malpractice of law enforcement officers will inevitably 
show a tendency to increase. This does not mean to suggest that the maltreatment of 
a suspect is the only result of a system which fails to provide a voluntariness test. 
Undoubtedly there may be other factors which lead to malpractice, and there may be 
a number of other tools other than the voluntariness rule for preventing malpractice. 
As a matter of fact substantial criminal law systems generally prohibit the 
maltreatment of suspects. "' Having said that, one has to still acknowledge that 
admission of involuntary confessions as evidence is likely to be perceived as giving 
93 Maltreatment of suspects is also banned by international agreements; see Article 
3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (Rome, November 4,1950). 
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approval to the particular method by which the involuntary confession was obtained. 
Prohibition of the use of such involuntary confessions is expected to reduce (or 
prevent) the employment of techniques which may be described as malpractice. This 
hope can be better explained by drawing an analogy between the trial judge and the 
receiver of stolen goods; by admitting an involuntary confession which was obtained 
as a result of malpractice, the trial judge is likely to effectively adopt the role of the 
receiver of stolen goods. Like the fact that non-existence of receivers will decrease 
the amount of thefts, it may be assumed that the non-acceptance of confessions 
obtained involuntarily (by employing malpractice) would reduce the occurrence of 
such practices. This analogy, however, would only be justifiable where the objective 
of the malpractice is to secure confession for evidential use in trial. 
6.3. The Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Accusare Principle 
In the case of R. v Sang94, Lord Diplock maintained that the underlying 
rationale of excluding involuntary confessions may be found in the maxim of "nemo 
tenetur seipsum accusarei9S. This principle, however, is not an easy concept to 
define; it has several aspects. It is said to be the freedom to refrain from providing 
information that could establish one's own guilt. 96 However, neither Turkish nor 
English legal systems seek to prevent, or even discourage, individuals from 
94 [1979] 2 All E. R. 1222, at p. 1230. 
95 The same principle is expressed by different latin maxims. Lord Diplock used 
the maxim nemo debet prodere se ipsum. 
96 Zuckerman, supra note 80, p. 306. 
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incriminating themselves. The clearest example of this is that the law enforcement 
may continue to question the suspect regardless of his preference not to answer. This 
principle is also stated as the freedom of individuals not to be compelled to make self- 
incriminatory statements. 97 In this sense, the scope of the principle changes 
depending upon the interpretation of "compelled". Also, considering the maxim as 
valuable in itself is misleading. It is desirable to have the rationale for the maxim 
identified. Unfortunately, there is substantial confusion as to the rationale of the 
maxim which is offered as a rationale for the voluntariness notion. 98 Finally, this 
principle was not historically a value lying at the foundation of the voluntariness 
notion; in tracing the history of the voluntariness notion and the maxim in question 
at common law, Wigmore has concluded that each of them have separate and 
independent origins 99 
6.4. The Legitimacy of The Verdict 
Each of the above theories have an important element of truth embedded in 
them. None of them, however, is entirely adequate to account for the notion of 
voluntariness. A preferable theory to explain the concept of voluntariness, it seems 
to me, is to employ the theory of the legitimacy of the verdict which has been 
developed by Dennis. "' The emphasis of this theory is upon the fact that a verdict 
" Mirfield, supra note 33, p. 65. 
98 See generally, Zuckerman, supra. note 80, p. 314. 
99 Wigmore, supra note 30, & 823, p. 250, n. 5. 
"0 See Chapter Five 3.4. 
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is an expression not only of factual but also of moral condemnation. The former 
states whether the defendant in fact committed the alleged offence, while the latter is 
concerned with whether he deserves to be convicted. Non-existence of one of these 
expressions of condemnation will destroy the legitimacy of the verdict which is the 
ultimate goal of the criminal process. 
The moral condemnation of a verdict depends both on its factual accuracy and 
its consistency with other fundamental values embedded in the criminal justice system. 
That is to say, the goal of generating a legitimate verdict is not met simply by 
choosing the verdict that is factually most accurate. Legitimate verdicts and factually 
accurate verdicts might appear to coincide, given that one obvious way to gain 
legitimacy is to search for truth. Having said that, the correlation between accuracy 
and legitimacy is not exact; an accurate verdict may not necessarily be a legitimate 
one. A guilty verdict based on a confession obtained by torture presents the most 
familiar example of a verdict that is lacking in moral authority. Such a verdict is self- 
contradictory irrespective of its factual accuracy or the confession's reliability. This 
is because, in the words of Dennis, 
"it cannot fulfil its integral functions of making a 
morally justified statement of the defendant's 
blameworthiness and fitness for punishment and of 
conveying an expressive message that the criminal law 
incorporates values which it is necessary to uphold by 
punishment""' 
"' Dennis, 1995, "Instrumental Protection, Human Rights or Functional Necessity? 
Reassessing The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination", 54 Cambridge Law Journal 
343, at p. 353. 
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As far as the substantive criminal law1°2 is concerned, moral condemnation 
is only possible for those who choose to break the law. Imposing moral blame 
without being concerned with the individual's ability to have done otherwise is hardly 
possible. It is a fundamental principle that there is in general no criminal liability 
without mens rea. Thus, mental freedom or free will is required for the verdict to 
have moral authority. The free will postulate seems more relevant to the substantive 
criminal law; much of the debate in the context of blame and punishment, however, 
has relevance for the free will or voluntariness issue in the law of admissibility of 
confessions. 
The requirement of free will in the context of blame and punishment in 
substantive criminal law resembles the requirement of the suspect's voluntariness as 
to whether to confess. "' Human actions which lack free will or confessions which 
lack voluntariness will have no legal consequences in criminal law. 'O' One can 
justify blame or inclusion as long as the defendant retains some degree of mental 
freedom or voluntariness. Accepting the contrary is likely to destroy the moral 
authority, or legitimacy, of the subsequent verdict. In other words, rules, inter alia, 
"I It is stated by Dennis that theorising about the law of criminal evidence needs 
to begin with the substantive law. Dennis, 1989, "Reconstructing the Law of 
Evidence", 42 Current Legal Problems 21, at p. 35. 
103 Grano, 1979, "Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions" 65 
Virginia Law Review 859, at 874. 
"' There is a moral value in a legal system that, even outside the context of 
criminal law, encourages the belief that individuals should be free from mental 
impairment. The law of contracts or wills says, for example, that an individual's 
decision can affect legal outcome provided that it is free from significant inducement. 
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requiring the exclusion of involuntary confessions prevent the legal system from 
generating illegitimate verdicts. 
The voluntariness test may thus be seen as a very sophisticated mechanism for 
implementing an important aspect of the legitimacy of the verdict principle within the 
context of improperly obtained confessions. Concerns other than the impairment of 
mental freedom may also play a role in the admissibility of confessions; when a 
confession is voluntary the trial judge may, in his discretion under s. 78, refuse to 
admit it in evidence. It has been demonstrated in Chapter Four that the exercise of 
the fairness discretion is not limited to confession evidence, it applies to all 
prosecution evidence including confessions. "' In Chapter Five, it is shown that 
factors considered by the courts to be relevant in exercising their discretion support 
the view that the fairness test is also best explained by the legitimacy of the verdict 
principle. "' It follows that one rationale, that is the legitimacy of the verdict, 
governs the admissibility of all improperly obtained evidence. This is not surprising 
because the inclusion of a statement obtained by any practice which impairs the mental 
freedom of the suspect may be regarded as adversely affecting the fairness of the 
proceedings in English law. Indeed, as argued convincingly by Professor Birch, "if 
section 76 were to be repealed tomorrow, it would remain possible to exclude all the 
evidence which that section excludes by invoking section 78 instead". 'O" The same 
argument is valid in Turkish law; involuntary confessions may be legitimately 
pos See Chapter Four 3.2.2.2.2. 
'06 Chapter Five 3.5. 
107 Birch, supra note 8 p. 105. 
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excluded under either A. 135/A or A. 254. Obtaining a statement by any practice 
which impairs the mental freedom of the suspect will constitute not only illegality but 
also unlawfulness. Existence of clear overlap between the scope of article 135/A and 
section 76(2) on the one hand, and article 254 and section 76 on the other has already 
been the subject of argument above. 'O' The possible causes for the independent 
existence of article 135/A and section 76(2) have also discussed in Chapter Four. '09 
In addition to those reasons, article 135/A and section 76(2) deserve a separate 
existence because they clarify the degree of mental freedom that will excuse a 
defendant from accountability for his confession. 
7. Analysis of the Notion of "Involuntariness" 
It has been identified that involuntariness has emerged in both jurisdictions as 
a central concept in determining whether a confession elicited by law enforcement 
officials should be admitted as evidence. Considerable room for discussion, however, 
exists as to the exact meaning of this concept. On one extreme, confessions obtained 
even by torture are the product of conscious choice and therefore, voluntary in the 
sense that the suspect submits to the wishes of the torturer in order to avoid the 
imposition of further suffering. On the other extreme, no confession is voluntary at 
all in the sense that it has been obtained as a result of the suspect's fear that adverse 
consequences will stem from it. "' Looking at the issue from an extremist point of 
"' See above note 9 and accompanying text. 
109 See Chapter Four 3.2.3.3. 
"o Ibid, p. 887. 
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view is inappropriate. To be able to apply this notion, voluntariness of a confession 
must be affected in some circumstances but not in others. Such an approach was 
adopted at English common law. The extent of it, however, was restricted to the 
presence of promises, threats, and oppression. The current notion of voluntariness 
may extent this list to include some other circumstances such as are included in Article 
135/A. The border of the extension needs to be carefully drawn since not every 
confession which may be said to be involuntary in some psychological sense is 
necessarily legally involuntary. It is therefore appropriate next to consider the 
distinction between legal and psychological involuntariness. 
7.1. Do Legal and Psychological Voluntariness Match? 
The need to make a decision is faced by the suspect in any type of 
interrogation. From the psychological perspective, making a decision involves, 
"a choice between alternative courses of action in the 
light of the consequences which (the decision maker) 
thinks will follow from each course of action and the 
value, either positive or negative, he places on those 
consequences" ''1 
Options available to the suspect may be stated in general as confessing, giving evasive 
I 
answers, refusing any involvement with the alleged offence, and declining to answer. 
"' Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980, Police Interrogation: The Psychological Approach, 
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Research Study no: 1, p. 12; See also 
Irving and Hilgendorf, Police Interrogation: A Case Study of Current Practice, Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure, Research Study no: 2. They are the source of 
much of the discussion in this section. 
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In psychological terms, a variety of different factors may impair the ability to 
make free decisions and render a confession involuntary. Factors include not only the 
more obvious ones such as hunger, exhaustion, and pain, but also the less obvious 
ones such as providing information and stress. The latter deserves more attention. 
The psychological literature suggests that information provided to the suspect by the 
police may cause a confession to be involuntary because relevant information is an 
inherent part of the decision making process. " 2 Three types of information are 
identified to have such an effect: the first is related to the issue of what will happen 
to the suspect, such as how he will be treated, how long detained, the nature of the 
charge, bail recommendations, etc. The second is to offer to the suspect to win or lose 
social approval or self-esteem. The third is supplying or withholding information 
about which the suspect is likely to be unaware, such as the probability of conviction, 
the probable length of sentence for the charge. Furthermore, stress is identified as an 
another factor leading to involuntariness. "' Stress which is relevant to the issue 
may arise from the physical environment which is generally unfamiliar to the suspect 
and controlled by the police, or from confinement and the isolation of the suspect from 
his natural social environment, or from the suspect's obedience to authority. "' 
Obviously these factors develop forces on many suspects which cause them to speak 
I 
when they would otherwise have stayed silent 
, 
but they do not necessarily render a 
confession involuntary in a legal sense. A distinction is needed to be made between 
the manipulation of decisionmaking and the collapse of the machinery of the mind. 
12 Ibid, p. 23. 
131bid, p. 28. 
"' For detail see ibid, p. 29-38. 
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In other words, the concern of legal voluntariness is, and should be, a certain degree 
of mental freedom, not an absolute one. Extending the meaning of voluntariness to 
the latter would weaken the police's power of arrest and interrogation in that the 
suspect would not confess if the arrest or interrogation did not happen. Nothing seems 
to me wrong in permitting law enforcement officers to try to overcome the suspect's 
initial unwillingness to confess without creating a risk that an innocent person will 
falsely confess. 
In addition to the lack of consensus as to approaches regarding the degree of 
mental freedom necessary to produce a voluntary confession, the problem may arise 
on how to measure voluntariness. Psychologists focus on the condition of the 
suspect's state of mind, rather than the improprieties which may cause involuntariness. 
Such an approach makes the operation of a voluntariness test difficult in that it 
requires inferences about the suspect's subjective state of mind. It is almost 
impossible to know exactly in relation to any particular suspect whether his will was 
impaired at the time of confessing. Even if it would be possible to inquire about the 
internal workings of the suspect's mind, involuntariness could derive from so many 
different motives including impropriety of detention or questioning conditions. 
Identifying the cause of a confession is only picking out a single cause from a group 
of factors which might only be sufficient in combination. As far as the legal concept 
of voluntariness is concerned, attention should be given to the question of whether 
improprieties impaired the suspect's decision to make a confession, rather than the 
issue of what psychologically motivated him to confess. In other words, unlike the 
concept of psychological voluntariness which involves in general an empirical 
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assessment of what lead a particular suspect to confess, the concept of legal 
voluntariness is "a normative concem about the degree to which it was legitimate to 
interfere with an accused's decision to confess". "' In determining the extent of the 
illegitimate degree of pressure, the courts should principally be required to focus on 
the probable effect of improper conduct upon the average person. In doing that, 
certain improprieties will be impermissible regardless of the actual impact of improper 
behaviour upon a particular suspect at the time of confessing. Some additional 
improprieties would be impermissible, causing involuntariness, with regard to 
vulnerable suspects because justice should not expect a child or severely ill person to 
resist improper conduct as would be expected from a normal adult. This should not, 
however, be taken as far as including the suspect's individual characteristics. 
7.2. Is Impropriety Required? 
With regard to the Turkish voluntariness test, the structure of Article 135/A 
provides some indication. Although the methods enumerated as capable of causing 
involuntariness are not exhaustive, all the practices listed as examples are forms of 
improper conduct. One may conclude from such a formulation that impropriety is 
required for the application of Article 135/A. 
113 Jackson, 1986, "In Defence of a Voluntariness Doctrine for Confessions: The 
Quenn v Johnston Revisited", 21 The Irish Jurist 208, at 236. See also R. v L. [1994] Crim. L. R. 839. 
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As far as the English voluntariness test is concerned, two decisions of the Court 
of Appeal, R. v Fulling"', and R. V HarVeyl 17, provide a useful starting point. In 
the former case it is stated, obiter, that, unlike subsection 76(2)(a), a confession may 
be excluded under s. 76(2)(b) where no suspicion of impropriety exists. In the latter 
case, a women who is lower than normal intelligence and suffering from psychopathic 
disorder heard her lover confess to murder and the following day she confessed to the 
murder. Although in the circumstances of this case there were no breaches of rules 
or misconduct on the part of the police, it was held that hearing her lover's confession 
may have had influence on her and may have caused her to make a false confession 
in order to protect her lover. Her confession was, therefore, not reliable and section 
76 was employed to exclude it. Furthermore, it is suggested by one respected author 
that arresting a suspect, taking him to the police station, placing him in a cell, and 
questioning him may be sufficient for excluding confessions under the subsection in 
question due to the employment of the words "anything said or done". "' However, 
as pointed out above"', statutory interpretation of these terms in the light of their 
origin does not allow expanding the scope of the test that far. The draft version of 
the provision included the words "threats or inducement" which are undoubtedly 
improper. The replacement of them by "anything said or done" should have been 
made because they missed out some other improper tactics such as prolonged detention 
and deception. Accordingly, the confession in R. v Harvey should have been rejected 
16 [1987] All. E. R. 65. 
117 [1988] Crim. L. R. 241. 
"' Mirfield, supra note 18, p. 70; Mirfield, supra note 33, p. 110. 
119 See the above paragraph followed by note 73. 
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under s. 78 rather than s. 76. Indeed, the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R. v 
Goldenberg'" indicates a departure from its early interpretation that s. 76(2)(b) may 
be employed where there is no suspicion of impropriety. In this case, submission for 
exclusion, under the sub-section in question, of the confession of a drug addict which 
was allegedly made to obtain bail and to feed his addiction was refused. Obviously, 
if the suspect had been questioned when he was unfit due to his addiction the result 
would be different. Similarly, in the more recent case of R. v Brine"' the trial 
judge's opinion that the target of section 76 is possible misconduct has been confirmed 
by the Court of Appeal. Although the cases of R. v Goldenberg and R. v Brine are 
positive steps in the process of distinguishing legal voluntariness from psychological 
one, they both failed to address to the question of whether the suspect was fit to be 
interviewed. If the answer to such a question is negative, than impropriety of 
questioning is obvious. As far as the latter case is concerned, there was, in fact, 
impropriety in that the psychologist's evidence established the suspect was unfit to be 
interviewed. Failure of the police to aware of such a situation should make no 
difference. The act of subjecting an unfit suspect to interrogation whether knowingly 
or mistakenly itself is improper and capable of causing involuntariness. 
"' (1988) 88 Cr. App. R. 285. 
12' [1992] Crim. L. R. 122. 
259 
7.3. A Typology of Improprieties 
7.3.1. In General 
Having concluded in the previous section that the admissibility of confessions 
in both jurisdictions has been governed by the notion of voluntariness, it is now 
necessary to examine which methods and practices in the process of criminal 
4 
investigation will render a confession involuntary. Before attempting to identify 
certain practices it is necessary to recognise that such circumstances should not be 
expected to be static; there may be more extensive circumstances than identified here. 
In the following pages an attempt will be made to identify the most notorious ones and 
to clarify the exact meaning of them by analyzing various courts' decisions. This will 
include not only domestic high courts of each country but also the European Court and 
Commission of Human Rights. 
As far as Turkish law is concemed, there exists a list of improper techniques 
capable of creating an involuntary confession. The Turkish Constitution affirms as a 
fundamental principle that "no one shall be subjected to torture ill-treatment, or any 
treatment incompatible with human dignity""' The Code of Criminal Procedure 
expressly pronounces the involuntariness of confessions obtained by "torture", "ill- 
treatment", "giving drug by force", "fatigue", "physical force and violence", and "using 
any device" such as a lie detector. 
"' Article 17, emphasises added. 
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Contrary to the Turkish position, English authorities have been willing to 
define the concept of voluntariness in the abstract form rather than referring to specific 
practices. In spite of the fact that "oppression" was pronounced by the judiciary as 
capable of causing an involuntary confession as early as 1964 123 , the amount of 
pressure required for the existence of it was not well stated. In one of the earlier cases 
a definition, to which reference was made quite often, was given as follows; 
"[the] word [oppression]... imports something which 
tends to sap, and has sapped, that free will which must 
exist before a confession is voluntary". 124 
As far as the post-PACE English law is concerned, although the concept of 
"oppression" is statutorily defined as including "torture", inhuman or degrading 
treatment, and the use or threat of violence (whether or not amounting to torture)", this 
is ignored by the Court of Appeal. To illustrate, in the case of R. v Fulling 125 the 
suspect contended that she only confessed because the police told her that her 
" Callis v Gunn [1964] 1 Q. B. 495. 
` R. v Priestley (Note) (1965), 51 Cr. App. R. 1, originally reported on 50 Cr 
App. R. 183 (CA); This definition was approved in the case of R. v Prager 
-[1972) 
1 W. L. R. 260 (CA)-. In this case a more concrete statement is made in the form that 
the existence of oppressive conduct depends on, inter alia, these elements; 
the length of time of any individual period of 
questioning, the length of time intervening between 
periods of questioning, whether the accused person has 
been given proper refreshment or nor, and the 
characteristics of the person who makes the statement" 
Besides non-existence, from the list, of the way in which a suspect has been 
questioned, one has to notice that the last mentioned element obviously required a 
subjective oppression test. Accordingly, what may be oppressive with regard to a 
person who has not previously been in trouble with the police may not be oppressive 
in the case of experienced criminals. 
[1987] All E. R. 65, at p. 69. 
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boyfriend was having an affair with another woman whom the police had also arrested 
and who was being held in the cell next to hers. According to the accused, these 
revelations so distressed her that she couldn't stand being in the cell any longer and 
she then confessed in order to escape from the police station. This allegation was 
denied by the police. The court ruled that even if the accused's assertion was wholly 
true, the information given to her by the police did not amount to oppression. 
Furthermore, it has been held that the word "oppression" should be given its ordinary 
dictionary meaning as stated in the Oxford English Dictionary; 
"exercise of authority or power in a burdensome, harsh 
or wrongful manner; unjust or cruel treatment of 
suspect, inferiors etc, the imposition of unreasonable or 
unjust burdens" 126 
. 
was further quoted from the dictionary that "there is not a word in our language 
which expresses more detestable wickedness than oppression". Without making 
reference to the definition of oppression in s. 76(8), the court went on to say that "it 
is hard to envisage any circumstances in which such oppression would not entail some 
impropriety on the part of the interrogator". The Court's approach as to the definition 
of oppression in Fulling is widely criticised. It is maintained by Professor Birch that 
the Court of Appeal's definition is susceptible to the risk of being interpreted too 
widely in that "the word 'wrongful' is capable of being understood as including any 
breaches of the rules by which the police are bound, whether accidental or deliberate, 
fundamental or trivial""'. She further points out that it would be "unfortunate" if 
1261bid, p. 69. 
"' Birch, supra note 8, p. 102. 
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every breach of the rules were considered as oppression". I am inclined to agree 
with the argument put forward by Professor Birch. No doubt, there can be some 
illegality or impropriety which does not lead to the conclusion that the evidence is 
obtained by oppression, and thus it may not be right to say that every illegality or 
impropriety constitutes oppression. In a more recent case Professor Birch's approach 
was confirmed by the Court of Appeal. "" Furthermore, the Court of Appeal's 
"dictionary approach" is criticised by Zuckerman as follows; "a perfunctory reference 
to a dictionary entry can hardly provide the guidelines for the conduct of interrogation 
that the police and the courts require""'. He further maintains that the same 
dictionary also includes two further definitions for the phrase of "oppression" and the 
second definition, which states that "the feeling of being oppressed or weighed down: 
bodily or mental uneasiness or distress", was not quoted by the Court without giving 
any explanation for not doing so. In addition, it should be borne in mind that since 
dictionaries seek to employ both current usage and to trace a historical developments 
of the meaning of words, they cannot be taken as an authoritative exponent of the 
meaning of words used in Act of Parliament. 13 1 As one writer observed, "a 
dictionary is not merely a home for living words; it is a hospital for the sick; it is also 
a cemetery for the dead". "' 
Birch, 1988, "Commentary on R. v Davison" Crim. L. R. 444. 
See R. v Emmerson (1991) Cr. App. R. 284. 
130 Zuckerman, 1987, "Evidence" All. E. R. Annual Review 121. 
13' R. v Peters (1886) 16 Q. B. 636, at p. 641. 
13' Dale, 1878, Nine Lectures on Preaching, second ed., p. 181. 
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Practices which fall short of "oppression" may also lead to involuntary 
confessions provided that they are likely to render any subsequent confession 
unreliable. This regulation should be credited for its usefulness in providing a 
yardstick to the issue of distinguishing legal and psychological voluntariness which 
particulary differ with regard to less serious improprieties. 
7.3.2. Torture 
In the view of the European Commission of Human Rights, the concept of 
torture includes an aggravated form of severe physical or mental suffering. "' More 
recently, it has also been defined by an International Covenant as, "any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person 
... 
it. 134 Both definitions include the element of severe suffering which is a 
matter of degree, dependent upon the facts and circumstances of an individual case. 
A general idea as to the amount of suffering required may be obtained from the 
findings of international and domestic authorities. As far as the European Commission 
of Human Rights is concerned, the practice of torture is found in the application of 
"falanga" which involves "the beating of the feet with a wooden or metal stick or 
bar". 135 Similarly, the use of five interrogation techniques including wallstanding, 
"' Denmark et al. v Greece (1969) 12 Yearbook of E. C. H. R 504; This case is 
widely known as "the Greek Case" which was logged by Denrnark, Norway and 
Sweden in 1967. against the military junta in Athens. 
"' Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Article 1, United Nations, Document A/Res/39/46. 
"' The Greek Case, supra note 133, p. 505. 
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hooding, subjection to continuous noise, deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of 
adequate food was considered to amount to torture. 136 On a more universal level, 
the Human Rights Committee of the UN found the presence of torture in cases where 
there existed singular or combined cruelties, such as forcing a suspect to remain 
standing with the head hooded for long hours (planton), electric shocks, putting 
hooded head into foul water (submarino), keeping him hanging for hours, keeping him 
naked and wet, squeezing the suspect's fingers after pieces of wood have been placed 
between them, and so on. "" These examples should not mislead us into assuming 
that torture is only physical cruelty. As has been confirmed by the aforementioned 
definitions, non-physical torture is also possible, defined as "the infliction of mental 
suffering by creating a state of anguish and stress by means other than bodily 
assault". '3' This type of torture is exemplified by the sub-commission in the Greek 
Case as mock executions, threats of death, insults, humiliations, threats of reprisals 
against relatives, threats to be present at the torture of others or actual presence at such 
torture. 
"' Ireland v United Kingdom, (1978) 2 E. H. R. R. 25; The European Court of 
Human Rights, however, declined to consider these tactics as torture, instead they have 
been labelled as "inhuman treatment". 
"' Bazzano and Massera v Uruguay (5/1977), Report of the Human Rights 
Committee, GAOR, 34 the Session, Supplement NO. 40 (1979), Annex 7; Grille Mona 
v Uruguay (2/1977), Report of the Human Rights Committee, GAOR, 35 th Session, 
Supplement no. 40 (1980), Annex 11; Lopez v Uruguay (52/1979), Report of the 
Human Rights Committee, GAOR, 36 the Session, Supplement No. 46 (1981, Annex 
19; cited in Rodley, 1987, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law 
"' The Greek Case, supra note 133, p. 461. 
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As far as Turkish law is concerned, although torture is prohibited by a number 
of legal texts 139 
, 
there is no statutory definition of it. Examples of torture, however, 
can be found in the judgments of the Court of Appeal. In the case of Gazi, Faik and 
Ziya 140 
, 
who were charged with causing the death of the three person under 
detention, it was reported that the suspects accused of smuggling historical and artistic 
items claimed to have been discovered by themselves were detained by gendarmerie. 
0 
Following their denial of such an involvement, electric currents were connected by a 
sergeant to their fingers, toes and penises in an attempt to discover the location of 
items. This practice continued for several days. Then the captain ordered to bring 
them to the headquarters where the suspects were punched, kicked, their testicles were 
squeezed, and their heads were kept in water until they almost drowned. These 
methods also failed to disclose the location of items and the suspects were taken back 
to the initial detention centre. After a few days they were taken to the medical doctor 
who not only gave a medical report stating the non-existence of any signs of torture 
but also offered to help to make the suspects confess. Then an official request seeking 
the aid of the medical expert to uncover the location of items was made in a written 
form by the captain. Following this request, the doctor attended the gendarmerie 
station at 3.00 a. m., and asked the gendarmes to bring him salt and flour. He forced 
the suspects to eat the mixture of salt and flour, Whilst at the same time pouring water 
from one cup to another in order to exploit their thirst. In other cases the Court of 
"' Article 17 of the Constitution, Article 243 of the Penal Code, UN Convention 
Against Torture (Official Gazette 10 August 1988), the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture (The Official Gazette, 29 Feb. 1988). 
"0 Yargitay Ceza Genel Kurulu (The General Assembly of Court of Appeal), E. 1983/8-64, K. 1983/156 T. 4.4.1983, Yargitay kararlari Dergisi (Journal of Court of Appeal Decisions), 1983, p. 445. 
266 
Appeal has found examples of torture such as assault with truncheons, beating after 
pouring cool water, burning with cigarettes and yanking people by the hair. "' 
7.3.3. Inhuman Treatment 
Improper behaviour which falls short of torture may still cause an involuntary 
confession if it can be categorised within the concept of "inhuman treatment". The 
distinction between torture and inhuman treatment is a matter of the intensity of the 
suffering inflicted. In the case of Ireland v United Kingdom 142 
, 
the aforementioned 
five techniques were regarded as inhuman treatment by the European Court, despite 
the earlier classification of them as torture by the Commission. The courts's approach 
is obviously a move towards limiting the meaning of torture to its general 
understanding, extreme barbarity. "' The practices of inhuman treatment vary from 
trivial beating to forcing to stand against a wall and beating severely. 144 The 
presence of such a practice was found by the Turkish Court of Appeal in cases where 
"' Sanik Bedýdiye Baskani, Y. I. C. D. 13.1-1970, E. 1969/173 0, K. 1970/118 cited 
by Donmezer, 1984, Ozel Ceza Hukuku Dersleri p. 131; Hirsizlik zanlilari, YCGK T. 
22.3.1976, E. 1976/8-100 K. 1976/133,3 Yargitay Kararlari Dergisi (Journal of Court 
of Appeal Decisions), 1977, p. 412; Jandarma ErIeri, 6.10.1976, Y. I. C. D. 
E. 1976/3053, K. 1976/3167,3 Yargitay Kararlari Dergisi (Journal of Court of Appeal 
Decisions) p. 106; Mustafa, Y. 8. C. D. 20.2.1986 E. 1985/6399 K. 1986/1151,12 
Yargitay Kararlari Dergisi (Journal of Court of Appeal Decisions), 1986, p. 1556; 
Ridvan, 17.6.1986,3320/3733, cited in Malkoc, 1988, Memurlar ve Suclar: Mumurlar 
ve Kamu Gorevlilerinin Hukuki Sorumluluklari (Public Servants and Crimes: 
Responsibility of Public Servants), p. 86. 
"I Supra note 136, p. 76-85. 
"' See Sarup, 1979, "Torture Under the European Convention on Human Rights", 
73 American Journal of International Law 267. 
"' Ireland v United Kingdom, supra note 13 6, para I 10,115 and 174. 
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the suspect was beaten so badly that he had marks and was unable to work for seven 
days. 145 
7.3.4 Degrading Treatment 
Practices which are not sufficient to amount inhuman treatment may cause 
involuntary confessions if they constitute degrading treatment. It was held that 
treatment of an individual may be regarded as degrading "if it grossly humiliates him 
before others or drives him to act against his will or conscience""'. Taken literally, 
the former element of the definition, "grossly humiliates him before others", may give 
rise to the misunderstanding that apart from the tormentor and the suspect the presence 
of a third party is required. The latter element, "drives him to act against his will or 
conscience", may also lead to the misconception that submission of the suspect to the 
request is necessary. These should not be the case. As pointed out by Rodley, the 
behaviour aimed at humiliation or action against will should be enough. "' 
Neither Turkish nor English courts 
, 
to the researcher's knowledge, has found 
any treatment of suspects degrading and therefore causing involuntary confession. 
Some examples, however, may be given by referring to the decisions of European 
judicial institutions. It was held that degrading treatment is a relative concept; 
145 Hasan, YCGK, 5.10.1987, E. 1987/8-186 K. 1987/423,14 Yargitay Kararlari 
Dergisi (Journal of Court of Appeal Decisions), 1986, p. 102-105; Erdogan, YCGK 
17.4 1989, E. 1989/3-87, K. 1989/143. 
"' The Greek Case, supra note 133, p. 500. 
"' Rodley, 1987, The Treatment of Prisoners Under Intemational Law, p. 93. 
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identifying its presence may differ in case to case depending on the duration of the 
treatment, its effects, the suspect's characteristics such as sex, age, religion etc. "' 
In the Greek case, for example, a certain roughness of treatment did not amount to 
degradation since it was tolerated by the suspect and the public. "' Another example 
would be that forcing the strict vegetarian to eat meat might fall within this concept 
whereas similar conduct towards a non-vegetarian might not. The concept of relativity 
is susceptible to misuse so it should be employed with caution. 
The difference between these three concepts is likely to derive principally from 
difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted. It is 
, 
therefore, difficult to 
identify the exact scope of each term. Such an effort may not be important with 
Tegard to the admissibility of confessions as all of them will cause involuntaTiness. 
7.3.5. Giving Drugs 
Voluntariness of confessions may also be impaired by giving substances, 
whether in solid, liquid or gas form, to the body of the suspect. Obviously, it does 
not matter whether they have been swallowed, mixed with foods or drinks, breathed, 
rubbed into the skin etc. The important point for the judiciary to focus on is whether 
such substances are capable of affecting the suspect's mental capacity. One may ask 
whether confessions obtained from the suspect who has voluntarily taken alcohol, 
drugs or prescribed medicine with side effects on mental ability are inadmissible with 
"' Ireland v United Kingdom, supra note 136, para. 162. 
"' The Greek Case, supra note 133, p. 501. 
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regard to Section 76 and Article 135/A. As argued earlier, impropriety is needed for 
the implementation of these provisions. With regard to this question, although the law 
enforcement officer has no responsibility whatsoever on taking these substances, 
questioning a suspect who has no control over his decision making is itself improper. 
7.3.6. Fatigue 
Experience of being detained and interrogated by the police is naturally tiring. 
If the suspect, however, is detained in conditions or questioned in a manner which 
make him extremely tired, the issue of voluntariness comes into play. The typical 
examples of such exhaustive tactics may be given as prolonged and incommunicado 
questioning, transporting the suspect from one police station to another, shining a 
bright and blinding strobe light continuously on the suspect's face, withholding food 
and drink from him"', keeping him awake to the point of extreme exhaustion, 
waking up regularly after brief periods of sleep, etc. As far as the English judiciary 
is concerned, the confession of a drug addict who has been in police custody for 18 
hours without any rest, despite the Code's requirement of at lest eight hours rest in 
any period of 24 hours, was found to be involuntary. "' A similar conclusion was 
reached for the confession of a retired public servant who had been subjected to a 
I" Not providing anything apart from bread and water for three days to the 
detainee, which is required as a disciplinary punishment by Military Criminal. Code, 
has been claimed to be unconstitutional before The Turkish Constitutional Court. The 
Court, however, did not agree. Kaliksiz Hapis Case, 27/12/1965, E. 1963/57, 
K. 1965/65, D. 4/3-9, Official Gazette no: 12520 of 6/2/1967. 
"' R. v Trussler [1988] Crim. L. R. 446. 
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total of 700 questions for 25 hours out of 50 spent in custody during a hot 
summer. '52 
7.3.7. Threat 
Moral restraint by means of threat can also harm the voluntariness of a 
confession. The coercive power of threat rests not only with the fear they produce but 
also with an individual's suggestibility. Clearly, the age, intelligence and character of 
the suspect will be important considerations. 153 The question to be addressed should 
be whether the suspect reasonably considers himself in sufficient danger. To be 
effective for the involuntariness purpose it needs not to be trivial or implausible. 
Having said that, threats may have cumulative effect; where any of them is not 
sufficient by itself to cause involuntariness, all, taken together might. To illustrate, 
in the case of R. v Sparks"', the suspect, accused of indecent assault, was told that 
unless he confessed he would be prosecuted in a civil rather than a military court, that 
additional motoring charges would be brought against him, that his family and friends 
would be embarrassed by the publicity and finally that his wife would not be permitted 
to leave the Island (Bermuda). His statements were held involuntary and hence 
inadmissible by the Privy Council. 
"' Hudson (1980) 72 Cr. App. R. 163. 
153 R. v McGovern (1992) 92 Cr. App. R. 228. 
1" [1964] Crim. L. R. 298. 
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Threats occur in different shapes and sizes. The problem may arise as to the 
employment of words to the effect that "it would be better" to tell the truth. In the 
case of R. v Emmerson'", a submission for the exclusion of a confession obtained 
by oppression was made on the grounds that the suspect was frightened by threats, 
where one of the police officers conducting the interview raised his voice and swore 
at the suspect. The police officer was saying in effect that it was plain that the suspect 
a 
had committed the crime, and asking why he was wasting their time. Although the 
conduct of the police officer was found to be rude and discourteous, it was not 
regarded as capable of causing involuntariness. More recently in R. v Paris, A bdullahi 
and Miller"' it was, however, held by the Court of Appeal that verbal intimidation 
could render a confession involuntary if it reaches a certain degree. Where should one 
draw the boundary of this level? There is no simple answer to this question. It is 
beyond question that police officers can interrogate a suspect with the intention of 
eliciting his account or gaining admissions and that there is no requirement for 
stopping questioning after the first denial, or even a number of denials. "' By the 
same token, police officers are not allowed to continue to question a suspect until they 
get what they want. Thus, shouting at a suspect what they wanted him to say after he 
had denied involvement over three hundred times was held to be undoubtedly good 
enough for exclusion of subsequent confession. "' 
(1991) 92 Cr. App. P, 284. 
(1993) 97 Cr. App. R. 99. 
Ibid, p. 100. 
Ibid, p. 100. 
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7.3.8. Promise 
A promise to the suspect that if he confesses he will be released on bail or that 
he will not be prosecuted, at least for some other accusations, may damage the 
voluntariness of a confession. "' The sort of promise which may, or may not, affect 
voluntariness depending on factors such as the severity of the crime, the position of 
the suspect. It should make no difference whether the promise was initiated by the 
suspect or by the officer; there is not much difference between a positive reply to the 
suspect's question "if I make a statement, will you give me bail" and telling the 
suspect "if you make a statement, I will see that you get bail" 
. 
160 The promise does 
not need to be made directly to the suspect, it may be sufficient if it comes to his 
knowledge. 161 
7.3.9. Deception 
Another tactic which may cast doubt on the voluntariness of a confession is 
deception. This method is said to be an alternative to coercive interrogation. "' 
Indeed, a sociological study examining changes in the nature of police interrogation 
in America reveals that "deception and manipulation have replaced force and direct 
"9 R. v Everet [1988] Crim. L. R. 826; R. v Barry (1992) 95 Cr. App. R. 334; R. 
v Conway [1994] Crim. L. R. 838. 
"' R. v Northam (1967) 52 Cr. App. R. 97; R. v Zaveckar (1969) 54 Cr. App. R. 
202; [1970] 1 All E. R. 413. 
R. v Thompson [1893] 2 Q. B. 12. 
Marx, 1988, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America, p. 130. 
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coercion as the strategic underpinning of information-gathering techniques that police 
now employ during criminal investigation". "3 Unfortunately there is no empirical 
data to prove or disprove such a trend in Turkey and England. Research conducted 
in England to examine strategic changes in the police questioning of suspects in the 
Metropolitan Police district between 1983 and 1988"' has not addressed this issue. 
For the present purposes two different forms of interrogatory deception may 
be identified as maximisation and minimisation. " The former generally involves 
attempts to scare the suspect into confessing by providing fabricated evidence. Tactics 
include informing the suspect falsely that an accomplice has identified him, stating 
falsely that existing physical evidence such as fingerprints"', bloodstains or hair 
samples affirms his involvement, conducting a false line-up which automatically leads 
to his identification and ascertaining incorrectly that the result of a lie-detector"' 
"' Leo, 1992, "From Coercion to Deception: the Changing Nature of Interrogation 
in America", 18 Crime, Law and Social Change 35. 
"' Williamson, 1990, Strategic Changes in Police Interrogation: An Examination 
of Police and Suspect Behaviour in the Metropolitan Police in Order to Determine the 
Effects of New Legislation. Technology and Organisational Policies, PhD Thesis, 
University of Kent. 
"' See Kassin and McNail, 1991, "Police Interrogations and Confessions: 
Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication", 15 Law and Human 
Behaviour 233. To obtain confession, there may be other types of deceptions. To 
illustrate, by conducting undercover operations the fact of interrogation itself may be 
misrepresented; typically police officers act as priests, newspaper reporters, lawyers, 
psychologists, cell mates, meter readers etc. In such cases fairness issue may arise 
rather than voluntariness. 
"' R. v Mason [1987] 1 W. L. R. 139; R. v Blake [1991] Crim. L. R. 119. 
"There is no consensus as to the scientific reliability of this test. See for detail 
Lykken, 1981, A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of Lie-Detector. 
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confirms his guilt. The latter, on the other hand, involves attempts to give the suspect 
a false sense of security by misrepresenting the seriousness of the accusation or by 
offering sympathy, tolerance, or moral justification. Examples include telling a 
murder suspect that the victim is still alive, convincing a suspect of rape that the 
complainant consented, persuading a suspect of embezzlement that low pay or 
inadequate working conditions are to blame for his action. Both maximization and 
minimization creates an appearance that the suspect's confession will have no effect; 
the former suggests that he will be convicted in any case whereas the latter implies 
that he will not be responsible for the accusation, regardless of whether he confesses. 
In this section eight general types of tactics capable of causing involuntariness 
have been identified. This list is by no means exhaustive. There may, of course, be 
many other improper methods which may be significant causes of involuntariness. An 
attempt to explain the most notorious ones is hoped to assist in clarifying the standards 
of legal voluntariness. Identification of involuntariness is relatively easy in cases 
where the extreme end of a range of improper tactics were employed. Such tactics, 
however, appear to be disappearing from the English scene. As one's attention moves 
from harder to softer improprieties, they become less visible and therefore it becomes 
more difficult to draw the line between tactics which cause involuntariness and which 
do not. Obviously, the voluntariness test allows some pressures. To assess the 
permissible degree of pressure the "qualified voluntariness test" of s. 76 offers some 
help; accordingly, the improprieties give rise to involuntariness only if they are likely 
to cause an unreliable statements. Involuntariness effect of oppression has been 
presumed in every case, and therefore it causes automatic exclusion. Obviously, the 
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reliability of a particular suspect's confession is beyond the concern of the qualified 
voluntariness test. The assessment of the reliability of an actual confession can only 
be made by taking into account other corroborating evidence, not by the admissibility 
test. As pointed out by Jackson, "an admissibility test based on reliability is a small 
step away from the abondonment of any admissibility test at allI1.169 
8- Evidence Discovered in Consequence of Involuntary Confessions 
It is argued above that confessions must be voluntary before they are 
admissible in evidence; involuntary confessions are inadmissible as evidence against 
the accused in both jurisdictions irrespective of reliability. "' In some circumstances, 
however, evidence incriminating the accused may be discovered by law enforcement 
officers in consequence of an inadmissible confession. In this section the issues of 
admissibility which are posed by such "consequently obtained evidence" will be 
examined. "' 
"' Jackson, supra note 109, p. 254. 
"' In addition to this, confessions may also be excluded if admission would 
adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings in English law and in Turkish law if 
they are secured unlawfully. 
"' The terms primary and secondary evidence are used for the direct and indirect 
result of an impropriety respectively. A confession obtained as a direct result of an 
impropriety is the primary evidence, whereas the body of the victim found as a result 
of that confession is the secondary evidence. La Fave, 1987, Search & Seizure: A 
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 369. 
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8.1. Refusal of Mandatory Exclusion and Inclusion 
In Turkey the issue has not been addressed. In England some aspects of this 
issue have been regulated by PACE. Section 76(4)(a) provides- 
"The fact that a confession is wholly or partly excluded 
in pursuance of this section shall not affect the 
admissibility in evidence 
... 
of any facts discovered as a 
result of the confession". 171 
The subsection forbids the mandatory exclusion of subsequently discovered 
evidence; it is a clear rejection of the US fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine"', the 
deterrent rationale 
173 
and the Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Accusare principle. 17' The 
statutory approach reflects the position at common law. In the case of 
"' One should note that s. 76(4)(b), unlike s. 76(4)(a), is not concerned with the 
admissibility of subsequently obtained evidence. Instead, it regulates the admissibility 
of evidence coming to light in the confession itself. Accordingly, an involuntary 
confession is admissible, subject to s. 78 discretion, as evidence showing that the 
accused speaks, writes or expresses himself in the same way as the offender, though 
not of the truth of the confession. It is hardly possible to agree with the proposition 
that "it cannot make any difference to the admissibility of handwriting whether it is 
written voluntarily or under the compulsion of threats" (Obiter, R. Voisin [1918] 1 K13 
533). As has already been argued, an involuntary confession should not be relied 
upon for any purpose; if the suspect is tortured, the value of his statement for any 
purpose should be doubted. See above note 38 and accompanying text. 
172 As far as this doctrine is concerned, all evidence which can be considered to 
be a "fruit" of an impropriety is regarded as tainted by the impropriety. Nordone v US, 
308 US 338 (1939). 
171 If the officer knows that the subsequently obtained evidence, unlike 
confessions, can be used at a later trial he will not be deterred from violating 
procedural rules. 
174 If the rationale of the exclusion of involuntary confession is the principle of 
Nemo Tenetur Seipsum A ccusare it would be rational to lengthen the exclusion to other 
evidence obtained in consequence of the confession. 
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175 Warickshall 
, 
the accused confessed to receiving stolen goods. As a result of the 
confession the stolen goods were found concealed in her bed. The confession was 
held inadmissible since it was induced by promises of a favour, but the contention to 
the effect that, as the goods were discovered as a result of an inadmissible confession, 
the evidence of actual discovery should also be excluded was rejected. It was stated 
that the principle requiring the exclusion of confessions in evidence, 
"has no application whatever as to the admission or 
rejection of facts, whether the knowledge of them be 
obtained in consequence of an extorted confession or 
whether it arises ftorn any other source; for a fact, if it 
exist at all, must exist invariably in the same manner 
whether the confession from which it is derived be in 
other respects true or false""' 
This approach should be welcomed in that it rejects a mandatory exclusion of 
subsequently obtained evidence. 
177 
The subsection and the common law approach as stated in Warickshall, at the 
same time, does not require mandatory inclusion; it does not provide that subsequently 
obtained evidence is necessarily or automatically to be admitted. It only states that 
consequently obtained evidence may be given in evidence as a matter of law", but 
"' (1783) 1 Leach 263. 
(1783) 1 Leach 263, at p. 264. 
I" For the criticism of the mandatory exclusionary rule see Chapter Three 3.2. 
"I Section 76(4) is concerned with facts discovered as a result of a confession 
which is inadmissible under s. 76(2). Confession evidence may also be excluded by 
employing section 78. Facts discovered as a result of a confession excluded under 
s. 78 may, and should, also be adduced as evidence, if not because of the analogous 
application of s. 76 (4), because of the common law principle stated in the case of 
Warickshall. 
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such evidence is still prone to be subjected to the general exclusionary discretion 
regulated by section 78.179 Factors taken into account by the court in the exercise 
of their "unfairness" discretion in respect to any evidence may also be relevant to the 
admissibility of the subsequently obtained facts. 
"' 
Turkish law has not directly dealt with the issue of subsequently obtained 
evidence, but this should not be taken as indicating a lack of sensitivity to the 
problem. Nothing prevents the application of Article 254 which also requires, as 
argued in the previous chapter, a flexible solution. Thus, Turkish and English legal 
systems' general attitude towards admissibility of improperly obtained evidence does 
not differ when faced with the admissibility of subsequently obtained evidence. This 
is a compelling illustration of the point that the function of the criminal justice system 
is not solely to generate factually accurate verdicts, as it is clear that the approach may 
result in the exclusion of subsequently obtained evidence which is perfectly reliable. 
8.2. Is the Voluntariness Test Applicable? 
Evidence obtained in consequence of an inadmissible confession is subject to 
the admissibility test under s. 78 in English law and under article 254 in Turkish 
law. "' One may ask whether consequently obtained evidence should be subjected 
to the involuntariness test. At present, in both jurisdictions, it is not; in Turkey article 
For the operational scope of s. 78 see Chapter Four 3.2.2.2.2. 
These factors are considered in Chapter Five 3.5. 
For the operation of these tests see Chapter Five. 
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1351A applies only to "statements". In England s. 76(2) is only applicable to 
confessions as defined by s. 82 of PACE. 112 Things which come within the 
definition of s. 82 cannot be treated as "facts" for the purpose of s. 76 (4)(a). 183 It is 
submitted that, in principle, these approaches are correct, as has already been stated, 
because there is a fundamental difference between a confession and other evidence, 
including evidence coming to light as a result of a confession. "' Having said that 
it may be difficult sometimes to decide where the "confession" terminates and 
"subsequently obtained facts as a result of it" begin. An interesting example of such 
a difficulty would be the common law case of R. v Barker"'. The accused was 
convicted of conspiring with another to defraud the Inland Revenue. He was promised 
immunity from criminal prosecution at an interview, as a result of which he produced 
books and documents which disclosed tax irregularities. A prosecution was 
subsequently launched and the trial judge admitted the books and documents. The 
Court of Appeal, however, quashed the conviction on the ground that, 
"documents stand on precisely the same footing as an 
oral or written confession which is brought into 
existence as a result of such a promise, inducement or 
threat" 196 
The act of producing some incriminating document or article may constitute a 
"confession", but not the documents or articles themselves. The reason for this is that 
See above note 47 and accompanying text. 
Murphy, 1995, Blackstone's Criminal Practice, p. 2109. 
184 See Chapter Four 3.2.3.4.1. 
"' [1941] 2 K. B 381. 
196 [1941] 2 K. B. 381, at p. 384-385. 
280 
books and documents which were produced in consequence of the inducement were 
in existence before and independently of any inducement or threat. Thus, regarding 
such books and documents as the equivalent of a confession does not seem satisfactory 
unless an improper inducement led the accused to re-write them. In another case, it 
was rightly held that the re-enactment of a murder, in which a defendant was shown 
disposing of the murder weapon, should be regarded as a confession rather than as a 
subsequently obtained fact. "' The question in this case was "where exactly is the 
murder weapon (a knife)? ". Such a question might have been answered by an oral 
description of the place where it was, or by going to the place and pointing to that 
place. It should not make any difference which method of answering the question was 
adopted. Thus, it is important to distinguish the confession from subsequently 
obtained evidence, because the involuntariness test applies to the former not to the 
latter. 
8.3. Non-Permission of Linking 
In some cases consequently obtained evidence can "stand alone""' without 
making any reference to the fact that it was obtained in consequence of an 
inadmissible confession. For example, the stolen property found concealed in an 
accused's bed itself incriminates the accused. There is no need to show that it was 
discovered as a result of the inadmissible confession. In some cases, however, 
Lam Chi-ming v The Queen [199112 A. C 212. See also above note 47 and 
accompanying text. 
"' This phrase is used by Choo, 1993, "Evidence Obtained in Consequence of an Inadmissible Confession", 57 Journal of Criminal Law 195, at p. 197. 
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consequently obtained evidence will have little relevance or value in the absence of 
evidence of how it was discovered. To illustrate, the recovery of a knife without any 
fingerprint on it in the sea will not itself indicate the accused's involvement in a 
murder unless it is permitted to adduce evidence that it was discovered as a result of 
an inadmissible confession. As far as the latter situation is concerned, adducing 
subsequently obtained evidence only has practical value if it "stands with the 
inadmissible confession". Thus, the question whether the prosecution are allowed to 
adduce evidence to show that consequently obtained evidence was discovered as a 
result of an inadmissible confession gains importance. This problem had arisen in a 
number of common law cases. Several different answers were given. Before discussing 
the present state of the law, it may be useful to examine these authorities. 
In the case of R. v Garbett"' the widest approach was adopted. According 
to this judgement, subsequent facts and the inadmissible confession that led to their 
discovery were admissible. This approach results from the assumptions that 
inadmissible confessions were excluded merely because they were not entitled to 
trustworthiness; and that once their trustworthiness i  confirmed the whole confession 
is admissible in that "it can hardly be supposed that at certain parts the possible fiction 
stopped and the truth began... if we are to cease distrusting any part, we should cease 
distrusting all"'" One should, however, note that both assumptions are open to 
"1 (1847) 2C&K 474, at p. 490, cited by Gotlieb, 1956, "Confirmation by 
Subsequent Facts", 72 Law Quarterly Review 209, at p. 215. 
'" Wigmore, 1940, Treatise on the Law of Evidence, 3 rd cd., sect. 847. 
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criticism. Inadmissible confessions, as argued above'91, are not excluded for the 
possibility that they may be unreliable but because they are involuntary. In any event, 
the assumption that a confession confirmed in part is true altogether ignores the fact 
that a confession may include true and false statements. 
The other approach was to admit those parts of a confession that have been 
actually confirmed by subsequently obtained evidence. 192 Parts of a confession not 
linking the subsequently obtained evidence with the accused were excluded. Again 
here, the rationale for excluding forced confessions was assumed to be the likelihood 
of unreliability. Unlike the first approach, a line is drawn between the aspects of the 
confession that have been actually confirmed and those which have not. 
Another approach was to accept that the subsequently obtained evidence alone 
is admissible and that it cannot be connected with the confession in any way. In the 
case of Warickshall, in which the consequently obtained evidence could stand alone, 
it was held that no part of the otherwise inadmissible confession could be heard and 
that "it can never be legally known whether the fact was derived through the means 
of such confession or not""'. Similarly, in the case of R. v Berriman'94 the 
"' See above note 64 and accompanying text. 
192R. v Thurtell (1824) Annual Register 4; R. v St Lawrence, [ 1949] Q. R. 215; R. 
v Griffin, (1909) Russ & Ry 151; R. v Gould (1940) 9C&P 364, these cases cited by Gotlieb, supra note 189, p. 213,214,215. 
193 (1871) 1 Leach C. C. 263, at p. 264. 
"' (1854) 6 Cox C. C 388, at p. 389; See also, R. v Mosey (1783) 1 Leach C. C. 265; R. v Cain (1839) 1 Crownford & Dix 36. 
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witness was allowed to testify that stolen property was found in a certain place, but 
he was not permitted to say that it was discovered as a result of a statement made by 
the accused. 
it is clear that there was authority at common law for each of these different 
approaches. The law was confused and uncertain as to whether an inadmissible 
confession could be used to link the subsequently obtained facts with the accused. 
These approaches were considered by the Criminal Revision Committee in its Eleventh 
Report and the issue was taken as a question of "policy". "' The first approach, 
examined above, was opposed by the Committee. The majority expressed the view 
that the second approach should be adopted. A minority did not support this proposal 
on the ground that it would be wrong to admit a confession indirectly when it was 
thought that the interests of justice required that it should not be admitted directly. 
The minority view, which is also a reflection of the third approach, was the one 
adopted by PACE. Subsection 76(5) and (6) clearly state that the prosecution' 96 are 
not permitted to show that the relevant facts were discovered as a result of a 
confession excluded under s. 76.1" 
"' Eleventh Report 
, 
supra note 7, para. 69. 
"' The defence may, however, adduce such evidence, if they wish. 
"' One may fairly ask whether linking the subsequently obtained evidence with 
the confession is possible where the confession is excluded under s. 78. This issue 
was not addressed in PACE. Professor Birch (Murphy, supra note 183, p. 2110) 
argues that a court should not feel compelled to follow the principle laid down by s. 
76(5), whereas it is argued by Choo (Supra note 188, p. 197) that "an analogous 
principle should apply" in relation to confessions excluded under s. 78. The researcher inclines to agree with the view that, as far as the consequently obtained evidence is 
concerned, confessions excluded under s. 78 and confessions excluded under s. 76(2) 
should be treated alike. Exclusion of the same confession may be justified, in many 
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The legislative strategy of not permitting the prosecution to adduce evidence 
that facts were discovered as a result of an involuntary confession seems to be not 
only convincing, but also consistent with the legitimacy of the verdict principle in two 
respects. "' Firstly, the prosecution cannot reveal such a link, whereas the defence 
can, if they wish. This distinction conforms with the view that state reliance on an 
involuntary confession weakens the moral authority of the verdict. "' Secondly, and 
more importantly, the justification for the exclusion of involuntary confessions should 
have been put upon wider grounds than its mere potential unreliability. In these cases 
the reliability of a confession has been confirmed by other independent evidence 
insufficient in itself to prove guilt. If unreliability were the sole ground for rejecting 
involuntary confessions, than that part of a confession which can be proved to be 
reliable by the subsequent discovery of facts that show it to be reliable ought to be 
admitted in evidence. One has to accept that allowing the prosecution to establish the 
link will contribute to the factual accuracy of a verdict. Although the legitimacy of 
the verdict principle generally derives from factual accuracy, however, this is not 
always so. As argued above? ", perfectly reliable confessions may be excluded if 
they carry significant risk of harming the moral authority of the verdict. In the 
context of the admissibility of subsequently obtained evidence, the judiciary, by 
excluding an involuntary confession, makes the judgement that admission of the 
instances, under either s. 76(2) or s. 78. As argued by Choo, in some cases it may be just a matter of chance whether a particular confession has been excluded by 
employing s. 76(2) or s. 78. 
"' The same approach should be adopted by Turkish law. 
'99 Dennis, supra note 101, p. 360. 
See above note 100 and accompanying text. 
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confession harms the legitimacy of the verdict. If direct admission of a confession 
harms the legitimacy of the verdict, indirect admission of the same confession should 
also have the same effect. 
9. Conclusion 
Not only the criteria which are used to determine the admissibility of 
confessions by Article 135/A and Section 76, but also the more fundamental question 
of the extent of these provisions is sought to be examined in this chapter. Neither 
great differences nor a consensus has been found in the latter regard. After identifying 
that exculpatory statements are not treated differently from inculpatory ones by Article 
135/A, it is argued that there is no merit excluding exculpatory statements from the 
scope of Section 76. 
A contention is made to the effect that the key test employed with regard to 
admissibility of confession by both countries is mainly voluntariness. Some may 
hesitate about the correctness of this argument with regard to English law. The literal 
meaning, however, of section 76(2) in the light of Parliamentary history reveals that 
in order to be admitted as evidence confessions should be obtained voluntary in the 
sense that it has not been obtained by methods conducive to unreliability or by 
oppression. 
The concept of voluntariness, however, has been proved not to be self-defining 
and thus there is a need to qualify it. One has to accept that English law has made 
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considerable progress in this direction. There is every reason for Turkish judiciary to 
benefit from that experience. The usage of the same framework, voluntariness, is 
likely to contribute the adoption of similar views about the application of this test in 
each country. This trend has already started by the perception by each jurisdiction of 
the voluntariness test as a vehicle for evaluating not only the effect of interrogative 
techniques on a suspect's will but also the propriety of police conduct regardless of 
its impact on the suspect. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
BREACH OF THE RULES SAFEGUARDING THE SUSPECT 
IN POLICE CUSTODY 
1. Introduction 
Recently the vulnerable position in which suspects are placed at the police 
station has become too obvious to ignore. The widely publicised English cases such 
as the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, the Maguires and Judith Ward are perhaps 
best illustrative of the vulnerability of suspects in police custody. ' Similar cases 
revealing the vulnerability of the suspect at the police station are also seen in Turkey. 
To illustrate, in 1992 the Human Rights Commission of the Grand National Assembly 
received 74 applications of mishandling during custody. ' More recently, the Human 
Rights Association, which is a leftist non-govermnental organization 3, reported 
receiving 645 allegations of mistreatment by law enforcement officers during 1994. 
I See Chapter Six note I and accompanying text. 
I Kazanci, 1992, "TBMM Insan Haklarini Inceleme Komisyonu ve Ulkemizde 
Insan. Haklari (The Human Rights Commission of the Grand National Assembly and 
the Human Rights in Turkey)", 14 Insan Haklari Yilligi (Turkish Yearbook of Human 
Rights), p. 55. 
' Evinch, 1992, "An Introduction to the Turkish Human Rights System", I 
(Turkish) Human Rights Review 43. 
4 Sik, 1995, "CMUK Iskencede Etkisiz (CMUK is ineffective in Preventing 
Torture)", Cumhuriyet (Daily Newspaper), 12 February; The question of compliance 
with human rights was also raised with respect to Turkey at an international level. 
Both governmental and non-governmental. international organizations (such as the EC 
and the Counsel of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, as well as Amnesty 
International and Helsinki Watch), and even states (such as the US,, which produces 
the State department Annual Report on Human Rights in the World) have repeatedly 
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Such cases reemphasise the susceptibility of suspects to two particular risks of harm. 
These are, as identified by Zuckerman, the risk of abuse of the suspect's person or 
self-esteem, and the risk of alteration or manipulation of the suspect's statement so as 
to bring him into connection with the crime. ' 
Even without the employment of any impropriety, the distressing effect of 
being in custody has been recognised. by the Royal Commission in England 6 as well 
as by psychological researchers7. Indeed, such factors as isolation from the outside 
world and the general environment of the police station create an atmosphere where 
law enforcement officers have a major psychological advantage over the suspect. 
Against this background, one may reasonably ask which safeguards should be 
adopted to protect suspects held in police custody and subjected to interrogation. 
Traditionally both the Turkish and English law recognised some kind of protective 
regime: the former through the written constitution, as well as subsequent statutes and 
issued reports on this subject. More recently, on December 1992, the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and 
Punishment issued an alarming public statement on this issue. For the detail of this 
statement see, Tanca, 1993, "The Public Statement on Turkey by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture", 4 European Journal of International Law 
115. 
' Zuckerman, 1989, The Principles of Criminal Evidence, p. 302. 
'Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 198 1, Report (Philips Report), Cmnd 
8092, para 4.73. 
' Gudjonsson and Clerk, 1986, "Suggestibility in Police interrogation: A Social 
Psychological Model" I Social Behaviour 83-104 ; Gudjonsson, 1992, The Psychology 
of Interrogations, Confessions and TestimoLiy; McConville and Sanders, 1991 The Case for The Prosecution. 
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court decisions, while the latter, having no written constitution, took its guidance ftom 
the common law and Act of Parliament. Recent growing public awareness to ensure 
that this vulnerability of the suspect is not exploited led to the introduction of the 
PACE in England and the amendment of the CMUK in Turkey. Both legislations laid 
down a much more comprehensive framework of protective measures for suspects in 
police custody than had been provided by the previous laws of each country. The 
main concern of the legislatures in both jurisdictions was a central question for any 
criminal justice system: striking the necessary compromise between individual rights 
and law enforcement needs. How a society establishes that balance affects not only 
the system's efficiency but, more importantly, shapes the society itself. This is 
because safeguards belong not just to the criminally accused but to all persons 
confronted with the state's police power. 
The safeguards provided by PACE and CMUK may be classified as the 
involvement of third parties in the detention and questioning process, the time limits 
for the detention of suspects and the requirements for documented procedures and 
record making. Once the importance of the suspect's rights is recognised, it then 
becomes important to ensure that remedies are available when such requirements have 
not been met. Having said that, the legal effect of non-observance of these 
requirements by the police is not made explicitly clear by the statutory provisions 
either in England nor in Turkey. It seems to have been left entirely to the judiciary 
to determine what effect a police officer's non-compliance legally has in relation to 
statements and other evidence obtained as a result. 
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The examination of the concepts of unlawfulness and unfairness in Chapter 
Five and the criteria for the admissibility of confessions in Chapter Six have disclosed 
the possibility of the same amount of evidence being excluded in both jurisdictions. 
This possibility will be tested in the following pages by specifically focusing on the 
admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of depriving the suspect from procedural 
safeguards such as the involvement of third parties, time limits for detention, or 
recording provisions. Although these improprieties often occur in conjunction, for the 
sake of simplicity only their individual effects will be considered. The type of 
evidence most likely to be in issue as a result of these breaches is confession evidence. 
This does not necessarily cause a problem of overlap with the previous chapter in that 
failure to comply with any of these procedural safeguards generally raise the 
admissibility issue under the unlawfulness and unfairness concepts rather than 
involuntariness. 
2. The Involvement of Third Parties 
In order to prevent the traditional secretiveness and exclusivity of police 
stations, the involvement of third parties such as legal advisers, family, friends, 
appropriate adults, custody officers, and public prosecutors is allowed, indeed some 
of them are required, in both legal systems. These involvements may, inter alia, 
contribute to the monitoring of those events that occur during the detention of 
suspects. Failure to comply with these requirements may be challenged to be capable 
of resulting in the exclusion of evidence under article 135/A and 254 of the CMUK 
in Turkey, and section 76,78 and 82 of the PACE in England. The amount of 
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evidence which may be excluded and the more relevant provision to be employed in 
each system as a result of these infringements deserves closer examination. 
2.1. Legal Adviser 
The involvement of a legal adviser at the pre-trial stage of the criminal process, 
which may be called the right to legal advice', is one of the most significant 
safeguards for the suspect. With regard to evidence obtained in breach of this right, 
neither CMUK nor PACE name with precision what legal consequences may flow 
from such infringements. However, where any breach occurred, the suspect may, 
logically, apply, under section 78 of the PACE and under the provision of 254 of 
CMUK, at the subsequent trial for exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of that 
breach. Similarly, more specific provisions, PACE 76 and CMUK 135/A, regulating 
admissibility of improperly obtained confessions may be applied to exclude 
confessions obtained from a suspect who has not been given the opportunity of 
obtaining legal advice-9 
Where admissibility of evidence obtained in breach of the right to legal advice 
is challenged under article 254 of CMUK or under section 78 of PACE, almost the 
' Different terms such as "access to a solicitor", "right to see a solicitor", " right 
to legal advice" etc. are used in order to refer to obtaining legal advice during the pre- 
trial stage of criminal process as though they are synonymous. I am inclined to use the 
term "right to legal advice" since advisers are not only solicitors in England, but also 
their clerks, representatives etc. 
' Exclusion of evidence under section 76 of PACE and 135/A of CMUK has 
already been examined in some detail in the previous Chapter. 
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same stages should be followed by the courts in both jurisdictions in the process of 
deciding whether to exclude evidence. The list of stages could easily be 
lengthened", but the identification of two main steps will serve to bring out the 
important facts which need to be stressed. Each of these will be examined in turn. 
2.1.1. Infringement of the Right to Legal Advice 
The first step is to determine whether there is a breach of the right to legal 
advice. Three different forms of infringements amy be identified: active, passive and 
inadequate assistance. 
2.1.1.1. Active Mode of Infringement 
The involvement of the legal adviser in pre-trial investigation has been 
recognised and regulated by statutory provisions in both jurisdictions. In Turkey the 
1992 Amendment guarantees the suspect's right to legal advice in the following form: 
"The apprehended person or the suspect may avail 
themselves of the assistance of one or more than one 
legal adviser (mudaft) at any stage of criminal 
investigation 
........ 
In England, the right in question is governed clearly and in detail by section 58 of the 
PACE which provides; 
" For example, whether or not a request for the legal adviser has been made. If 
it has, consideration is to be given to whether that request has been refused. If the 
request has been made and refused, another stage would be to consider whether the delay or refusal was permissible so on. 
" Article 14/1 of the 1992 Amendment replacing Article 136 of CMUK. 
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#'a person arrested and held in custody in a police station 
or other premises shall be entitled, if he so request, to 
consult a solicitor privately at any time". 
Furthermore, The Code of Practice for Detention, Treatment and Questioning of 
Persons by Police Officers" accompanies PACE to regulate the right to legal advice. 
To guarantee that the right to legal advice is not a privilege only of the rich, 
the law in both countries provides a duty solicitor scheme. In each country, under 
the present arrangement, it is possible to obtain free legal advice while being held in 
police custody at any time within 24 hours. 13 The Duty Solicitor arrangement is 
organised by the Bar in Turkey and by the Law Society in England, and whenever 
a suspect requests legal advice, the police make a phone call to the relevant body and 
inform them that a duty solicitor is requested. 
The active mode of infringement takes the form of refusal or rejection by the 
law enforcement officers of the suspect's request to consult a legal adviser. 
Obviously, in such a case the suspect is not ignorant about his right in question. His 
awareness may derive from notification to him by the law enforcement officers of his 
statutory right. Alternatively, he may have prior knowledge about his right to legal 
advice. 
12 The revised code C come into force on 10 April 1995 and superseded the 1991 
version. 
13 For the practical difficulties of implementation of this scheme in Turkey see, Safak, 1993, "CMUK ve Polis (CMUK and the Police", Zaman (Daily Newspaper), 
20-21-22 and 23 February. 
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In some cases refusing access to legal advice would not be illegal in either 
jurisdiction. As far as Turkish law is concerned, subsection three of article 135/A 
reads, 
"legal adviser's right to communicate with the suspect or 
the apprehended person, to be present during interview 
and questioning, to provide legal assistance shall not be 
restricted and prevented(deprived) in any stage of 
investigation, including interviews conducted by the 
police and the gendarmerie". 14 
Although the wording of this subsection suggests otherwise, in the case of offences 
against state security, safeguards provided by the 1992 amendment, including right to 
legal advice, will never come into play. In such cases CMUK's previous provisions, 
which were amended in 1992, requiring the preliminary investigation to be conducted 
in secrecy will be applied. " This is a very strange position in that the same legal 
norms are repealed in some cases but they are still in force in others. 
In England, on the other hand, there are circumstances under which the police 
may delay access to legal advice. " However, in any case, all persons have an 
" Article 14/3 of the 1992 Amendment replacing Article 136 of CMUK. 
" Article 31 of the 1992 Amendment. The first draft, which had been approved 
by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 21 May 1992, did not make such a 
distinction. However, the draft was returned by the President of the Republic to the 
Assembly for reconsideration. Meanwhile, there were significant terrorist activities in 
the south of Turkey, which supported the law and order lobby's argument to make 
such a distinction. For a detailed examination of this process see, Sahin, 1993, 
"Savunma Hakkinin Gelisimi ve CMUK degisikligi (Improvement of the Right to 
Defence and the Amendments in CMUK)", 3 Izmir Bar Dergisi (Journal of Izmir Bar). 
p. 73. 
" In England access to a solicitor can only be delayed if the offence is a serious 
arrestable offence and then only if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the 
exercise of the right would result in the interference with or harm the evidence; the 
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absolute right of access to legal advice after 36 hours detention except for suspected 
terrorist cases where the period is 48 hours. 
To determine whether a refusal of access to a legal adviser can be considered 
improper, it is necessary to take into account the explanation or reason given by the 
law enforcement authorities for the refusal. Existence of some reasons will, in both 
countries, weight in favour of a conclusion that the refusal was not improper and, 
therefore, did not technically infringe the right to legal advice. "' That means that this 
right is not absolute; under certain circumstances it may be withheld. The English 
judiciary, however, has played its part, by narrow interpretation of the provisions 
relating to delay, to meet its obligation to help ensure that an increasing number of 
suspects receive legal advice. Indeed, in order to justify denial of the right, a 
reference to specific circumstances including evidence about the person detained or the 
actual solicitor involved is required. " Further it has been held that to refuse access 
to legal advice the police officer should have the belief that a specific solicitor would, 
if allowed to consult the person in police detention, subsequently assist in the 
concealment of a criminal offence. " Evidence obtained after the refusal, which did 
not meet these requirements is consistently considered to have been obtained in breach 
of the right to legal advice. This narrow interpretation makes the grounds for refusal 
alerting of other suspects or hinderance of the recovery of property: PACE 58(8) 
There are also additional grounds for delaying access to legal advice for terrorism 
suspects: Annex B of Code C. 
" Section 58(8), Code C, Section 6, Annex B. 
18 R. v Samuel [1988] All. E. R. 135. 
" R. v Silcott, Braithwaite, Raghip, 1991, The Times, December 9. 
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of access to legal advice entirely hypothetical in that even if there exist the above- 
mentioned risks in relation to a particular solicitor, the assistance of another solicitor 
can always be requested. 
2.1.1.2. Passive Mode of Infringement 
The passive mode of infringement arises when law enforcement officers do not 
inform the suspect of his right to legal advice. The right in question has automatic 
effect in neither jurisdiction. In order to avail himself of the right a request by the 
suspect is required. This regulation may be criticised in that lack of knowledge of the 
right by the suspect may be exploited by the police. Thus, one may recommend that 
all suspects should have the right in question unless they specifically reject the offer. 
Instead of adopting this recommendation, both systems, like the famous American case 
of Miranda v Arizona", stipulate that a suspect must be informed of the right to legal 
advice and of the availability of the duty solicitor scheme. " Unlike Miranda 
neither CMUK nor PACE mandates the right to be informed of that right at an early 
stage of contact between the law enforcement officer and the suspect. The Turkish 
and English approaches with respect to the time of informing also differ; in England 
the suspect should be informed about his right to legal assistance when he is brought 
to a police station under arrest or arrested at the police station having attended there 
voluntarily. " In Turkey, before the beginning of the police interview or questioning 
" 384 U. S. 436 (1966). 
21 CMUK 135/3; Code C 11.2,6.5 and 15.3. 
2' Code C 3.1; see also RSPCA v Eager, [1995] Crim. L. R. 59. 
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by the prosecution, the suspect should be notified of his right either to choose his 
counsel or to have the police or the prosecution designate one for him. " 
In addition to the notification requirement, the Code in England requires 
advertisement of the availability of free legal advice on request in the shape of posters 
in the charging area of every police station. The Code also stimulates the translation 
of this poster into other languages such as the main minority language, and the 
principal E. C languages. " The same regulation should be recommended for Turkey. 
Although the wording of these provisions are quite promising, one may ask to 
what extent, in practice, these provisions ensure adequate notification to the suspect 
before facing any question. Published researches, unfortunately, indicate that police 
officers are generally reluctant to inform arrested suspects of their rights. " 
There is no reason why passive breach of the right to legal advice should be 
treated with the same gravity as active breach of the right in question. This is 
recognised by several decisions in England 
. 
2' For example, in the case of R. v 
" CMUK 135/3. 
" Code C 6.3,6H. 
" Empirical research conducted by Sanders and Bridges in England reveals that 
the police used various ploys to deflect the proper way of informing suspect of their 
right in question (rule bending); the most common ploy 
-42%- was that suspects were 
told of the right to legal advice "too quickly, incomprehensibly, and incompletely". 
Sanders and Bridges, 1990, "Access to Legal Advice and Police Malpractice" 
, 
Crim. 
L. R. 498. 
" R. vAbsolam, (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 332; R. v Vernon, [1988] Crim. L. R. 445; 
R. v Mary Quayson, [1989] Crim. L. K 218; R. v Sanusi, [1991] Crim. L. R. 43. 
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BeycaW" after arrival at the police station the suspect was asked "are you happy to 
be interviewed in the normal way we conduct these interviews without a solicitor..? ". 
This phraseology, the Court of Appeal held, did not amount to a proper way of 
informing the suspect of his right to legal advice and, therefore, the right in question 
was infringed. Similarly, in the case of R. v VernoW% after the suspect's request to 
access to legal advice and the nomination of a solicitor who was unavailable, she was 
told that the interview would therefore be delayed overnight if she adhered to her 
insistence upon the solicitor's presence. She was not told of the duty solicitor scheme 
as an altemative. This was obviously a passive breach of the right to legal advice. 
The trial judge exercised his discretion and excluded the interviews. 
2.1.1.3. Inadequate Legal Assistance 
Presence of a legal adviser at the police station, or more specifically at the 
interview, should not lead us to assume that all legal advisers fulfil the exact duty of 
assisting a suspect during interview. Various studies have indicated that in actual 
practice ineffective counselling by the legal adviser is too common. In a recent 
English study for the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, McConville and 
Hodgson found that legal advisers were performing badly at police interviews by 
adapting a passive stance; 
"Despite the fact that the police might resort to overt 
psychological manipulation, accusation and abuse, and 
might lose their tempers with the suspect, legal advisers 
" [19911 Crim. L. R. 185. 
" [1988] Crim. L. R. 445. 
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usually continue to act as spectators and make no 
attempt to alter the interrogation dynamics". 29 
This fact has obviously been contributed to, by the use of non-solicitor advisers. 10 
The Law Society guidelines enables the attendance of non-solicitors, stating that: 
"Solicitors organise their work in a variety of ways and 
it is acceptable for solicitors to give general authority to 
their clerks to undertake this work without the necessity 
of a decision by a solicitor in each individual case. "" 
It would not be realistic to expect that this work will be provided by lawyers in 
Turkey. During the daytime it would be hard for lawyers to attend the police station 
due to the workload at courts, whereas attendance at the police station at night time 
will affect their performance the next day. 
If the poor quality of legal advice offered to suspects at the police station 
becomes the norm rather than exception, the involvement of a legal adviser would be 
little more than an act of legitimising the criminal process. Indeed, some other breach 
of procedural safeguards may be overlooked because of the presence of a legal 
" McConville and Hodgson, 1993, Custodial Legal Advice and the Ripht to 
Silence, Royal Commission Research Study No: 16, p. 163-164; For similar 
conclusions see, Baldwin, 1992, The Role of Legal Rej2resentatives at Police Stations, 
Royal Commission Research Study No: 3, p. 49; Dixon, Bottemley, Coleman, Gill, and Wall, 1990, "Safeguarding the Rights of Suspects in Police Custody", I Policing and Society 123. 
" It is not possible to state the extent of the use of non-solicitor advisers since no 
official record is kept of the status of those attending police stations to provide legal 
advice. Observation conducted by Dixon, however, revealed that "most solicitors' 
firms with substantial criminal practices employ ex-police officers as runners". Dixon, 
ibid; For similar findings see McConville and Hodgson, ibid. 
" The Law Society, 1991, Advising a Suspect in the Police Station. 
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adviser. " To avoid such a conclusion it should be accepted that infringement, of the 
spirit if not the letter, of the right to access a solicitor may occur in cases where a 
legal adviser is present. In such a case legal advisers themselves are responsible for 
the breach rather than police officers. This is, however, not an excuse as far as the 
legitimacy of the verdict principle is concerned. 
Information about quality of of legal advice needs to be made available to the 
court in order to assess the existence of infringement of the right to legal advice. 
Difficulties may arise in deciding what constitutes inadequate advice, but these 
difficulties should not prevent the courts from scrutinizing the legal adviser's conduct 
more carefully, if necessary, by recognising a test for the legal adviser's performance. 
Of course, such a test may develop, on a case by case basis, as courts assessed what 
a specific legal adviser had or had not done in a given case. Such a process has 
already started in England. In the case of R. v Paris and other? ' the solicitor was 
found to be severely at fault for staying passive throughout the miscarriage of the 
interview. It was held that a solicitor fulfilling the duty of assisting a suspect during 
interviews should follow the guidelines" issued by the Law Society and perform his 
" R. v Dunn, (1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 237. 
" (1993) Cr. App. R. 99. 
34 Guidelines for solicitors on "Advising a Suspect in the Police Station" were first 
issued in 1985, second and third editions were published in 1988 and. 1991 
respectively. As far as the current edition is concerned, there is a need to intervene "if 
the questions are 
.. 
oppressive, threatening or insulting (6.3.2), if the officer is not 
asking questions but only making his own comments (6.3.3), if questions are improper 
or improperly put (6.4.1)". Furthermore, where improprieties remain uncorrected or 
continue, the suspect should be advised to remain silent (6.4.2). 
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function responsibly and bravely. In R. v Glaves", failure to discharge this function 
lead to exclusion. It was clearly stated by the English Court of Appeal that, "it 
behoved the solicitor representing (the suspect) to ensure there was somebody present 
who would interfere if questioning apparently went too far. There was no point in a 
solicitor's representative going along and doing nothing but taking a note". 
Questioning may go too far, to become unfair, in a number of ways. To illustrate, 
firstly, the content of the question may be unfair if it is ambiguous, hypothetical or 
based on non-existent evidence. Secondly, the form of the question may be unfair if 
it is a leading question or one which involves a legal concept not understood by the 
suspect. Thirdly, the style of the questioning may be unfair if it is overbearing or 
bullying. 
Establishment of any of these breaches will not automatically lead to exclusion 
of subsequent evidence in either jurisdiction. There is another requirement to be 
satisfied. 
2.1.2. Infringement Causing Unlawfulness or Unfairness 
As has been argued in Chapter Five, both unlawfulness and unfairness concepts 
require ignorance of technical breaches; the right in question is no exception. The 
main reason for this is that the exclusion of evidence on the grounds of merely 
technical improprieties is likely to erode public confidence in the legitimacy of the 
verdict. One should notice that the most common forms of technical violations are 
31 [1993] Crim. L. R. 685. 
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made in good faith. However, the existence of good faith cannot be conclusive in that 
a premium is not placed on ignorance and the legitimacy of the verdict may still be 
harmed. 
Given the importance of the right in question, breaches of it may, and should, 
only be overlooked in exceptional circumstances. As far as Turkish law is concerned, 
the infringements will normally constitute unlawfulness; a justification should be 
needed if the judge considers the impropriety was excusable. Similarly, it is now well 
established in English law that failure to comply with the requirement of the 
involvement of a legal adviser amounts a serious inroad on a suspect's rights. In R. 
v Walsh", the Court of Appeal held that a non-technical breach of the suspect's pre- 
trial right to legal advice will prima facie have an adverse effect on the fairness of 
proceedings but that the court must consider in each case whether that effect is such 
that evidence should be excluded. It appears that exclusion, in either jurisdiction, will 
depend on the extent to which the infringement undermines the functions, or 
underlying rationales, of the right. 
Several functions of the involvement of a legal adviser at the police station 
may be identified. " Besides safeguarding, to some extent, the suspect against the 
36(1990) 91 Cr. App. R 161. 
" As far as the police are concerned there are even considerable advantages in 
having a legal adviser present; the legal adviser may improve communications between 
police and the suspect by explaining the situation and technicalities of law to the 
suspect and the police. Dixon quoted from one officer who said that "most prisoners 
are brain dead and we get more sense out of them if they've got a solicitor". 
-Dixon, 1991, "Common Sense, Legal Advise and the Right to Silence", Public Law, 233. p. 240-. Furthermore, where unfounded allegations of police malpractice are raised or 
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risk of abuse of his person and dignity, it will provide psychological support for the 
citizen whether he is a witness or a suspect. Being deprived of such support, even in 
the absence of any abuse of his person or dignity which is likely to cause 
involuntariness, may itself be adequate for unlawfulness in Turkey and may cause an 
adverse effect upon the fairness of proceedings in England. The reason for this is that 
false or misleading admissions are likely to arise in the absence of a legal adviser. It 
may be argued that the suspect made a false or misleading admission as a result of his 
assumption that something had to be said in response to police questions, but at the 
same time being uncertain as to what to say. This may be particularly true in England 
following the new-style caution". The core of the argument here is that the absence 
of a legal adviser may cast doubt as to the reliability of a confession. 
Further, it facilitates the fact-finding function of the court in attempting to 
assess what occurred during police questioning, how effectively the suspect was 
informed of his rights and how well protected he was from adverse manipulation of 
his statement. As far as this function is concerned the legal adviser is an independent 
the accuracy of incriminating statements is challenged, the presence of a legal adviser 
as unbiased witness will protect officers against public criticism, official complaints 
or disciplinary proceeding against them, and will give weight to police evidence. This 
function of legal adviser may be particularly important in interrogations which are not 
tape-recorded. One may perhaps find this rather naive given the fact that not all legal 
advisers came near these standards. But the solicitor in England is assumed to be an 
officer of the Court: R. v Samuel, 87 Cr. App. R. 232, at p. 242, who often has to 
make decisions which put considerations of justice above his duty to the lay client. 
The new caution reads, 
"You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your 
defence if you do not mention when questioned 
something which you later rely on in court. Anything 
you do say may be given in evidence". (Code C 10.4) 
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witness and validatory of the result of the police interrogation. Where there is dispute 
between the prosecutor and the suspect as to whether an admission took place or 
whether the suspect was tricked into providing the evidence, non-involvement of a 
legal adviser will deprive the court of the chance "to get to the bottom of thingS"39 
and will also deprive the suspect from telling his side of the story with the support 
of a witness. Had the right in question been observed, this would not have been the 
case. Therefore, in such a case, disputed evidence should be excluded in Turkey, but 
not necessarily in England since the conflict may be resolved by tape-recording. " 
Furthermore, one should acknowledge that, because of unfamiliarity with the 
rules of evidence and substantial criminal law, even the intelligent and educated 
layman has few and sometimes no skills when confronted with the police. The 
involvement of a legal adviser may, therefore, help the suspect to give their account 
coherently in the face of police questioning and may remind the suspect of his rights 
such as the privilege against self incrimination, the length of time he can be held 
without being charged etc. All this is likely to provide the suspect with a more 
advantageous legal position at trial. Having said that, in some cases the prosecution 
may contend that the legal position of the suspect at the trial would not have been 
better even if his right to access to legal advice had been observed. Deciding upon 
the plausibility of such an assertion requires the court to engage in a hypothetical 
inquiry into whether compliance with the right to legal advice would have put the 
suspect in a better position in a subsequent rial. 
Birch, 1989, "Commentary on R. v Walsh", Crim. L. R. 822. 
R. v Parris (1989) 89 Cr App. R. 68. 
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Such a dispute arises, firstly, in the context of the right to silence. For 
example, courts may face the defence's submission that had the suspect's right in 
question been observed he would have been advised to exercise his right to silence and 
thus confession evidence would never have been emerged. " Alternatively, a 
submission, where silence has evidential value, may be made to the effect that if the 
suspect had legal advice he would not have remained silent. The poor quality of legal 
advice offered to the suspect may lead the suspect to speak in cases where silence 
would be more favourable and vice versa. In cases where active or passive breaches 
are involved, it is never possible to state with certainty what kind of advice the legal 
adviser would have given in a particular situation. Therefore, the task of the judge is 
to weight the plausibility of different hypothetical speculations. For instance a 
suspect's refusal to say anything after the arrival of the solicito, 41, or the confused 
or emotional position of a suspect would be reasons for concluding that the suspect 
would have been advised to stay silent had the legal adviser been present at the prior 
interviews. 
As far as English law is concerned, after the enactment of the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994, which enables the drawing of adverse inferences from the 
suspect's silence in the face of police questioning, situations in which silence would 
have been advised may be expected to be limited. As a natural consequence of this, 
testimony from the adviser to the effect that he would have advised the suspect to 
remain silent is likely to be less convincing. That is not to say that silence would 
41 R. v Samuel [1988] 1 Q. B. 615. 
" R. v Parris (1989) 89 Cr. App. Rý 68, at p. 73. 
306 
never be advised after the new provisions came into force. The particular 
circumstances of the case may still justify the submission that, had the right to legal 
advice been complied with, the suspect would have been advised to remain silent. To 
illustrate, speaking may cause greater harm to the suspect than remaining silent, or the 
questioning, though pertinent to the alleged offence, may be directed to facets of the 
43 
event which may appear to fall outside the provisions of the new Act. 
Of course, it does not follow that the suspect would necessarily take the 
solicitor's advice to remain silent. Even had a solicitor been present and advised the 
suspect not to speak, it is not certain that the suspect would have acted upon such 
advice. Factors such as the suspect's early consent to be interviewed in the absence 
of a legal adviser and his subsequent admission of responsibility in the presence of a 
legal adviser powerfully indicate that the solicitor's advice to say nothing would not 
have changed his mind. "' That is to say that if the evidence had been obtained in any 
event, infringement of the right to legal advice is no more than a technical breach. 
Secondly, the prosecution may contend that the presence of a solicitor would 
not add anything to the suspect's knowledge of this rights. In the case of R. 
Sanuse', where a passive infringement of the suspect's right in question occurred, 
the Court of Appeal expressed the opinion that since the suspect was unfamiliar with 
"' Silence may not cause adverse effect in circumstances which has not be 
specified by the provisions 34,36 and 37. See Chapter Six 3.4.2. 
" R. v Anderson [1993] Crim. L. R. 448; see also following commentary by Professor Birch. 
" [1992] Crim. L. R. 43. 
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the rights of a suspect in that he was a foreigner and had no previous convictions, 
admitting the evidence obtained as a result of that breach would have an adverse effect 
upon the fairness of proceeding. In another case, however, the suspect's previous 
convictions and his answers, prior to his alleged confession, to police questions in the 
form of "no comment" lead to the conclusion that the presence of a solicitor would 
add nothing to the suspect's knowledge of his rights, and therefore admission of the 
evidence obtained in breach of the right in question would not lead to unfairness. " 
Three assumptionsP may be identified behind the Court of Appeal's recognition of 
what I call the "no contribution exception". Firstly, the function of legal advisers is 
limited to advising silence. The inevitable conclusion of this assumption is that if the 
suspect knows his right to legal silence, breach of the right to legal advice functionally 
will not lead to unfairness. However, one can hardly justify reducing the function of 
legal advisers to advising silence. 48 Secondly, the knowledge of the right is 
equivalent to knowing how to exercise it well and effectively. If this was so, the 
involvement of a legal adviser would not be needed at all in the first place, because 
the suspect's rights, including the right to silence was already being cautioned by the 
police. Thirdly, in the words of Hodgson, "once given, legal advice need not to be 
" R. v Dunford (1990) The Times, 16 March, (CA). A similar decision was 
reached in the case of R. v Alladice (1988) 87 Cr. App. R. 380 where the suspect 
required a solicitor only to ensure that the police acted properly, not to obtain legal 
advice. 
"' Two of them was mentioned by Hodgson, 1992, "Tipping the Scales of Justice: 
The Suspect's Right to Legal Advice", Crim. L. R. 854, at p. 859. 
" Dixon identifies many occasions in which silence will not be advised- Dixon, 
supra note 37, p. 233-. The infringement of the right to legal advice may even lead 
to exclusion of the fact of silence in that if the suspect had legal advice he would not have remained silent. 
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renewed; it applies to the future as much as the presentiv. 49 It is, however, hardly 
possible to give legal advice which does not change depending on the changing 
circumstances of the case. Thus, it seems to the researcher that the notion that the 
presence of a solicitor would add nothing to the direction and outcome of a police 
interview is seriously open to debate, as an interview in the presence of a legal adviser 
would very likely have been carried out in a markedly different manner. 
Establishing that law enforcement officers or the legal adviser acted in bad 
faith in breaching the right to legal advice constitutes a strong case for exclusion. 
This is not only to conform with the deterrent rationale, but also with the legitimacy 
of the verdict principle. Admission of evidence gained as a result of wilful conduct 
which has deprived the suspect of the right to legal advice casts overwhelming doubt 
on the legitimacy of the verdict. 
2.2. Friends and Relatives (Intimation) 
Under CMUK and PACE all persons who are arrested and held in custody are 
entitled, upon request, to have a friend, relative or other person informed " as soon as 
practicable" that they have been arrested. " The purpose of the right is twofold: 
since it is natural that a detained person's family will be concerned as to his 
whereabouts, some device other than the right to legal advice is required to make sure 
"' Hodgson, supra note 47, p. 859. 
'0 CMUK, 135/3 and Article 19/6 of the Turkish Constitution; PACE 56 and Code C 5.1. 
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his whereabouts can be ascertained. Secondly, the right also serves the indirect 
purpose of facilitating legal advice, in that either the suspect may ask the third party 
to make the necessary arrangements, or the third party may decide for himself that 
legal advice is essential. 
Infringements of the right not to be held incommunicado are generally 
accompanied by breaches of other safeguards such as the right to legal advice. In such 
cases the courts should have little difficulty in excluding evidence obtained 
subsequently. A wrongful denial of notification to a friend or relative itself is unlikely 
to cause exclusion. " In comparing the aims of the involvement of friends or 
relatives to those of the legal adviser, it must be accepted that their functions are not 
entirely the same: unlike the latter, the former's concern is not directly evidential. 
2.3. Appropriate Adults or Compulsory Involvement of Legal Adviser 
Compulsory involvement of an appropriate adult to the criminal investigation, 
particularly to the pre-trial interrogation and identification procedure, is required in 
both jurisdictions where a vulnerable person is involved. " The list of vulnerable 
persons, however, are not exactly the same: in England it includes persons who are 
juvenile under 17, mentally ill, mentally handicapped, blind, visually handicapped, 
deaf, unable to read, and unable to speak"; while in Turkey people considered 
" For the contrary decision see R. v Cochrane [1988] Crim. L. R. 449 (CC). 
52 CMUK 138 and 136; Code C Sections I and 11, Code D Subsection 1.14. 
" Code C, Subsection 1.4,1.5 and 1.6, Code D, Subsection 1.3,1.4 and 1.5. 
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vulnerable include those who are under 18 54 , deaf, unable to speak, or unable to 
defend themselves. 55 The catalogues in both jurisdictions seem to me illustrative 
rather than restrictive. 
The role of an appropriate adult may be performed in England by a relative, 
a guardian, a person who has experience of dealing with mentally handicapped and 
mentally disordered people, a social worker" or as a last resort, an independent 
responsible adult. 5' The appropriate adult should have some empathy for the suspect, 
and thus someone cannot act as an appropriate adult if the suspect objects to his 
presence. " The suspect's legal adviser cannot also function as an appropriate 
adult. " This is the result of the recognition of a distinction between the role of the 
legal adviser and that of the appropriate adult. The main concern of the former is to 
determine the legal strategy to be employed on behalf of the suspect. This does not, 
in general, require any personal experience of the suspect. The concern of the 
appropriate adult, on the other hand, is the physical and emotional welfare of the 
suspect rather than the issue of innocence or guilt of the suspect. In Turkey, the 
boundary between the respective functions of the legal adviser and the appropriate 
` Also, suspects under 15 can only be questioned by the public prosecutor, not by 
the law enforcement officers. The Establishment of Children' Courts Act, Article 19, 
Statute No. 2259 of 7 December 1979, RG No. 16816 of 21 December 1979. 
5' CMUK 13 8. 
56 See Haley and Swift, 1988, "PACE and Social Worker; A Step in the Right 
Direction? ", Journal of Social Welfare Law 355. 
" Code C, Subsection 1.7; Code D, Subsection 1.6. 
58 D. P. P. v Blake [1989] 1 W. L. R. 432. 
" Code C, Notes For Guidance IF. 
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adult is ignored, and thus lawyers are required to perform the role of the appropriate 
adult too. 
60 
The rationale behind the special care for these groups is that they are rightly 
regarded to be potentially more vulnerable to pressure, suggestion, intimidation and 
fear than those who are normal and adult. Indeed, "they may without knowing or 
wishing to do so be particularly prone in certain circumstances to providing 
information which is unreliable 
, 
misleading or self incriminating" 
. 
6' The presence 
of an appropriate adult is likely to decrease the likelihood of any evidence being 
unreliable. The appropriate adult has an important role to play at the police station, 
particularly in any interview he attends. He is not there to act simply as an observer. 
He is also there to advise the person being questioned, to observe whether the 
interview is being conducted properly or fairly and to facilitate communication with 
the person being involved. " 
Given the value of the involvement of an appropriate adult as a fair process 
norm, evidence obtained in breach of the right to the support of an appropriate adult 
is likely to be excluded in both jurisdictions. In Turkey the infringement of the right 
in question is likely to occur spontaneously with the right to legal advice since the 
compulsory involvement of legal adviser as an appropriate adult is required. Thus, 
there can hardly be any justification to excuse the infringement. The Court of Appeal 
60 CMUK 138. 
61 Code CI IB. 
62 Code C, 11.16. 
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has not, so far, hesitated in quashing the judgment of the initial courts where a breach 
of the right in question was involved. " Such a tough line is quite consistent with 
the legitimacy of the verdict principle given the fact that one of the main functions of 
the involvement of an appropriate adult is to filter out unreliable evidence. " 
Evidence obtained in breach of the right in question is likely to be more unreliable 
than one produced in the observance of the right in question. Lack of this function 
alone will provide a very strong reason for excluding any subsequent evidence under 
section 78 of the PACE in England", as it will under article 254 of CMUK in 
Turkey. Failure to observe the requirement in question may even lead to exclusion 
of confession subsequently made by the suspect under the involuntariness test 
examined in the previous chapter. 66 
As far as the type of infringement of the right to the support of an appropriate 
adult is concerned, two forms may be identified. First is the failure of the law 
enforcement officer to procure the attendance of an appropriate adult. All persons at 
risk must benefit from the presence of an appropriate adult in both jurisdictions. Like 
all general rules, this rule may be subject to exceptions. Unlike Turkish law, English 
" Orman Yasasini Ihlal, E. 1993/11595, K. 1993/15592, T. 30.11-1993, [1994120 
Yargitay Kararlari Dergisi (Journal of the Court of Appeal Decisions), p. 298; Kemal, 
E. 1994/2793, K. 1994/3060, T. 7.4.1994, [1994] 20 Yargitay Kararlari Dergisi (Journal 
of the Court of Appeal Decisions), p. 1180. 
" See Chapter Five 3.5.1. 
" R. v Dutton, 1988, Lexis, II November, Unreported, Transcript Marten Walsh 
Cherer; R. v Delroy Fogah [1989] Crim. L. R. 141; R. v Weekes, [1993] Crim. L. R. 
211. 
" R. v Cox [1991] Crim. L. R. 276; R. v Blake (1989) Cr. App. R. 179. 
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law clearly recognises that the police may conduct an "urgent interview" defined in 
Code C with 
-the suspect in the absence of an appropriate adult. The reasons for 
permission to conduct an urgent interview are that delay will involve, "an immediate 
risk of harm to person or serious damage to property". 67 Furthermore, a police 
officer is allowed to ask questions at or near the scene of a suspected crime to elicit 
explanations which if true or accepted would exculpate the suspect and the person at 
risk is no exception. 
68 
Secondly, the mere presence of a person who is not a police officer will itself 
not necessarily lead to the achievement of the objective of the appropriate adult being 
of assistance and being a safeguard to the suspect at risk at the police station. 
Naturally, in some cases an independent person may not be able to meet the function 
of an appropriate adult. One needs to recognise that in such a case there would be a 
clear breach of the right to the support of an appropriate adult. For instance, in the 
case of DPP v Blake" a juvenile was interviewed, contrary to her wishes, in the 
presence of her estranged father with whom the suspect did not wish to have any 
further contact. The only conversation that took place between the suspect and her 
father was for him to ask her if she was all right, to which she did not reply. No 
other conversation took place between them regarding the alleged offence, or the 
reason for her detention. Throughout the interrogation she ignored him. All these facts 
lead to the conclusion that the spirit of the requirement of an appropriate adult's 
117 Code C, Annex C, para 1. 
"R. v Weekes[1993] Crim. L. R. 211; R. v Maguire (1990) 90Cr. App. R. 115. 
" (1989) 89 Cr. App. R 179; 153 J. P. 425. 
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involvement was breached and therefore it is hardly possible to claim that the 
interview was conducted in the presence of an appropriate adult who fulfils the 
objectives described in Code C. Similarly, in the case of DPP v Morris" the issue 
was whether the manager of the children's home, who notified the police of the 
alleged offence, was a suitable person to play the role of the appropriate adult. The 
independent person(manager) acting as an appropriate adult was not keen to approach 
the suspect for any advice and therefore he did not attempt to converse privately with 
the suspect. These circumstances are naturally capable of raising doubt as to whether 
the appropriate adult was on the suspect's side, and consequently whether the 
requirement of somebody with the vulnerable suspect's interest in mind and aware of 
his duty to advise the suspect was satisfied. More recently, the question was raised as 
to whether a suspect's mother who was herself entitled to the protection of an 
appropriate adult because of her mental handicap was capable of fulfilling the role of 
appropriate adult. The divergency of medical experts' opinion on the matter enabled 
the judge to choose the opinion that she was able to act as appropriate adult despite 
her illness. " The problem in this case is primarily a medical rather than legal one. 
Firm judgment by medical experts stating whether she could appreciate the gravity of 
the situation in which the child was placed and could give appropriate support to the 
suspect would very likely have been respected by the judiciary. 
"' Lexis, 1990 
, 
transcript by Martin Walsh Cherer, 8 October. 
" R. v W. and another [1994] Crim. L. R. 130. 
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2.4. Custody Officer and Republic Prosecutor 
The systems of criminal procedure in England and in Turkey reflect two 
different methods of regulating events before the trial. In England, the pre-trial stage 
is left entirely in the hands of the executive officer 
-the police-, whereas in Turkey the 
pre-trial stage of criminal procedure is subject to the control and guidance of the 
republic prosecutor. In spite of this fundamental difference, traditionally in both 
jurisdictions police powers in the preliminary stages of a criminal investigation were 
considerably large. By introducing the PACE and the CMUK, both countries 
attempted to protect the interests of the suspect and that of the public to the extent to 
which they think it safe to do so. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, both PACE 
and CMUK seek to achieve better protection of the suspect and to reduce the risk of 
the miscarriage of justice. To that end a legal official (the republic prosecutor) in 
Turkey, and an officer who is independent of the investigation (Custody officer) in 
England are required to be involved in the investigative process 
. 
71 Both are regarded 
as guardians of the suspect, a kind of barrier to protect him from police pressure. 
Having said that it may be questioned whether either the republic prosecutor or the 
custody officer can ever perform the role of "guardian of the suspect", since, in the 
mind of the suspect, they are inevitably be identified with the police. 
The involvement of the republic prosecutor in the criminal investigation was 
strengthened by the 1992 amendment. Under the present Code of criminal procedure 
72 Article 23 of the 1992 Amendment replacing Article 154 of CMUK; Section 36 
of PACE. 
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the prosecutor supervises the work of the judicial police and gendarmerie. The 
prosecutorial division is in theory a judicial one; prosecutors are magistrates separate 
and distinct from the private bar of defence lawyers (avukats). Their role, inter alia, 
is to control how a suspect is treated by the law enforcement officers during the pre- 
trial investigation. In this respect their function is much wider than that of custody 
officers, who are mainly responsible for ensuring detained persons are treated in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act and Codes of Practice. This comparison is, 
however, more theoretical than real since the prosecutors generally do not attend police 
stations. 
The requirement of the involvement of a republic prosecutor or custody officer 
is mainly related to the general welfare of the suspect at the police station rather than 
in obtaining evidence. Thus the infringement of this requirement does not itself, it 
seems to me, generally cause exclusion in either jurisdiction. It is hardly possible to 
claim, for example, that a person confessed because the prosecutor or the custody 
officer was not involved. Having said that, such a breach may provide the law 
enforcement officers with an opportunity to fabricate or tamper with the evidence. In 
such cases non-involvement of the prosecutor or the custody officer will be followed 
by other improprieties which have a stronger chain of causation with the emergence 
of the evidence. If this is so, there will be little difficulty in excluding the evidence 
both under Article 254 and Section 78. 
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3. Record Making 
The monitoring of the use of powers given to the police will undoubtedly 
provide a safeguard against the mistreatment of suspects and planting evidence. To 
this end, both legal systems require record-keeping of what took place between the 
p4lice and the suspect when they encounter. A variety of recording requirements are 
laid down in both countries for almost all exercises of powers 
. 
7' To illustrate, the 
law enforcement officers in Turkey maintain a detention register which gives full 
information concerning the details of detention. Similarly English law requires 
opening of a separate custody record for every arrested person. 74 All information 
such as the grounds of detention", all visits to the detained perSon76, the times at 
which meals are served to the suspeCt77 
, 
any medical treatmeneg, the time the 
suspect is banded over by the custody officer for questioning79 should be recorded 
as soon as practicable in the custody record. All entries in custody records should be 
timed and signed by the maker. " In exercising any power, not only detention 
conditions, but also every significant action should be written down and the record 
" Articles 99,101,106 and 135 of CMUK; Sections 3,50,60 of PACE and Section 4 of Code A. 
Code C para. 2.1. 
Code C, para. 3.7. 
Code C, para. 5.8. 
Code C, para. 8.12. 
79 Code C, para. 8.12 and para 9.8. 
79 Code C, para. 12-9. 
go Code C, para 2.6. 
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should be signed by an officer who can later be held individually accountable for what 
occurred. The suspect should also be asked to confirm with a signature what occurred; 
if he refrains from doing that the reasons for it should be recorded. The length of this 
study does not, unfortunately, allow exmnination of the consequences of the failure to 
obey all recording provisions. In the following pages, only the infringement of the 
rules relating to interview records will be examined, owing to its importance on 
admissibility of confessions. 
Traditionally, statements of the suspect were not recorded verbatim in either 
country. Rather, investigators summarised them in writing; subsequently, the suspect 
acknowledged the statement's summary. It seems likely that, either deliberately or 
unconsciously, investigators may eliminate aspects of the statement that appears to 
them to be irrelevant, inconsistent or unnatural. One may ask whether this danger may 
be prevented by the requirement that the statement should be acknowledged by the 
suspect who has an opportunity to amend it. This mechanism is unlikely to provide 
an effective guarantee that statements exactly represent what the suspect said, as by 
that time the suspect may come to believe the account or feel that he has no other 
choice. In any event, it seems unlikely that a suspect would often challenge 
omissions. Furthermore, it is a fact that over the years the accuracy of interrogation 
records have been amongst the most controversial issues in criminal justice systems: 
allegations that the police attribute false statements to the suspect have been made for 
many years. " 
" Royal Commission on the Police, Cmnd 1728 of 1962, para. 369. 
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One may suggest as a solution to this problem the adoption of mechanisms 
which offer greater visibility to the circumstances of questioning, such as tape- 
recording or videotaping. Such mechanisms might provide certain safeguards for the 
factfinding process, both by permitting scrutiny of the actual manner of questioning 
and by ensuring the availability of a verbatim record of the interrogation. Equally 
important, such measures would enable the judiciary and the public to make more 
informed judgements about whether existing interrogation practices are acceptable as 
they are or should be reregulated. 
The question of whether police interrogations should be tape recorded has been 
subjected to discussion for a long time in England. As early as 1957 Professor 
Williams suggested routine tape recording of interrogations. 92 In 1972 the majority 
of the Criminal Revision Committee recommended that experiments should be 
conducted to assess the value of tape-recording police interrogations. 93 In 1976 the 
Hyde Committee, which was appointed only to study the feasibility of an experiment 
in the tape recording of police questioning reported that such an experiment was 
indeed feasible. " In 1979, Barnes and Webster undertook a study on behalf of the 
" Williams, (1957-1958), " The Reform of the Criminal Law and of Its 
Administration" 4 The Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 217 at 226; 
also see Williams, 1960, "Questioning by the Police: Some Practical Considerations", 
Crim. L. R. 325. 
83 Criminal Law Revision Committee, 1972, Eleventh Report, Evidence (General), 
Cmnd 4991, paras. 52 and 50; A minority of the three members of the Committee 
went further and suggested that all interrogations in police stations in the large centres 
of population should be tape-recorded, and confessions not recorded when they ought 
to have been should be excluded. 
94 The Hyde Committee, 1976, The Feasibility of an Experiment in the Tape 
recording of Police Interropation, Cmnd. 6630. 
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Royal Commission to examine the cost and organisational implications of taping 
interrogations and to conduct a limited experiment in order to assess the technical and 
operational problems of such recording. Although they identified several practical and 
technical difficulties, they were generally in favour of tape-recording. " Then, the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure adopted the view that tape-recording should 
be introduced on a gradual basis. " Subsequently, it has been stated by Section 60 
of PACE that it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice 
in connection with the tape recording of police interrogations and to make an order 
requiring tape recording of interrogations in accordance with the Code. In pursuance 
of this provision a Code of Practice on Tape Recording (Code E) was issued in 
1988. " 
According to the provisions of Code E, all interviews at the police station 
should be tape recorded. " This requirement, however, is not free from exceptions: 
interviews with suspects in connection with terrorism; interviews with persons 
suspected of offences triable summarily only and interviews with persons suspected 
of espionage under the Official Secrets Act 1989 are not required to be tape- 
recorded. " 
" Barnes and Wester, 1980, Police Interrogation: TMe Recording, Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice Research Study No: 8. 
" Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, supra note 6, para. 4.29. 
" House of Commons, Hansard, vol: 138, July 27,1988, Cols 444-463; House of 
Lords, Hansard, vol. 500, July 28,1988, cols. 443-453. 
" Code E, para 3.1 (a). 
89 Code E, para 3.2. 
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The Code requires that tape recording should be conducted openly "to instil 
confidence in its reliability as an impartial and accurate record of the interview". 90 
For this purpose, the whole of the interview should be recorded on two tapes. 9' One 
of these tapes should be sealed in the presence of the suspect and should be kept 
securely and treated as an exhibit for the purpose of any criminal proceedings. The 
suspect has to be asked to sign the label of the tape. Police officers do not have 
authority to break the seal on Us master Copy. 92 The other copy may be used as a 
working copy to which the police and the defence may have acceSS. 
93 Having said 
that, an empirical study conducted by Baldwin and Bedward revealed that only very 
small numbers of tapes are being played either by courts, prosecutors, and even 
defence solicitors. Instead a transcript or summary of tapes, carried out by police 
officers, has been relied upon. 9' In the light of this finding, the success of tape 
recording requirement would depend on the quality of transcripts or summaries. 
Assessments of the quality of the transcripts by the same authors showed that "a half 
of all summaries cannot be regarded as fair and balanced accounts of what took place 
in the interview". " 
Code E, para 2.1. 
Code E, para 3.5. 
Code E, para 6.2. 
Code E, para 4.1 and 4.15. 
9' Baldwin and Bedward, 1991, "Summarising Tape Recording of Police Interviews", Crim. L. R. 671, p. 672. 
9' A parallel conclusion has also been reached by Baldwin, 1992, Preparin 
Records of Taped Interview, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Research 
Study no: 2. 
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The tape recording requirement applies to interviews at the police station, not 
to interviews elsewhere. Since the word "interview" has been held 96 to include any 
series of questions and answers regardless of however brief and wherever held (on the 
street, in a police car, in a corridor on the way to the interrogation room)", there 
is a need, and indeed a requirement in English law, to record them accurately. " 
Under the Code C para 11.5 the interview must be recorded contemporaneously, 
wherever it takes place, unless this would not be practicable. 
If we turn our attention to the present Turkish position, there is neither a 
requirement for the use of a tape recorder at interviews in the police station, nor a 
requirement for recording of questioning outside the police station. There is, however, 
a duty to make an accurate record of ifade alma (interview) conducted by the police 
at the police station or by a public prosecutor and an accurate record of sorgulania 
(questioning) carried out by a judge. The suspect should be given an opportunity to 
read the records and to sign them to confirm that they exactly represent what he said 
or wished to say. Where the suspect refrains from signing, the reason for such an 
96 R. v Absolam (1988) 88 Cr. App. R. 332 and R. v Mathews, (1990) 91 Cr. App. 
R. 43; Code CI 1A. 
" Code C, 11.13,11.5 ; "Asking questions at or near the scene of a suspected 
crime to elicit an explanation which if true or accepted would exculpate the suspect" does not constitute an interview. See R. v Maguire, (1990) 90 Cr. App. R. 115, R. v Cox (1993) 96 Cr. App. R. 464; see also Code C, Note I IA. 
" The use of hand-held tape recorders would obviously be a greatly improved 
method of recording interviews outside the police station. The use of pocket type 
recorders was suggested by Wolchover and Heaton-Armstrong, 1990, "The Questioning 
Code Revisited and the Flaws Persist", 140 New Law Journal 369-371. The Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice has not ruled out the use of tape recorders outside the 
police station (para I I). 
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action should be noted. " The record should include the place and the time of the 
interview, the names of all those present, and so on. 
Unlike Turkey, tape recording is now a permanent feature of police interviews 
in England. The existing gulf concerning the recording of statements made by the 
suspect in Turkish and English law derives to a large extent from cost objections on 
the Turkish side. This gulf needs closing, yet the trend is in the opposite direction. 
Video taping of interviews is currently at the experimental stage in England and there 
is a possibility of the general introduction of interview video recording. "' This is 
a significant step in opening the interview room to external scrutiny. "' As pointed 
out by Davis, "openness is the natural enemy of arbitrariness and a natural ally in the 
fight against injustice". 102 Thus, there is every reason for the Turkish police to 
follow the same direction. 
The need to record the interview may be overlooked or deliberately ignored by 
the law enforcement officers. Such a failure obviously constitutes a breach of norms 
requiring the accurate record keeping of an interview. As far as the admissibility issue 
9'CMUK 135/7. 
"' See, Baldwin, 1992, Video Taping Police Interviews with Suspects- An 
Evaluation, Police Research Series Paper 1. 
"' Video technology is not free from potential dangers: It has been shown that 
where and how the camera is focused will in itself strongly influence the impression 
that observers have of a suspect. See, Lassiter and Irvine, 1986, "Videotaped 
Confessions: The Impact of Camera Point of View on Judgments of Coercion", 16 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 268. 
lo' Davis, 1969, Discretionary Justice, p. 98. 
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is concerned, a breach of recording provisions may be ignored if there is no dispute 
as to the content of the conversation. In most cases, however, failure to record the 
interrogation is followed by allegations that the interview (ifade alma) or questioning 
(sorgulama) did not take place, that alleged responses to the questions were fabricated, 
or recording was made inaccurately. 
Since the recording requirement is one of the main safeguards against 
fabrication of evidence, the courts in both countries will find little difficulty in 
excluding confessions where there has been a non-technical breach of these provisions. 
Hesitation may, however, arise as to which article or section is to be employed to 
exclude such evidence. 
As far as English law is concerned, in some cases the Court of Appeal took the 
view that failure of the interviewing officer to comply with recording provisions in 
itself may justify the exclusion of a confession under s. 76(2)(b) 103 
. 
As has been 
argued in the previous Chapter, section 76(2)(b) is concerned with involuntariness of 
confessions. To bring this sub-section into operation it should be established that the 
suspect made the confession in consequence of 'something said or done. Failure by 
the interviewing officer to record properly the questioning can hardly lead to an 
unreliable confession because the failure occurs after the confession was made. 
Professor Birch argues convincingly that the concern of sub-section 76 (2)(b) is not 
"' R. v Doolan [1988] Crim. L. R. 747; R. v Chung (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 314 (CA); R. v Joseph [1993] Crim. L. R. 206. 
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about the doubts which may arise as to whether a confession was actually made. 104 
Although this is an issue of reliability in whether the evidence of the police officer 
claiming that the suspect confessed is reliable or not, it is not the kind of reliability 
to which this sub-section is directed. It is doubtless for this reason that the failure to 
comply with recording provisions cannot by itself give rise to the exclusion of the 
confession under s. 76(2)(b), but it may be an indirectly relevant factor, as pointed out 
by Professor Birch, in deciding whether the unreliability arises from 'anything said or 
done'. Since the burden of proof to show that the confession is not obtained in the 
way claimed by defence is upon the prosecution, if a confession was challenged under 
section 76(2)(b), inaccurate recording of the interview is likely to prevent the 
prosecution from proving that it was not obtained in the way claimed by the defence. 
This was the case in R. v Delaney"' in which the issue was whether the methods 
used during police interrogation were capable of giving rise to improper pressure on 
the suspect to confess. It was maintained that, "by failing to make contemporaneous 
notes the officers deprived the court of what was the most cogent evidence as to what 
did happen during these interviews and what did induce the appellant to confess" 106 
, 
and the conviction based on this confession was excluded. 
" Birch, 1991, "Commentary on R. v Chung", Crim. L. R. 624; see also, Profesor 
Birch's Commentaries on R. v Doolan 
-[1988] Crim. L. R. 748- and on R. v Delaney 
- [1989] Crim. L. R. 140- which are the source of much of the comment presented in 
this paragraph. 
los (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 338. 
106 R. v Delaney (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 343; This dictum is confirmed in R. v Joseph [1993] Crim. L. R. 206. 
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In cases where the failure to record the interaction between the law 
enforcement officer and the suspect or to show the record to the suspect afterwards 
occurred, it seems more suitable to employ section 78(l) rather than section 76(2)(b) 
in England and article 254 rather than article 135/A in Turkey. The reason for this 
may be stated by making reference to the object of the rules relating to 
contemporaneous recording. Three concerns, inter alia, of these provisions may be 
identified. "' The first aim is to ensure that suspects were not subjected to improper 
pressure or oppression. The second object is to provide safeguards against inaccurate 
recording or inventing the words used in interrogation. The last but not the least goal 
is to make it difficult for the suspect to make unfounded allegations against the police 
which might otherwise appear credible. All these concems are the result of the more 
general concern of achieving the correct balance of fairness at the pretrial stage 
between the police power to bring offenders to justice and safeguards to ensure that 
these powers are used properly. Non-technical infringement of the recording 
provisions is likely to affect trial fairness in England and cause unlawfulness in 
Turkey. Exclusion of unrecorded interviews should not depend on showing that the 
breach was "flagrant, cynical or even deliberate". log Although such a finding will 
be likely to guarantee exclusion 109 
, 
the mere fact that the interview went unrecorded 
is capable of giving rise to exclusion in that the court will be deprived of the most 
cogent version of what happened in the interview. 
"' R. v Keenan (1990) 90 Cr. App. R. 1, at p. 7. 
"' R. v Barry (1992) 95 Cr. App. R. 384. 
" R. v Canale (1990) 91 Cr. App. P, 1; R. v Ismail [1990] Crim. L. R. 109. 
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One may ask whether failure to record an interview may cause exclusion of a 
subsequent interview which is properly conducted and recorded. This was the issue 
in the English case of R. v Canale" in which the suspect was interviewed on four 
occasions. At two of the interviews he allegedly admitted the accusation. However, 
those interviews were neither contemporaneously recorded nor were the reasons for 
failing to do so was noted. Each of these unrecorded interviews was followed by 
another interview which was properly recorded and in those the suspect repeated the 
admissions allegedly made at the previous unrecorded interviews. It was held that 
breaches of the recording provisions in early interviews not only render them 
inadmissible, they also contaminate later interviews which are properly recorded. 
Indeed, later interviews may have been affected by what took place earlier. Having 
said that, it does not make sense to suggest a universal rule that whenever the 
recording provisions have been infringed in one or more interviews, all subsequent 
interviews should be affected and should therefore be excluded. There needs to be a 
connection between the inadmissible earlier interviews and the properly recorded 
s sequent interviews. III 
Failure to keep a contemporaneous record may derive from the suspect's 
request not to write down or record what he says. In such a situation the English Court 
of Appeal suggested that the interviewing officer should make a note of the content 
of conversation after the event and show the document to the suspect. If he refuses 
(1990) Cr. App. R. 1. 
"' R. v Gillard and Barrett (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 61. In this case there was no 
claim to the effect that promises or other inducements was made in the flawed 
interviews so that their effect may continue in the later interviews. 
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to read or to sign it, a copy of it should be given to his solicitor. "' Failure to 
submit the notes of the interview to the suspect or to the solicitor after the suspect 
declined to be interviewed with contemporaneous recording is capable of resulting in 
exclusion of evidence. ' 13 
The formal recording of interviews entails awareness in the suspect as to the 
fact that the interview is being recorded. In some cases, however, the law enforcement 
officers record a conversation of the suspect without letting him know. The typical 
examples are bugging cells or interception of communications. A comprehensive 
analysis of the admissibility of such evidence, however, deserves a separate 
examination beyond the scope of the thesis. 
4. Time Limits 
Other safeguards to protect the suspect against abuse of police powers may be 
placing limits on the length of time for which a suspect may be detained and requiring 
adequate reviews of detention during that time. Attempts were made by both 
countries' Parliaments to regulate the length and review of pre-charge detention. 
112 R. v Matthews and Others (1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 43. 
R. v Saunders [1988] Crim. L. R. 521. 
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In both countries ordinary suspects may generally be subject to detention which 
may last up to twenty-four hours. "' They are to be brought within this time before 
a judge or a magistrate who either proceeds to arrest or free them. These time limits 
do not apply to all offences; in some cases there may be a need to extend these limits. 
Since detention operates on the necessity principle, the need to maintain the suspect's 
detention further should only be decided after determining that conditions for detention 
continue to exist. 
in England, periods of detention over 24 hours are only possible in the case of 
a serious arrestable, offence. Extra detention of 12 hours may be authorised by an 
officer of the rank of superintendent or above. "' If more time is needed at the 
expiry of 36 hours, the authorization of a magistrate is required. The magistrates may 
extend the period of detention for up to 36 hours a time, but the total duration of 
detention may not go beyond 96 hours(4 days). "" In addition to this, the Act 
requires detention to be reviewed by a custody officer to see whether the grounds for 
keeping the suspect in custody still exist. "' The first review is to occur within 6 
114PACE 41 (1), CMUK 128. One should note that the Turkish Constitution allows 
detention on the authority of the police for up to 48 hours. 1992 Amendment of 
CMUK shortened this period in favour of the suspect to 24 hours. At the present there 
is a conflict between constitutional and statutory provisions. Although the provisions 
of the Constitution are theoretically superior to those of CMUK, provision which are 
more favourable to individuals rather than to the public authorities should have 
enforcement. 
11' PACE 42. 
116PACE 42(10) and 43(l). 
117 PACE 40 (1)(a). 
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hours of detention and subsequent reviews are to be at intervals not exceeding nine 
hours. "' 
In Turkey, the detention period for those suspected of common, individual 
crimes is 24 hours. Those detained for common, collective crimes may be held for 
four days, and detention period may be extended for an additional four days. The 
republic prosecutor is empowered to extend detention for up to four days on his own, 
whereas a further extension of up to eight days is subject to an order by the sulh 
hakimi Oustice of peace) acting on a request of the republic prosecutor. "9 
The European Convention on Human Rights also includes time limits. Article 
5(3) of the Convention requires that individuals who are arrested or detained are to be 
"brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by the law to exercise 
judicial power". The precise meaning of the terms "promptly" and "other officer" 
requires clarification. As far as the former term is concerned, in the case of Egue", 
the Commission declared that domestic law which allows detention for up to four days 
without the decision of a judge or other officer conforms, in principle, with the 
Convention. The matter also came before the European Court of Human Rights: in 
118 PACE 40(3). 
"9 CMUK 128. One should note the existence of different time limits concerning 
the suspect of terrorism. Persons detained for individual crimes which fall under the 
Anti-Terror Act must be brought before a judge within 48 hours, while those charged 
with crimes of a collective, political or conspiratorial nature may be detained up to 15 
in normal times and up to 30 days when a state of emergency is declared. 
120 Appl. 11256/84, dec. 9 May 1988. 
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the case of McGolf "' detention for 15 days without judicial involvement was 
accepted, without any hesitation, as excessive. Furthermore, in the case of Brogan and 
Others v UK"', a detention period of four days and six hours without judicial 
involvement was held to constitute a violation of Axticle, 5(3). More recently in the 
case of Koster"', in spite of finding a detention of 5 days a breach of the 
Convention, the Court avoided pronouncing a firm four-days time limit in response 
to the allegation by the State party that the Convention did not command any specific 
time limit. Thus, these rulings indicate that a period of four days is the maximum the 
Convention permits; detaining the suspect without judicial involvement beyond this 
period is likely to result in an infringement of the Convention. As far as the term 
"other officer" is concerned, it should be interpreted narrowly for two reasons. Firstly, 
since the objective of the Convention is mainly to establish individuals" rights which 
are to be secured by the state, the rights should be interpreted in favour of individuals. 
Secondly, the text of Article 5(3) gives the impression that the authorities should fulfil 
a similar function to that of the judges. Questions may arise as to the position of 
public prosecutors or high-ranking police officers. In the case of Schiesser"', the 
Court held that public prosecutors are not "other officers" in the sense of Article 5(3) 
of the Convention, let alone high-ranking police officers. 
"' Judg. 26 Oct. 1984, E. C. H. R ser. A no: 83. 
122 Jud. 29 Nov. 1988, E-C. H. R Ser. A no: 145-B. 
123 Jud. 28 Nov. 1991, E. C. H. R ser. A no: 221. 
124 Judgment of 4 December 1979, ECHR, Series A, Volume 34. 
332 
The revision of European Convention jurisdiction reveals that English and 
Turkish law both comply with the requirement of the Convention: as has been noted 
above, judicial involvement is normally required within 24 four hours in both 
countries. In some cases, however, detention without judicial involvement may be 
extended for up to 36 hours in England and up to 4 days in Turkey. 
Within these time limits the law enforcement officers may collect evidence of 
every description and, in particular, interrogate the suspect. The infringement of the 
limits constitute an illegal deprivation of liberty. It seems to me that exclusion cannot 
be justified in both jurisdictions solely on the grounds that fixed time limits have been 
exceeded. Instead of counteracting such breaches by prohibiting the use of all 
evidence obtained in violation of the set limits, circumstances of an individual case 
should be given priority. Although it is difficult to draw a just borderline between 
admissible and inadmissible evidence in such cases, some factors may be identified as 
relevant in deciding the admissibility issue. To illustrate, these are, first, the reason 
for excessive detention. Detention for a period exceeding the permitted limits may 
be employed as a tactic to weaken the suspect's insistence of not incriminating himself 
or to gain the suspect's consent to a procedure in which he is unwilling to participate. 
In such cases exclusion should follow. In some other cases, however, explanations 
offered for the excessive detention may reveal that it is only a technical breach. 
Second is the length of the excessive detention. Obviously, a longer excessive 
detention would weigh more heavily in favour of a conclusion that subsequent 
evidence should be excluded. Another relevant factor for consideration relates to 
whether the evidence emerged within or outside the permissible limits. 
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As far as English case law is concerned, it is recognised that prolonged periods 
25 
of detention may be oppressive' , and may affect the reliability of statements made 
by the SUSpeCtI26. Such breaches should also be capable of affecting the fairness of 
the proceeding. Having said that it is extremely rare to find post-PACE cases in 
which infringement of time limits is considered with regard to the admissibility rules. 
one exception is R. v Taylor 127 
. 
The question in this case was whether under 
section 78 the judge should have ruled the evidence of confrontation, which was 
outside the time limits, inadmissible. It was held that since an identification parade, 
group identification, or confrontation was going to happen at some stage in any event, 
detention exceeding permitted limits did not have any effect upon the conduct or 
fairness of the confrontation, let alone upon fairness of the proceeding. Similarly, in 
the case of R. v Canale" the periodical review of the suspect's detention (after six 
hours of detention and subsequently thereafter every nine hours) did not take place 
until 48 hours. Such breaches was not considered by the Court of Appeal as capable 
of having effect in the outcome in a way which was prejudicial to the suspect. These 
two cases emphasise the fact that similar to the breach of the Codes of Practice, not 
every breach of the provisions of the PACE will necessarily affect fairness of the 
proceeding. 
"' R. v Hudson (1980) 72 Cr. App. R. 163; R. v Gowan and Others, [1982] Crim. 
L. R. 821. 
"' Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980, Police Interropation: A Case Study of Current 
Practice, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No: 2. 
- 
"' Lexis, Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Tran. by Martin Walsh Cherer, 12 
Dec 1990; [1991] Crim. L. R. 541; The Times, 11 Jan. 1991. 
121 [1990] 2 All E. R. 187. 
334 
5. Conclusion 
The goal here has been to examine the concepts of unfairness and unlawfulness 
in the context of the specific breaches of safeguards provided for the suspect at the 
police station. Non-extensiveness of the case law on the Turkish side has forced the 
researcher to concentrate on cases raised in the English legal system. It is hoped that 
the discussion in this Chapter has demonstrated that differences between English and 
Turkish law and therefore differences between civil and common law should not be 
exaggerated. In the abstract, the CMUK and PACE's approaches to protecting the 
individual in criminal process appear to have much in common. Despite the 
anthropologists' long recognition that different cultural and political traditions result 
in equally different social values and different approaches towards law and rights", 
both legislations basically adopt the same safeguards. They have in common, inter 
alia, the requirement of record making, the time limits, and the involvement of third 
parties such as legal adviser, friends and relatives, and appropriate adults. A point of 
difference is, inter alia, the type of the recording which drives basically from the cost 
objection on the Turkish side. Another point of difference is the involvement of the 
public prosecutor in the pre-trial investigation in Turkey. This does not, however, 
appear to be an essential difference since it is more theoretical than real. 
"' See Hatch, 1983, Culture and Moralily: The Relativily of Values In 
Anthrol2olga; Herskovits, 1972, Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural 
Pluralism; Bozeman, 1971, The Future of Law in a Multicultural world; Milne, 1986 
Human Rights and Human Divera Ut. 
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It is highly likely that these similarities derive from the adherence of both 
systems to the European Convention on Human Rights: under the Convention, England 
and Turkey are obliged to provide a minimum standard of protection for certain 
human rights and freedoms. 
4 
Implementations of these safeguards by exclusionary machinery are likely to 
follow in both jurisdictions. There are already strong indications that the pre-trial 
stage of criminal investigations will be more closely scrutinised by the courts than it 
has been in the past. This is not to suggest that, upon finding that the law 
enforcement officer had violated the procedural safeguards, courts will automatically 
exclude the subsequent evidence. As has been argued in Chapter Five both 
jurisdictions declined to adopt a mandatory exclusionary rule in favour of a more 
flexible approach. Indeed, it is not reasonable to claim that the PACE or the CMUK 
achieved the final balance in investigating crimes between society's interest in 
repressing crime and the individual's interest in his own personal liberty. The 
particular circumstances of an individual case may require resetting that balance. That 
is to say that unconscious, accidental or trivial improprieties will not be treated in the 
same manner as deliberate and serious ones. Also, in response to social and political 
changes that balance may change over time. Even the guarantees contained in the 
PACE and the CMUK are not static; their meaning and scope is capable of changing 
over time. It seems to me that with these new improvements come a new dimension, 
a new yardstick of reconciliation between the individual and community and their 
respective rights, a dimension which remains to be interpreted and applied by the 
Courts of each country. Obviously in such a process, the objectives of the safeguards 
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gain importance. In other words, in order to justify exclusion in both Turkey and 
England there needs to be a destruction of the functions of the procedural safeguards 
rather than the letter of them. This represents a welcome step in the right direction, 
which is consistent with the legitimacy of the verdict principle. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
Three basic solutions to the problem of the admissibility of improperly 
obtained evidence have been identified. The first is to admit the evidence without 
inquiring as to its origin. The diametrically opposite solution is to exclude all 
improperly obtained evidence. Between these rigid solutions lies a flexible way of 
dealing with the issue: improperly obtained evidence is included in some cases, but 
excluded in others depending of the circumstances of the individual case. With this 
solution the trial judge exercises his discretion which is guided by relevant criteria. 
An examination of the pros and cons of these approaches reveals that the first two 
solutions are extreme, although in opposite directions, and that the flexible approach 
would be the most desirable one to adopt. Indeed, forms of impropriety might differ 
widely in terms of the gravity of the interest violated and in terms of the intensity of 
the relationship between the improper action and the evidence obtaining process. One 
can foresee a continuum in cases of impropriety varying from the insignificant and 
irrelevant to the serious and essential. The difficulty in objectively drawing a line in 
advance between cases which do or do not justify exclusion suggests that a certain 
amount of discretion should be given to the judiciary to determine the matter in 
individual cases. Furthermore, it is argued that the legitimacy of the verdict principle, 
which has been advanced by Professor Dennis, seems to be the most appropriate 
principle to guide the exercise of discretion. One also has to accept that exclusion of 
improperly obtained evidence as a way of ensuring the legitimacy of the verdict may 
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result in some side effects such as protecting judicial integrity, or the suspect, and 
deterring the law enforcement officers from future violations. 
Despite the fact that Turkey and England do not share the same legal tradition, 
a comparison of Turkish and English approaches to the admissibility of improperly 
obtained evidence reveals that there are, to a great extent, similarities in the ways the 
two countries deal with such an issue. 
Traditionally, it was well established as a general rule in both jurisdictions that 
the means by which evidence was obtained was immaterial to its admissibility in 
criminal proceedings. Besides this, dicta were occasionally expressed both in Turkey 
and in England to the effect that some form of exclusionary rule was recognised in 
exceptional circumstances. The extent and the scope of these exceptional 
circumstances, however, were not clear. Recently, both countries have adopted 
express legislative provisions regulating the admissibility of improperly obtained 
evidence: the 1992 Amendment on the Code of Criminal Procedure for Turkey and 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for England. These legislative activities 
indicate that there is agreement between the Turkish and English legal system as to 
the fact that Parliament should take the responsibility for deciding what the rules 
regulating the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence should be. The similar 
attitudes of the Parliaments is a clear illustration of the fact that both countries are 
moving towards a more careful review of the methods of pre-trial investigation.. More 
importantly, the principle emerging in both legislations is that when sanctions, 
disciplinary or criminal, attached to procedural requirements fail to ensure compliance 
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with them, exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of that breach may become an 
option. 
Both legislations mainly include two provisions: one is a general provision for 
any improperly obtained evidence', and one is a specific provision for improperly 
obtained confession evidence. As far as the general provisions are concerned, 
evidence may be excluded in England if it has an adverse effect upon the fairness of 
the proceedings, whereas in Turkey, where evidence is secured "hukuka. aykiri olarak" 
(unlawfully), it is required to be suppressed. The amount of evidence excluded under 
these two provisions may or may not be similar depending on how the Turkish and 
English judges interpret the key words, "unlawfulness" and "unfairness" respectively. 
Although the exact determination of what circumstances must exist before the fairness 
of the proceedings is adversely affected or before the lawfulness of a procedure is 
breached will undoubtedly require decades of jurisprudence, it is submitted that they 
may be interpreted quite similarly in related to providing a flexible solution. 
As far as the Turkish general provision, article 254/2, is concerned, the 
standards of unlawfulness governing the process of obtaining evidence and the 
admissibility of improperly obtained evidence arc two aspects of the same event. 
What determines whether police action is unlawful also determines whether evidence 
obtained as a result of that action is inadmissible. In this respect, there is a slight 
difference between the Turkish and English approaches; unlawfulness arises from the 
' Although England has a third provision [s. 82(3)], the fact that evidence which 
could be excluded under this section may also be excluded under s. 78(l) reduces the function of this section to procedural issues. 
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method used to obtain the evidence, whereas unfairness emanates from the use of the 
evidence at trial. This difference, however, does not remove the possibility that both 
provisions will exclude roughly the same amount of evidence. It is argued that 
unlawfulness is not simply a breach of a normative texture which can be reduced to 
a set of formally defined procedural provisions. A distinction between the notion of 
unlawfulness and the concept of illegality should be made. The latter refers only to 
the infringement of prescribed procedural norms, whereas the former is much wider 
than this. It is true that in most cases unlawfulness and illegality overlaps, but not 
always. Evidence gathered by an unfair or unethical, although not illegal, means may 
be considered as unlawfully obtained. Also, illegality in the way of procuring 
evidence does not have to constitute, at the same time, unlawfulness in that there may 
be circumstances which excuse the illegality. The facts of individual cases will no 
doubt lead to different excusing circumstances. It should be noted that most of the 
excusing circumstances will be the versions of factors taken into account in exercising 
the unfairness discretion. The only difference between section 78 and article 254 
would be reduced to the fact that the Turkish trial judge exercises a discretion to 
include otherwise inadmissible evidence while the English judge exercises a discretion 
to exclude otherwise admissible evidence. The possibility of whether the same amount 
of evidence will be excluded by the operation of these provisions has been tested in 
the context of evidence obtained in breach of procedural safeguards such as the 
involvement of third parties, time limits for detention, or recording provisions. It was 
revealed that under both provisions the decisive factor is the destruction of the 
functions of the procedural safeguards rather than the letter of them. 
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The specific provision in both legal systems regulates the admissibility of 
confessions. As far as English law is concerned, it is generally agreed that the law 
relating to the admissibility of confession evidence has been changed by the enactment 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act; section 76(2) replaced the common law test 
of involuntariness with a dual statutory test of oppression and unreliability. It has 
been questioned in this thesis whether there has indeed been a change in the law of 
the admissibility of confessions or just the illusion of change. It is submitted that the 
test of admissibility employed in section 76 with its reference to "oppression" and 
"unreliability" is not as radical as it first appears. The Parliamentary history of the 
section and the interpretation of it after coming into force by the judiciary clearly 
suggest that section 76 does not represent a break with the traditional English test of 
involuntariness. The Turkish provision, on the other hand, clearly requires the 
exclusion of involuntary confessions. It enumerates a series of improper techniques 
which are likely to create a risk of causing involuntariness. Thus, there is a clear 
consensus between Turkish and English law as to the fact that voluntariness is the 
decisive criterion for the admissibility of improperly obtained confession evidence. 
This study, by revealing remarkable similarities in the treatment of improperly 
obtained evidence, contributes to deepen the belief in the existence of a unitary sense 
of criminal justice. 
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